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Three puzzles motivate this dissertation.  First, how much does Republic Book 
10 contribute to the dialogue’s main argument?  For centuries, commentators have 
found Book 10 to be a puzzling and disappointing conclusion to the dialogue.  The 
second puzzle is the important and still much debated question of whether Plato 
considered the parts of the soul to be independent and agent-like (as ‘realists’ interpret 
the dialogue) or not (as ‘deflationists’ argue).  The third puzzle regards an issue that is 
much less discussed in the literature, namely the Republic’s notion of character.  On the 
one hand, Socrates never launches an explicit inquiry into this subject, and on the other 
hand, the character types displayed in Books 4, 8, and 9 seem idiosyncratic 
caricatures—most people seem not to fit into any of them.  In considering character, a 
fourth puzzle arises.  Through the end of Book 9, Socrates has focused on perfect virtue 
and various forms of vice.  What has been left open, though, is the question of the moral 
status of those people who are decent, but are not people of perfect virtue.  People 
such as this are left undiscussed in Books 1-9.  At the end of Book 9, on my view, 
Glaucon and Adeimantus (as well as many readers) should be left wondering about 






I begin with the second puzzle, namely the nature of soul-parts.  It is important to 
note that a review of the secondary literature reveals that although the debate continues 
to be active, many of the key commentators completely ignore Book 10 in their 
accounts.  I argue, in Chapter 1, that by the end of Book 9 there is good evidence to 
settle on a deflationist reading, but the matter is still open and realists have good 
arguments for their point of view.  I claim, though, that when Book 10 is taken into 
account (as it mostly is not) fresh evidence comes to light to support the deflationist 
position.  Socrates uses tripartition and agent-like parts as a ladder to help the reader 
take a first look into the inside of the soul, but in the end, I argue that he leaves the 
explicitly imprecise account of agent-like soul-parts behind.  The person, not her parts, 
emerges as the only agent of action. 
If this is the case, though, and we are right to take a deflationist view of soul-
parts, then the reader is faced with the third puzzle.  How one should refer to the soul as 
a whole, the true moral agent, in its moral status?  The answer, I will propose, is 
Socrates’ notion of ‘character’; a matter that is much less discussed in the literature.  
Book 4 introduces the perfectly just character type, which is refined in books 6-7 in the 
figure of the Philosopher-King.  Books 8-9 introduce the four character types that 
Socrates says are worth discussing, out of the countless forms of vice.  The resulting 
picture of the nature of character types (e.g. the oligarch, whose soul is dominated by 
an agent-like money loving part) appears unrealistic and unconvincing.  Indeed, this 
picture is even more unconvincing if we leave behind the notions of tripartition and 
agent-like soul parts.  I thus begin, in Chapter 2, to mine the text of the dialogue for a 






9 we have a good notion of character as something that can be described in terms of 
character traits and also in terms of its overall degree of virtue.  Character traits emerge 
as dispositions to act in a particular manner, although we may not act according to our 
dispositions all of the time.  
 But here the reader is faced with a fourth puzzle.  By the end of Book 9 all of the 
discussion of virtuous character has been about perfect virtue, which seems to be 
beyond the reach of most of us.  Therefore, in Chapter 3, I examine Book 10 in regard 
to character, arguing that Socrates has quietly lowered the bar for virtue.  By the end of 
Book 10, I claim, Socrates has made clear that a decent life that will be judged as 
reasonably virtuous is a live possibility for many of us. 
Working on the second, third, and fourth puzzles has provided an answer to the 
first puzzle as well.  Although Book 10 both revisits the question of poetry and also 
opens the question of the nature of the immortal soul, it also provides a critical 
contribution to the main argument of the Republic, namely whether the just or unjust life 
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1.0 Problem  
 Three puzzles motivate this dissertation.  First, how much does Republic Book 
10 contribute to the dialogue’s main argument?  For centuries, commentators have 
found Book 10 to be a puzzling and disappointing conclusion to the dialogue.  
Somewhere around 1150 C.E., Averroes concluded his commentary on the Republic 
after Book 9, saying:  
This then…is the sum of the theoretical statements necessary.... What the tenth 
treatise comprises is not necessary for this science.  For at its beginning he 
explains that the art of poetry has no <ultimate> purpose...This point has already 
been completely explained in another place…After that he also produces a 
rhetorical or dialectical argument in which he explains that the soul is immortal.  
Then after this there is a tale in which he describes the bliss and delight which 
the happy, just souls attain and also what the tormented souls attain…But we 
have made known more than once that these tales are of no consequence.1 
 
Now Averroes’ first claim as to why it is unnecessary to discuss Book 10 (namely, that 
the subject of poetry has already been completely covered) has not stood the test of 
time.  Many commentators have analyzed Book 10 in order to fill out an account of 
Platonic aesthetics in the Republic. And the last claim as to why Book 10 is 
unnecessary (that Platonic myths are of no consequence) has also not stood the test of 
time.  Commentators differ widely on how to interpret Platonic myths, but ignoring them 
is not a typical approach. 
                                            
 
 






 But his overall claim, namely, that the dialogue is essentially complete after Book 
9, has been echoed by commentators frequently, at least up through the end of the 20th 
century.  One hundred years ago, Shorey held the same opinion, saying that Book 10 
was "technically an appendix”.2  Many of the best-known 20th century commentators feel 
much the same way.  Reeve begins his chapter preface to Book 10 by saying “The main 
argument of the Republic is now complete”.3  Annas speaks for many when she says: 
“Book 9 ends the main argument of the Republic, and ends it on a rhetorical and 
apparently decisive note.  We are surprised to find another book added on”.4  She goes 
on to characterize Book 10 as “an excrescence”, “gratuitous”, “clumsy”, “full of oddities”, 
and overall, as a “coda” or “appendix...added to a work essentially complete already”.5   
 On the other hand, many commentators of note have argued that the Republic, 
like many texts, was composed as a ring composition.6  Barney names the inner and 
outer rings A and A’, B and B’, etc.  She goes on to make the critical point that: 
It should be obvious that the recapitulation steps here ((A)–(A’)), presented in 
more or less mirror order, are a matter of “resolution” rather than mere repetition. 
In the case of (B’) and (C’), we might say that the relation of exposition to 
resolution is one of question and answer: How should we face death? Is it 
advantageous to us to be just or not? And, to state the crashingly obvious, the 
answers given in (B’) and (C’) are informed by the intervening core of the work. 
(italics mine)7 
 
                                            
 
 
2 Shorey (1933, 248). 
3 Grube/Reeve (1992, 264). 
4 Annas (1981, 335). 
5 ibid.  White (1979, 246) similarly calls Book 10 “an appendix...and not a fully cohesive one”.  Other 
examples could be cited. 
6 See, for example, Brann (2004) and Barney (2010), who argue that the Republic was composed as a 
ring composition.  Barney (2010, 38) cites many other commentators who have held the same view.   






If Barney’s reading is accepted, and key topics such as these are resurfaced, refined, 
and ‘resolved’ in Book 10 (‘informed by the intervening core of the work’), then it seems 
clear that Book 10 is more than just an appendix.   
In addition to the matter of an overall design as a ring composition, Book 10 
makes important backward references to Books 2-4 (e.g. 10.603b referring back to 
4.436bff, 10.603d-e referring back to 3.387d, 10.612b referring back to 2.359c-360d, 
and 10.612c referring back to 2.367a-e).  These moments in Books 2-4 are certainly 
central moments in the Republic, especially with respect to the superiority of the just life; 
and the Book 10 references back to them, I will argue in line with Barney’s claim, are 
not simple repetitions of what was previously said.  Perhaps, then, Book 10 does indeed 
have something to add to ‘the main argument of the Republic’ (pace Reeve, et. al.).   
 The second puzzle that motivates this dissertation is the important question of 
just how independent and agent-like Plato considered the parts of the soul to be. This 
issue recently has been perhaps debated more than ever.  Some commentators (often 
called ‘realists’) argue that Plato considered the parts to be like homunculi, each 
possessing not only desires, but beliefs and goals as well. Further, on the realist 
account, the parts possess some measure of capacity to reason about how to achieve 
their goals, and to act as an agent in pursuit of them.  Other commentators (sometimes 
called ‘deflationists’) agree that Plato describes internal conflict between different 
motivations and locates them in different ‘parts’ of our psyche.8  Unlike the realists, 
                                            
 
 
8 Just what it means to be a part is discussed in Chapter 1 Section 1.1.  As will become clear, when I use 
the term ‘part’ (with quotes) I’m casting doubt as to whether the ‘part’ in question is (to Shields’ 
terminology) a compositional part (like each bean in my hill of beans) or rather a conceptual part (like 






though, on the deflationist account, those parts do not reason, choose, or act—rather 
the person is the only agent.  In line with the previous puzzle, though, Book 10 has 
mostly been ignored by both deflationists and realists.  Thus, a second question 
motivating this dissertation is whether taking Book 10 into account, instead of ignoring it, 
will further the discussion.  As will become clear, on my view, by the time we get to the 
end of Book 10 there is good support for the deflationist position.  
 If this is the case, though, and we are right to take a deflationist view of soul-
parts, then a third puzzle arises.  How one should refer to the soul as a whole, the true 
moral agent, in its moral status?  The answer, I will propose, is Socrates’ notion of 
‘character’; a matter that is much less discussed in the literature.  At many points in the 
Republic Socrates launches into an explicit inquiry into some specific topic.  Taking the 
subject matter of the above paragraph as an example, in Book 4 Socrates launches into 
an inquiry into the nature of soul parts, saying,  
But this now is hard. Do we act in each of these ways as a result of the same 
part of ourselves, or are there three parts and with a different one we act in each 
of the different ways? (4.436a B). 
 
By contrast with this and other explicit inquires, although character is discussed 
pervasively throughout the Republic, Socrates does not go after a definition of 
character, nor does he launch a localized inquiry into exactly what sort of thing it is.  
Perhaps this is why there is very little secondary literature on the Republic’s view of 
character.  Nevertheless, three times Socrates says or agrees to the statement that 
‘there is one form of virtue and a countless number of forms of vice, four of which are 
worth discussing’.  Those four turn out to be the character types that resemble the 






On the surface it may seem that Plato thinks that, as Gerson puts it, “At maturity, 
whenever this occurs, the person becomes sufficiently like one of the types of soul 
described by Plato in order to be characterized as such”.9   But the perfectly just 
character type (described in Book 4 and refined in Books 5-7), as well as the four 
character types depicted in Books 8 and 9 seem to be very different from the characters 
of a) the people that we see around us, b) the characters (e.g. Thrasymachus, Leontius) 
within Books 1-7, as well as c) the characters depicted in Book 10 (both those in the first 
half of Book 10 and those in the Myth of Er).   
If the five character types noted above are indeed not the Republic’s notion of 
character, then what is?  The deflationist reading of soul-parts that I will argue for (which 
locates location agency in the soul as a whole and not its parts) along with the textual 
fact that Plato has Socrates assign “character” to the soul as a whole, motivates me to 
look back at the entire dialogue from the perspective of what is said about character and 
character types. Thus, in addition to the puzzle of whether Book 10 is indeed an 
excrescence, we have puzzles regarding soul-parts and character types.   
But one new puzzle arises from the consideration of character and character 
types.  By the end of Book 9, as noted above, Socrates has introduced us to the 
perfectly just character type and countless forms of vice, four of worth are “worth 
mentioning”.  But Socrates’ characterization of the character of the perfectly just man 
(and, later, of his introduction of the philosopher-king as the paradigm of the perfectly 
just man) leaves open the question of the moral status of those people who are decent, 
                                            
 
 






but are not people of perfect virtue.  People such as this are left undiscussed in Books 
1-9.  At the end of Book 9, on my view, Glaucon and Adeimantus should be left 
wondering about their own relation to justice and their own moral status. 
In approaching these problems, I will resist the temptation to attack the first 
puzzle (regarding the status of Book 10) directly. Rather I think that by attempting to 
make sense of the other puzzles, we can not only refine our understanding of the 
Republic’s view of soul-parts and character, but also develop an overall view of whether 
Book 10 is a critical part of the overall dialogue, or, rather, an ‘appendix’, ‘excrescence’, 
etc.  
 
2.0 Scope  
 I propose to limit my scope entirely to the text of Republic and secondary sources 
that comment on the Republic.  Without entering into the so-called unitarian / 
developmentalist debate, I am content to accept the notion that Plato might well have 
articulated one view of the soul and its psychology in, say, the Phaedo and a very 
different view in the Republic.   I will therefore not feel obligated to respond to concerns 
that some reading of mine is inconsistent with the account of another of Plato’s 
dialogues.   I will neither labor to demonstrate consistency with Phaedrus, Phaedo, 
Laws, etc., nor will I appeal to those dialogues to evidence my claims.  Rather my 
approach will be exegetical in nature.  My goal is to interrogate the text in order to arrive 
at a new understanding of the Republic’s account of psychology.  By taking Book 10 
into account, I hope to surface additional evidence that will help unravel the puzzles set 







3.0 Thesis  
 Overall, I argue for four theses.  First, in Chapter 1, I claim that a sometimes-
overlooked crucial break in Book 4, coupled with an appreciation of the role of Book 10, 
point to new evidence in support of the deflationist position.  I claim that the person, not 
her soul-parts emerges as the only agent.  I argue that Plato divides the soul into ‘parts’ 
differently at different points in the dialogue, in response to which division best supports 
the argument at any particular moment.  The initial view of soul-parts (explicitly 
introduced by Socrates as imprecise at 4.345b) is overturned, causing us to look anew 
at the dialogue for a non-partite explanation of why a person is the way she is and acts 
as she does.   
Second, I argue, in Chapter 2, that Books 1-9, despite the lack of localized 
inquiry into character, if examined closely give us a good view of the Republic’s view of 
character and character development.  Given the view of the soul as the only agent, the 
notion of character offers an alternative and more realistic explanation than soul parts 
for why people are the way they are and act as they do.  But Books 1-9, I claim, focus 
almost exclusively on perfect virtue, leaving in question the moral status associated with 
the life of the many decent people who do not have that perfect virtue of character.   
Thus, my third claim (argued in Chapter 3) is that in Book 10 Socrates quietly 
sets a lower bar for virtue.  The decent person (often referred to as the ἐπιεικὴς) is 
depicted in Book 10 as having a character that is sufficient for living a flourishing life and 
for being judged favorably by peers and by the gods.  
Finally, I claim that at least a significant part of the solution to the first “puzzle” 






makes decisive contributions to the solutions of other “puzzles.”  Book 10 offers decisive 
evidence for a deflationist reading of soul-parts, and, invoking Socrates’ use of the 
notion of “character” as it does this, it offers a tacit reevaluation of virtue that 
accommodates the non-philosopher’s less than perfect virtue, thereby avoiding 
undermining the decent person’s motivation to pursue virtue as such.  Thus, my fourth 
and overall thesis is that far from being an appendix, Book 10 plays a critical role in 
understanding the Republic’s account of the psyche.  In so doing, it plays a critical role 









Chapter 1: Soul-Parts in the Republic  




Plato’s writings present an early and influential account of human psychology, 
with a special focus on the nature of psychological conflict.10  Several dialogues address 
the problem in depth (e.g. the Phaedo, the Republic, the Phaedrus), but the picture that 
emerges is complex, and appears inconsistent, at least across different dialogues. Even 
if we focus just on the psychology of the soul as presented in the Republic, we still have 
a complex account with discrepancies that are hard to reconcile.  For example, although 
it is clear that Plato is discussing intra-psychic conflict and that he is locating the 
conflicting motivations in different parts of the psyche, the precise nature and number of 
those parts are not at all clear.   
One important and still much debated puzzle is just how independent and agent-
like Plato considered each part to be (irrespective of how many parts there are).  Some 
commentators (now commonly called ‘realists’) argue that Plato considered the parts to 
be like homunculi, each possessing not only desires, but beliefs, and goals as well.  
Further, on the realist account, the parts possess some capacity both to reason about 
                                            
 
 
10The influence of Platonic psychology extends even to Freud, as pointed out by Murdoch (1998, 418).  
"Freud's own clear announcement, made several times, of his debt to Plato...Freud also makes a tripartite 






how to achieve their goals and to act as an agent in pursuit of them.  In essence, realist 
commentators insist that “we should not treat as merely metaphorical or read away 
these attributions of psychological states to parts of the soul.  For better or worse, 
Plato’s moral psychology in the Republic is committed to the idea that every person is a 
compound of agent-like parts”.11  Thus realists are committed to taking as literal the idea 
that parts can act as ‘external agents’, (i.e. agents of actions that manifest themselves 
in the world that is external to the person), and, importantly, also as ‘internal agents’ (i.e. 
communicating with and acting on other parts––one part sometimes ‘compelling’, 
‘enslaving’, ‘obeying’, or ‘disturbing’ another part).   
Other commentators, usually called ‘deflationists’, agree that Plato describes 
internal conflict among different motivations, locating them in different parts of our 
psyche.  Unlike the realists, however, deflationists do not hold that those parts reason, 
choose, or act—rather the only agent is the person as a whole.12  Diametrically opposed 
to the realist rejection of metaphor, deflationists hold that “what is as explicit and 
emphatic as we could wish is the use of metaphors of physical force ... to bring out 
Plato’s conception of parts of the soul as psychic forces that impel or inhibit action.”13 
                                            
 
 
11 Bobonich (1994, 4).   
12 When Plato opens the Republic by having Socrates say “I went down yesterday to the Piraeus…”, it 
seems that the person (Socrates) is the agent of the action.  At other times it seems as if the soul is the 
agent of the action, for example, when Socrates says, “Will the soul ever accomplish its own work well if 
deprived of its own virtue, or is this impossible?” (1.353e).  And at yet other times, it seems as if a part of 
the soul is the agent of action, such as when Socrates says, at 4.442b, "Then, wouldn’t these two parts 
also do the finest job of guarding the whole soul and body against external enemies—reason by planning, 
spirit by fighting, following its leader, and carrying out the leader’s decisions through its courage?”. Now 
this chapter will concern itself critically with whether, on Plato's account, soul-parts are or are not agents.  
But I take it that Plato does not distinguish "the person gets angry” from "the soul gets angry” or from "the 
person gets angry with his soul”.  On my view he uses these three constructions severally as stylistic 
concerns dictate. 






Both the realists and the deflationists have good textual support for their 
positions.  For example, there is a key passage in Book 4 (4.435c-441c) that I call 'The 
Inquiry into Soul-Parts’.  Although the question is by no means closed, on the whole, the 
description of soul-parts in this passage seems more in line with deflationist accounts.  
On the other hand, in another key passage (that I call ‘The Inquiry into Character 
Types’, which begins with 4.441c-445d and then, after the interlude of Books 5, 6, and 
7, resumes with 8.544a-9.592b) the descriptions of the soul-parts seem more in line 
with realist accounts.14  Some commentators, such as Annas, are content simply to 
charge Plato with inconsistency.15  By contrast, most commentators try to argue that 
Plato’s picture is consistent. The realists often apply the language and metaphors from 
the ‘Inquiry into Character Types’ to the understanding of ‘The Inquiry into Soul-Parts’, 
while the deflationists do the reverse.  Jennifer Whiting, on the other hand, offers a 
hybrid solution, which starts from the useful methodological perspective that apparent 
inconsistencies may result from failing to focus on the fact that different parts of the 
dialogue are in fact discussing different things.16  Whiting criticizes both realists and 
deflationists for a “homogenizing conception of what is required for consistency”.  This, 
on my view, is a key insight.  She focuses closely on the different subjects under 
discussion at the different points where soul-parts are described.  She concludes that 
Plato held the souls of just people to lack agent-like appetitive or spirited parts (in this 
                                            
 
 
14 Note that by the above I am identifying what I take to be a crucial break in Book 4, namely 4.441c. This 
will be discussed in depth.  Here I merely note that the division of the Republic into books, or at least the 
10 books we currently have, is not thought to have been done by Plato. 
15 Annas (1981, 135-136).   






she agrees with the deflationists), but the souls of unjust people to have agent-like 
appetitive and spirited parts (and in this she agrees with the realists).  I argue against 
this conclusion, though I do follow her closely from a methodological perspective.   
What I find extremely surprising, though, is that few commentators have 
attempted to use Book 10 to help make sense of the discrepancy.  Many who write 
about Book 10 remark upon the fact that in this final chapter Plato introduces what 
seems to be an entirely new set of soul-parts.  I shall argue that Book 10’s new soul-
parts offer a means of helping settle the question of how we should understand the 
nature of the soul’s parts in the first nine Books.   On my reading, both the first half of 
Book 10 and the crucial break in the argument in Book 4 point toward fresh support for 
the deflationist position.  
Before diving into exegesis, though, some background is needed to provide a 
heuristic framework against which to consider the text.  I will thus begin, in Part 1, by 
considering just what it means to be a soul-part, just what it means to be a realist about 
soul-parts, and just what it means to be a deflationist about soul-parts.  Then, in Part 2, I 
will examine the relevant passages in Books 4, 8, 9, and 10, comparing the text to Part 
1’s framework.  I will argue, in this first chapter of my dissertation, that overall the text 
pushes us toward a deflationist view, especially when Book 10 is not ignored.  Adopting 
the deflationist view, though, poses a problem which needs to be addressed.  On the 
realist view, agent-like parts provide an easy explanation for why we act as we do.  
When I reason that eschewing a third cup of wine is best, but I drink it anyway, realists 
explain this as a combat between reason and appetite, where appetite won in this case.  






seems under-described.  Chapters 2 and 3 of the dissertation will suggest that the 
notion of character provides answer to this problem, while further supporting the 
deflationist reading.  There is also the question of why Plato introduces both the notions 
of agent-like and non-agent-like parts, on the way (on my account) to the notion of 
character.  This question will be taken up in the conclusion, when all of the pieces of the 
argument are in place. 
 
1.1 What Does It Mean to Be a ‘Part’? 
 
Since Plato’s account of the nature of the soul’s parts is a central concern of this 
dissertation, some inquiry is needed into just what, essentially, it means to be a part.  
We will not dive too deeply into mereology, but will attempt at least to suggest some 
distinctions that should be kept in mind as we consider Plato’s text.  In addition, we will 
need to touch on the specific Greek words and grammatical forms that Plato uses in the 
Republic to refer to soul-parts. 
Although mereological concerns have engaged philosophers at least as far back 
as Plato, much attention has been paid to the topic during the past 100 years.17  
Winston, et. al, distinguish six types of parts, which they call components (the handle is 
part of the cup), members (the tree is part of the forest), portions (the slice is part of the 
pie), stuff (the gin is part of the martini), features (paying is part of shopping), and 
places (the Everglades is a part of Florida).18  Clearly different types of parts admit of 
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different types of attributes.  Carbon is part of carbon dioxide (CO2) in a different way 
than paying is part of shopping.  I might go shopping for a shirt and fail to find one that 
suits me; and so paying would not be part of shopping on that occasion.  That carbon is 
part of CO2, though, is not contingent.  Shields offers the distinction between 
‘compositional parts’ (like the beans in a hill of beans, which “are not parasitic on the 
whole for their identity conditions”), and ‘aspectual parts’ (an aspectual part being 
essentially a “property or a feature” of the whole, such as the exterior of the Louvre).  In 
an earlier article, instead of ‘aspectual parts’ he used the term ‘conceptual parts’.19  The 
contingent nature of conceptual parts is well expressed by Pirsig, who describes a 
motorcycle as having two parts, namely, a power assembly (which itself breaks down 
into several parts, one of which drives the bike forward), and a running assembly (which 
also has sub-parts, one of which holds the bike back).  These are conceptual parts.   
But, as Pirsig points out, “You get the illusion that all those parts are just there and are 
being named as they exist. But they can be named quite differently and organized quite 
differently”.20  Similarly, the opening word of the Republic, κατέβην (I went down), is part 
of the Republic, in a very strong sense of the word part.  If an experienced reader began 
reading a copy of the Republic that did not begin with “I went down” (κατέβην), but 
rather began “Yesterday to the Piraeus” (χθὲς εἰς Πειραιᾶ), she would say that part of 
the text is missing, or that the text is defective.  κατέβην, though, is not only a part of the 
Republic, but is also a part of Book 1.  The Books of the Republic are also parts of the 
Republic, but are parts in a much weaker sense.  They might better be described as 
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conceptual parts of the Republic.  Thus the experienced reader knows exactly what I 
mean when I write the words Book 4.  Waterfield, however, in his translation of the 
Republic, divides the work not into ten Books, but into fourteen chapters.21  The section 
that the experienced reader knows as Book 4 (4.419-445e) is present in his text, but 
starts in the middle of Chapter 5, and runs through Chapter 6.    
As will be seen, realists and deflationists differ in how they interpret the nature of 
soul-parts in the Republic.  Realists understand appetite and spirit as parts of the soul in 
a very strong sense.  That these parts are agents, in harmony in just souls and in 
contention in other souls, is a fundamental premise of the realist position.  By contrast, 
deflationists do not need to take spirit or appetite to be parts in a strong sense (though 
some do). For example, on the account of some quite vigorous deflationists, Socrates 
sometimes groups together anger, desire for victory, desire for honor, etc., and 
identifies the group as ‘spirit’.  At other places in the argument, though, these 
deflationists take Socrates to identify anger, desire for victory, desire for honor, etc., as 
‘parts’ of the soul in their own right.  Other deflationists (who might be called moderate 
deflationists), interpret Plato’s soul-parts to be parts in a strong sense, just as realists 
do. For these deflationists, though, the parts have no agency, nor any of the other 
capacities ascribed by realists to soul-parts. 
One way the distinction between strong and weak parts matters to the 
realist/deflationist debate is as follows.  Some deflationists argue that a) soul-parts in a 
strong sense are necessary to the realist position, b) the soul-parts in the Republic are 
                                            
 
 






not, in fact, parts in a strong sense, and therefore, c) the realist interpretation fails.22  I 
have sympathy for this line of argument, but will not be directly pursuing it in this 
dissertation.   
More critical, on my view, is the warning inherent in Pirsig’s comment. When 
Socrates uses the term part (or translators insert it), we tend to think of parts in a strong 
sense.  It is important to remember that Socrates might be using the term ‘part’ in a 
strong sense, but it is just as possible that he is not.  When I want to emphasize that the 
‘part’ of the soul under discussion might be either of these, I will often do so by using 
quotes around the word ‘part’.23 
In addition to mereological concerns, there is the matter of what Greek terms and 
grammatical forms Plato uses to describe the soul’s ‘parts’.  There are several ways to 
express the notion of part in Attic Greek.  Sometimes, for example, Socrates uses the 
term αὐτός (‘thing’) when discussing parts of the soul.24  At other times he uses εἶδος 
(‘form’ or ‘kind’) to refer to soul-parts.25  He also he uses γένος (‘type’, or ‘kind of 
thing’).26  Indeed, Socrates often omits any word for ‘part’ and will use the substantive, 
                                            
 
 
22 Shields (2010), for example.   
23 As Price (2009), for example, does. 
24 For example, Shorey (like Grube/Reeve, Bloom, and others) translates τῷ αὐτῷ, at 4.439b, as ‘part’: 
“οὐ γὰρ δή, φαμέν, τό γε αὐτὸ τῷ αὐτῷ ἑαυτοῦ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμ᾽ ἂν τἀναντία πράττοι”— “For it cannot be, 
we say, that the same thing with the same part of itself at the same time acts in opposite ways about the 
same thing” 
25  For example, Grube/Reeve translates εἶδος, at 4.440e, as ‘part’: “ἆρ᾽ οὖν ἕτερον ὂν καὶ τούτου, ἢ 
λογιστικοῦ τι εἶδος, ὥστε μὴ τρία ἀλλὰ δύο εἴδη εἶναι ἐν ψυχῇ, λογιστικὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμητικόν;”— “Then is it 
also different from the rational part, or is it some form of it, so that there are two parts in the soul—the 
rational and the appetitive—instead of three?” 
26 For example, Grube translates γένη, at 4.441c, as ‘parts’:“ταῦτα μὲν ἄρα, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, μόγις 
διανενεύκαμεν, καὶ ἡμῖν ἐπιεικῶς ὡμολόγηται τὰ αὐτὰ μὲν ἐν πόλει, τὰ αὐτὰ δ᾽ ἐν ἑνὸς ἑκάστου τῇ ψυχῇ 
γένη ἐνεῖναι καὶ ἴσα τὸν ἀριθμόν.”— “We have now made our difficult way through a sea of argument to 
reach this point, and we have fairly agreed that the same kinds of parts and the same number of parts 






speaking of, for example, ‘the better’ to indicate ‘the better part’,27 or uses the partitive 
genitive.28  Finally, there is the most straightforward word for part, namely μέρος.  εἶδος 
can refer to many different things (including the Platonic Forms), and γένος, αὐτός, and 
other ways of signifying parts can similarly have many meanings.  μέρος, though, simply 
means ‘part’ and Socrates sometimes (though not usually) does refer to a ‘part’ (μέρος) 
of the soul.29    
What significance should we place on the word choices that Plato puts in 
Socrates’ mouth?  In some dialogues, the different words for ‘part’ are used distinctively 
and specifically in order to make distinctions.30  However, it is not the case that μέρος is 
used across the Platonic Corpus exclusively to mean a ‘part’ in a strong sense.  For 
example, in the Crito, Socrates speaks of “doing one’s part [μέρος] in endeavoring to 
destroy the laws”.31  Certainly, some commentators point to the fact that Plato seems to 
avoid the term μέρος as evidence that he is not thinking of the parts of the soul as ‘real’ 
parts.32  Their opponents, though, could return to the passage quoted earlier in this 
section (4.436c) and point out that even when Socrates is explicitly discussing parts (i.e. 
part of the man being at rest and part in motion), he does not use μέρος or any other 
                                            
 
 
27 For example, Shorey inserts the word ‘part’ into the two substantives at 4.431a: “ἀλλ᾽, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, 
φαίνεταί μοι βούλεσθαι λέγειν οὗτος ὁ λόγος ὥς τι ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τὸ μὲν βέλτιον 
ἔνι, τὸ δὲ χεῖρον”—“But,” said I, “the intended meaning of this way of speaking appears to me to be that 
the soul of a man within him has a better part and a worse part”. 
28 For example, Shorey inserts the word ‘part’ into the partitive genitive at 4.436c-d, into both of the 
‘μέν/δὲ’ clauses: “τὸ μέν τι αὐτοῦ ἕστηκε, τὸ δὲ κινεῖται”— “a part of him is at rest and a part in motion”. 
29 For example, Shorey translates μέρους, at 4.444b, as ‘part’: “ἐπανάστασιν μέρους τινὸς τῷ ὅλῳ τῆς 
ψυχῆς”— “the revolt of one part against the whole of the soul”. 
30 Thus in the Statesman, although εἶδος and γένος are used somewhat interchangeably to mean form or 
type or kind, μέρος is used exclusively to mean ‘part’.  Here I am following Cooper (1997, 297 n8).   
31 As pointed out by Shields (2010, 166).   






explicit ‘part’ word.  On the whole, it seems imprudent to me either overly to rely upon or 
utterly to ignore Plato’s word choices for ‘parts’ of the soul. Therefore, none of the 
claims of this chapter will rest on Plato’s choice either to use or to avoid the explicit 
word for ‘part’ in referring to the soul.  Nevertheless, as we work through the exegesis of 
the passages related to soul-parts, we will keep our eyes on the terminology. 
Finally, before leaving the subject of parts, let me note that in addition to the 
nature of parts and the language of parts, the number of parts that centrally comprise 
the soul will be a key issue.  Realists will want to insist that there are three main parts of 
the soul, even if there may be some others, “in between” (4.443d).  For realists, reason, 
spirit, and appetite as agent-like parts are important in understanding both the city-soul 
analogy and the character types of Books 4, 8, and 9.  Deflationists, on the other hand, 
interpret Plato to hold that the person (or the soul) is the only agent; and so Socrates is 
at liberty to sometimes describe the soul as tripartite, while at other times describing it 
as bi-partite, multi-part, or incomposite, without jeopardizing his account of agency.  
This issue, however, will best be addressed in Section 2, when we examine the text in 
detail.  I will ultimately argue that the deflationist position seems better supported (and 
therefore that the three canonical parts are not as prominent as realists contend).  I will 
consequently need to offer an suggestion as to why Socrates introduces tripartition. 
This, though, will need to wait for the conclusion, where we sum up of the view of 










This dissertation does not argue for or against alternative methodologies for 
interpreting Plato, but a few words are in order regarding how I intend to approach the 
exegesis.  First, I choose to remain entirely within the confines of the Republic.  I do so 
partly in order to manage scope and partly because I believe that the integrity of a 
dialogue as a unit permits interpretation of (say) the psychology of the Republic, without 
detailing how that psychology fits with the psychology of the Phaedrus, Phaedo, etc.  
Nothing here relies on an ordering of the dialogues, as insisted on by many so-called 
‘developmentalist’ commentators, for example, Vlastos.33  I do, though, follow Altman 
(and Vasiliou, Miller, Pappas, and others) in paying careful attention to the distinction 
between the ‘inner frame’ (i.e. the depicted interaction between Socrates and the 
interlocutors) and the ‘outer frame’ (i.e. the reader of the Republic reading Plato’s 
writing).34  
The words that Plato has Socrates ‘utter’ are absorbed by both the interlocutors 
in the inner frame and the readers in the outer frame.  However, the listener in the inner 
frame and the reader in the outer frame (especially the careful re-reader, who is reading 
Socrates’ words having already read the entire dialogue and perhaps the other Platonic 
dialogues as well) ‘experience’ those words very differently.  The reader in the outer 
frame is aware that she is reading the words that Plato has written, whereas, if we enter 
into the dramatic spirit of the inner frame, the interlocutors hear Socrates’ words as his 
                                            
 
 
33 See Vlastos (1991) Chapter 2. 
34 I adopt the terms ‘inner frame’ and ‘outer frame’ from Vasiliou (1999, 465 and 2008, 74).  See also 






own and hear them as they are ‘spoken’.  So, for example, when Socrates completes 
the picture of the just person at 4.444a, he says to the interlocutors: “Well, then, if we 
claim to have found the just man, the just city, and what the justice is that is in them, I 
don’t suppose that we’ll seem to be telling a complete falsehood”, to which Glaucon 
replies, “No, we certainly won’t.”  But, by the time Socrates has finished the ‘digression’ 
of Books 5,6, and 7, Glaucon and the other interlocutors have been brought to a 
different state of understanding.  Thus at 8.543c, Glaucon says “you were talking as if 
you had completed the description of the city. You said that you would class both the 
city you described and the man who is like it as good, even though, as it seems, you 
had a still finer city and man to tell us about”.  Thus, at the moment of reading 4.444a, 
the careful re-reader in the outer frame is in at (at least) the same epistemic state that 
Glaucon is in at 8.543c, and for that reason the outer frame reader might interpret 
Socrates’ words at 4.444a quite differently than Glaucon will.  In essence, the 
interlocutors are ‘listening’ to Socrates in real time, whereas the re-readers in the outer 
frame are ‘reading’ Plato, aware of both his silent presence and, at each moment, of the 
entire arc of the work.  This difference opens space for the reader to ask questions of 
the text and to interpret Socrates’ words very differently than, say, Glaucon does.   
Another matter of interpretive methodology that will be crucial in this dissertation 
is the attention I will pay to whether, at any moment in the text, Plato has Socrates 
employ metaphorical tools or rather has Socrates speak in what I will call ‘direct 
speech’.  Plato’s metaphorical tools are many, including simile, analogy, image, 






many things, including the parts of the soul.  For example, at 4.440c-d, Socrates 
describes spirit in the following way:  
does not his spirit … make itself the ally of what he judges just, and in noble 
souls it endures and wins the victory and will not let go until either it achieves its 
purpose, or death ends all, or, as a dog is called back by a shepherd, it is called 
back by the reason within and calmed. Your similitude is perfect, [Glaucon] said, 
and it confirms our former statements that the helpers are as it were dogs subject 
to the rulers who are as it were the shepherds of the city. 
 
Here it is clearly up to us to decide in just which aspects spirit and reason are similar to 
the dog and the shepherd.  And we need to interpret in just which aspects spirit is like 
its analogue in the city, namely the auxiliaries.   
By contrast with simile above and other types of metaphor, though, sometimes 
Plato has Socrates use what I call ’direct speech’ that is to say, places where Socrates 
(or an interlocutor) says ‘X’ about ‘Y’.  For example, sometimes Socrates ‘directly’ 
ascribes a particular attribute to a particular soul-part.  Thus, at 9.581a, Socrates says 
“of the high-spirited element, do we not say that it is wholly set on predominance 
[κρατεῖν] and victory [νικᾶν] and good repute [εὐδοκιμεῖν]?”  Of course there is some 
measure of metaphor at play whenever we describe internal states using the language 
of the perceptible world. Nevertheless, Socrates, here, without any apparent metaphor, 
ascribes goals (of predominance, victory, and good repute) to the spirited part.  
Similarly, at 10.608d, Socrates says that “our soul is immortal” (ἀθάνατος ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ).  
Certainly even direct speech demands interpretation.  Often Plato has Socrates use 
direct speech to say things that are intentionally inaccurate, are contrary to Socrates’ 
own belief, are ironic, etc.  These passages push us to consider alternative 






examination and interpretation, sometimes Plato must mean for Socrates’ statements to 
mean just what he says.  Socrates’ last words in the Republic, at 10.621c, are  
we'll always hold to the upward path, practicing justice with reason in every way. 
That way we'll be friends both to ourselves and to the gods while we remain here 
on earth and afterwards—like victors in the games who go around collecting their 
prizes—we'll receive our rewards. Hence, both in this life and on the thousand-
year journey we've described, we'll do well and be happy. 
 
It is possible that Plato does not really believe that ‘if we practice justice with 
reason we’ll do well and be happy’, but given the passage’s consistency with so much 
of the Republic, I at least am inclined to interpret this as an example of Plato having 
Socrates say just what he (Plato) means, in direct speech.  
As I move through the exegesis, I will take careful note of where Socrates does 
and doesn’t describe soul-parts as agent-like in direct speech.  And I will take note of 
where the metaphors might invite Glaucon or the reader to ascribe agency to the soul-
parts.  But I will also leave open the possibility that Plato is making space for the careful 
re-reader to draw a different conclusion and I will not draw my own conclusions until I 
have worked through all of the relevant passages in the ten Books of the Republic. 
 
1.3 Distinguishing the Realist Position 
 
As noted earlier, in this chapter I argue that Socrates appears inconsistent in his 
description of the soul (albeit, as I will finally suggest, intentionally and with good 
reason).  Certainly, commentators differ over translation, interpretation, and a host of 
other matters. Nevertheless, even if there is agreement about the translation of a 






nature of the parts of the soul) we still need to know what precisely counts as realist or 
deflationist, if we are to make exegetical progress. 
Of course, the various realist commentators do not each present the same 
picture of the nature of soul in the Republic.  Thus one ‘realist’ will essentially disagree 
with another ‘realist’, on what it takes to count as a realist (and similarly for 
deflationists).35  Naturally, there is no authoritative definition for what constitutes either 
position.  Notwithstanding these obstacles, in this section I will summarize what I take 
(for the purpose of this dissertation) the realist position to be.     
In distinguishing the realist and deflationist positions, I am going to focus on 
‘lower soul-parts’, namely those ‘parts’ of the soul other than reason.  Certainly the 
status of reason as a soul-part is problematic and worthy of discussion.  Reason 
appears to be both a soul-part (with a distinctive desire for knowledge [9.581b], and 
concern for the good of the whole soul [4.441e]), and at the same time it appears to be 
the essence of the soul as a whole (e.g. in the Glaucus passage (10.611b-e), where 
reason without other encrusted parts emerges as the true soul, or in the discussions of 
‘weakness of will’ (ἀκράτεια), where whether ‘I' do or do not get the better of myself, ‘I' 
am always reason). Fortunately, though, despite the inherent value of an inquiry into 
Plato’s view of reason, it is not necessary for the purposes of the realist/deflationist 
debate that is the subject of this chapter.  If appetite and/or spirit, for example, can be 
shown to be agent-like, then we must endorse the realist interpretation.  But if both 
appetite and spirit can be shown to not be agent-like, then the arguments of the realists 
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can be rejected, without settling the status of reason, since none of them has argued 
(nor, I think, would agree) that a realist interpretation is satisfied by reason alone being 
agent-like.  Distinguishing me from my reason is complex and fortunately is not 
necessary to the argument of this chapter.36 
What, then, are the criteria for a soul-part to count as realist?  Chris Bobonich 
offers perhaps the most widely cited realist definition of the nature and attributes of a 
soul-part.37  For Bobonich, each soul-part “has its own desires (ἐπιθυμίαι) and can wish 
and want (βούλεσθαι and ἐθέλειν)”.38  Further, each part “has conceptual and cognitive 
capacities”, namely, “beliefs”, “practical goals”, “can engage in reasoning”, and “can 
communicate with the others; one part can persuade another and they can all agree”.39  
In essence, the parts are, as Bobonich and others put it, “agent-like”.40  
While the literature on agency is large, a common view is that a human agent is 
the agent of an event (E) if he performs an action that is a sufficient causal contributor 
to E.41  In simple terms, an agent is one who acts.  What, though, does it mean for a 
soul-part to be an agent?  The question is difficult in cases of external agency.  Imagine 
that I have an appetite for a beer.  Although part of me wants to eschew the beer, I 
decide to drink it, and do so.  Obviously my appetite is not the agent of the actual 
drinking, but is it the agent of the overall action in the sense of being a sufficient causal 
                                            
 
 
36 Gerson (2003, 106) offers a persuasive argument that you can easily distinguish a person from his 
appetites or emotions, but one “cannot so easily distinguish between the person and his thinking, 
especially in matters related to action”.   
37 Bobonich (2002, 219-220, 54).   
38 ibid., 220. 
39 ibid., 220. 
40 ibid., 219.  






contributor?  Even if we take it that the decision to drink is a sufficient causal contributor 
to drinking the beer, it can be very difficult to distinguish, in Plato’s text, whether 
Socrates presents my appetite or ‘me’ as the decision maker.42  It is correspondingly 
difficult to distinguish whether ‘I’ am or ‘my appetite’ is the agent of the action of 
drinking.  Fortunately, though, Socrates presents us with many easier examples—cases 
of what I call ‘internal agency’.  If my appetite acts on (e.g. persuades) some other part 
of my soul (say, my spirit), then it would seem clear that this counts as my appetite 
acting as agent.  Without extensive discussion, I will take it to be the case that, as 
Bobonich says, agent-like parts such as this are “treated as the ultimate subject of 
psychological affections, activities, and capacities that are normally attributed to the 
person as a whole”.43  
If we interpret a passage to attribute beliefs to the lower soul-parts, that passage 
may or may not count as realist depending on what we mean by beliefs.  Carone, 
Bobonich, and Irwin, for example, ascribe to the lower parts what I would call ‘strong’ 
beliefs.44  For these three commentators, appetite and spirit have beliefs about the 
good, are concept-possessing, and have a self-conception.  A passage that describes 
lower soul-parts as possessing ‘strong beliefs’ will count as realist.  Other 
commentators, however, (e.g. Moss and Lorenz), give the lower parts beliefs, but of a 
very different sort.45  For these two, appetite and spirit have cognitive but not rational 
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43 Bobonich (2002, 219). 
44 Carone (2001, 123).  Bobonich (2002, 254). Irwin (1995, 219).       






capabilities and lack the capacity to form beliefs about the good or to possess concepts.  
Moss and Lorenz interpret Plato to mean that certain objects appear good to our 
appetite or spirit and those parts of us ‘believe’ that those objects are good just in the 
sense of accepting the appearance.  A passage that ascribes weak beliefs of this sort to 
the lower soul-parts would not, on my view, count as realist.46   
 Whether or not mere ascription of desires to a soul-part counts as characterizing 
that soul-part as agent-like is a vexed question.  Indeed, even whether Socrates is 
arguing that soul-parts have desires is unclear.  It is difficult to distinguish whether 
Socrates (for example in Book 4) is arguing, that a) ‘I' desire to drink in virtue of a part of 
me called appetite, or rather that b) my appetite desires to drink—and much ink has 
been spilled on this question.47  Part of the problem stems from a mixing of the physical 
and psychical.  Certainly when the body gets parched, the person and the person’s soul 
are thirsty.  But it is hard to tell whether Socrates is saying that a) the soul is thirsty on 
account of its appetite, b) the soul is thirsty with its appetite, or c) the appetite is itself 
thirsty.  Further, even if we do take it to be the case that Socrates is ascribing desires 
(say, the desire to drink) to soul-parts (say, appetite), it is unclear whether this should 
be cited as showing the part to be realist.  Certainly some strong deflationists deny that 
the parts of the soul have their own desires.48  Other deflationists are content to ascribe 
desires to the individual parts, but still deny that those parts are agent-like.  Because it 
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relevant literature, but will turn out not to matter to my argument. 
47 I find Price’s discussion in Mental Conflict, expanded in his later 2009 article most illuminating.  He, 
Bobonich (2002), Lorenz (2006a), Irwin (1977), Burnyeat (1976) and many others weigh in on the issue of 
whether ‘I’ or ‘my appetite’ is the subject of my thirst. 






is so difficult to assess whether Socrates is giving soul-parts desires and whether this 
should count toward characterizing a passage as realist, I am not going to count partite 
desires, on their own, as markers of agent-like soul-parts.   
The other attributes in Bobonich’s list are sufficient, however, and indeed, on my 
view, any one of them is sufficient on its own.  If appetite or spirit is described as a part 
that: has strong beliefs; sets its own goals; uses means-end reasoning; acts as an 
agent in achieving their goals; or persuades other parts to go along with their goals—
then those descriptions count as realist.  Partly, I am pushed toward this view because I 
think that all deflationist commentators would reject any of these attributes as being an 
attribute that Plato would ascribe to lower parts of the soul.  In addition, since I am going 
to argue for the deflationist interpretation, allowing any of these attributes to count 
against the deflationist position is the most charitable approach.   
Most realists ground their arguments textually by pointing to passages that depict 
soul-parts as having goals (e.g. 4.442a, 4.442b, 9.581a), concepts (e.g. 4.442a, 
4.442c), reasoning (e.g. 4.442b-d, 9.574d-575a, 9.580e), awareness (e.g. 9.571c), 
persuasiveness (e.g. 4.442b-d, 8.554c-d, 9.589a-b), and agency (e.g. 8.553c, 8.560a-c, 
9.571c-d, 9.587a).  In addition to textual references, of course, realists also offer other 
reasons to prefer their interpretation.  For example, they can consider Plato to be in line 
with the Humean view that reason is (at least often) the slave of passion and that an 
action is always the product of a belief-desire pair.49  Other realists tend to argue from 
perceived Platonic argumentative goals toward an understanding of soul-parts, rather 
                                            
 
 






than the reverse.  Thus, some realists consider Plato’s description of the soul to be an 
attempt to refute or confirm Socratic Intellectualism.50  Others take Plato to be primarily 
pursuing the isomorphism that exists between city and soul, in an attempt to get at the 
nature of justice.51   
 
1.4 Distinguishing the Deflationist Position 
Despite the numerous, clear references to soul-parts in agent-like terms, some 
modern commentators (so-called deflationists) resist interpreting Plato’s soul-parts 
(other than reason) as agent-like.  Just as not all realists are alike, there is also variation 
among the deflationist positions.  As noted earlier, at their most vigorous, deflationists 
deny even that the ‘parts’ are parts in a strong sense, interpreting them, rather, as 
aspects or faculties of the soul.52  For these deflationists, tripartition is not a central 
feature of Platonic psychology, but rather a convenient tool for Socrates at a particular 
spot in the argument.  Socrates, they point out, will later prefer to describe the soul as 
bi-partite, multi-part, or even not partite at all.53  On this view, any attributes of the ‘parts’ 
are actually attributes of the soul itself.   
More moderate deflationists understand the ‘parts’ of the soul to be part-like in 
the same way that realists do.  Further, like the realists, they give more credence to the 
importance of tripartition.  However, these more moderate deflationists still deny that 
                                            
 
 
50 See, for example, Carone (2001) or Segvic (2007), or Anagnostopoulos (2006, 167). Further 
references can be found in Lorenz (2006a, 28 n25). 
51 See, for example, Keyt (2006), Lear (1992), or Ferrari (2005). 
52 Shields (2010) and Santas (2013) are examples. 






those parts are agent-like.54  A moderate deflationist of this type might take Plato to 
consider a Leontius-type person (with a persistent desire to view corpses) as having a 
defective appetite.55  But, on a moderate deflationist understanding, this would not 
require that Plato held that the corpse viewer’s appetite part (or indeed, appetite in any 
of us), has its own goals, reasoning powers, etc. 
As before, realists tend to point to passages that directly or metaphorically 
describe soul-parts as agent-like, arguing that they should be taken at face value.  The 
deflationist reading is essentially a critical posture, which presents itself in the form of 
objecting to realist readings of passages in the text.  Thus the deflationist will argue that 
nothing in a particular section of text demands a realist interpretation.  Deflationists tend 
to interpret many passages describing soul-parts as metaphorical, whereas realists take 
them literally.  For example, consider Irwin's interpretation of Socrates’ “symbolic image 
of the soul” (i.e. the multi-headed beast/lion/man wrapped in the shape of a man 588c-
d).  Despite the fact that Socrates calls it an image, Irwin takes from the image that the 
“analogy suggests that each part can be treated as a single agent”.56  Deflationists, on 
the other hand, will disagree.  On a deflationist interpretation, it is true that the image 
                                            
 
 
54 I take Lorenz as an example of a deflationist of this type, though he does not use the terms realist or 
deflationist.  He takes lower soul-parts to lack agency as defined here, and therefore is a deflationist, on 
my account.  But, he denies that soul-parts are merely properties or faculties of the soul as a whole.  He 
says (Lorenz, 2006a, 25 n16) that “if soul-parts are merely properties, we cannot take literally Socrates’ 
talk of the embodied soul as a composite (610 B 4–6), as one thing composed of a plurality of parts (443 
E 1–2). And thirdly, Socrates’ (direct) attribution to soul-parts of desires and aversions, pleasures (580 D 
6–7), beliefs (571 D 2, 603 A 1–2, 605 C 1–2), and emotions (604 D 7–9, 606 A 3–7) sits awkwardly with 
a conception of soul-parts as properties of the soul (or, for that matter, with a conception of them as 
capacities or faculties).”  
55 Socrates distinguishes between people with base appetites (say Leontius), and people who mostly 
have necessary appetites, saying that “In a few people, [base desires] have been eliminated entirely or 
only a few weak ones remain, while in others they are stronger and more numerous” (9.571b G). 






depicts spirit as a lion and true that a lion acts as an agent.  But, the deflationist will say 
that the agency of the lion is not the salient point about the nature of human spirit 
intended by Plato’s image of the lion.  Rather, for a deflationist, the point has to do with 
the associations we have with lion-like characteristics, such as desire for victory, anger, 
fearlessness, etc.  In support, the deflationist might well point to 4.434d-e where 
Socrates outlines his method for using the city/soul analogy.  Socrates reminds us that 
the notion that a just soul might resemble the just city was merely a hypothesis.  Justice 
in the city is provisionally agreed to be the condition when the moneymakers, 
auxiliaries, and guardians each do their own work (4.434c).  However, this hypothesis 
should not be taken as secure just yet (4.434d).  Socrates proposes to dialectically test 
this definition of justice in the city against the soul of the individual.  “But if something 
different is found in the individual, then we must go back and test that on the city” 
(4.434e G).  The notion of justice that is found in the larger item, namely the city, 
provides a hypothesis for what we may find in the soul.  But we should not simply apply 
what we’ve found in the city to the soul.  Rather we must examine the soul directly.  And 
if we do not find the same thing to be present, we even revise our notion of what we 
thought to be justice in the city.  We can and should form hypotheses regarding which 
aspects of the city-parts might illuminate the nature of soul-parts.  But we should not 
simply accept them; we must test the hypothesis on the soul part through direct inquiry.  
The same method applies to how to interpret the metaphor of the beast/lion/man.  When 
we examine the soul, we do find that ‘part’ of our psyche has to do with desire for 






that the lion is agentic should not convince us that the corresponding ‘part’ of the soul is 
similarly agentic, until and unless we have examined the soul to test this hypothesis.  
In addition to contesting the passages pointed to by realists, deflationists point to 
other passages, which raise questions as to whether realists can credibly rely on their 
passages to support a realist psychology.  For example, deflationists highlight the 
conflicting accounts of soul-parts that appear in the course of the dialogue.  At first, in 
Book 4, we seem to have a three-part soul.  Book 10, though, on many accounts, 
presents first a two-part soul, but then later a soul which may be without parts.  In 
addition, as will emerge later (for example, see Chapter 1, Section 2.3.3), at many 
points the parts seem to proliferate, leading to a many-part soul.  So the soul is 
variously presented as one-part, two-part, three-part, many-part, and even, perhaps, 
incomposite.  Deflationists also point to the avowed inadequacy and imprecision of the 
account.  When Socrates introduces soul-parts in Book 4, he immediately and 
repeatedly hedges the discussion.  The soul-parts are three, but there may be others 
(4.443e).  The notion of soul-parts depends on the principle of non-opposition, but that 
principle may be incorrect, and if so, any conclusions based on that principle must be 
discarded (4.437a).57  Socrates says that his description of soul-parts is suboptimal and 
imprecise, merely being sufficient for the argument as it was (6.504a-b).  In general, 
deflationists take very seriously Socrates’ denials of the argument’s precision and 
accuracy at 4.435d and 6.504a-b, taking it that we have to look to other dialogues for 
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the “longer and fuller way” (4.435d).58  The shorter way does not even give a precise 
answer to the ‘easy question’ of whether the soul has the same three parts as the city 
(4.435c-d).  More importantly, the shorter way falls short of precision about the nature of 
the virtues (6.504b-d).  Since the perfectly just man depicted in Book 4 depends on the 
nature of his soul-parts and their interactions, by insisting on the inadequacy of the 
shorter way, and reminding us twice that there is a “longer and fuller way”, Plato invites 
the reader to rigorously question, examine, and test the description of soul-parts.  
One of these tests applied by most deflationists is that if we take Plato to be 
endorsing realism, then his argument has logical flaws and the psychology he outlines 
has conceptual problems. These conceptual problems support deflationists in thinking 
that where Socrates offers realist descriptions of soul-parts, they are to be taken more 
as metaphor in support of the argument and less as literal psychological discussion.  
The deflationists take it that Plato would also have seen the flaws and would not have 
offered a psychological theory so fraught with difficulty.  In order to give a flavor of the 
typical deflationist position, a few such problems will be summarized in the following 
paragraphs.  
The most commonly cited problem raised by deflationists is that taking soul-parts 
to be agent-like leads to various forms of regress.  Thus, for example, if spirit has 
reasoning power it might simultaneously have desire for and aversion to the same thing.  
Since simultaneous desire and aversion was the basis on which Socrates partitioned 
soul-parts, then spirit itself must be partitioned.  But, if each of the two new parts also 
                                            
 
 






has reasoning power, then again there may be internal conflict within each of the new 
parts, leading to further division.59  
Deflationists also object that understanding soul-parts as agents leads to the 
view that the person lacks any true unity, without which it may be hard to hold them 
morally accountable for their actions.60  As Price aptly puts it, “if each of Plato’s parts is 
the psychological subject of mental states, how is the mental life of a man not really like 
the mental lives of a set of Siamese triplets?”61  Bobonich similarly argues that “The 
Republic’s partitioning theory commits Plato to denying the unity of the person…What 
seems to be a single psychic entity is in fact a composite of three distinct and durable 
subjects”.62  If this were to be the case, as Brown and Bobonich point out, Plato’s 
psychology might even preclude the possibility of holding people morally accountable 
for their actions.63  Or, to put it in more Platonic terms, it might be hard to hold a person 
who acts unjustly or immoderately as acting ignobly.  If I take Thrasymachus’ rudeness 
to be due to his spirit (θύμος) acting as agent, or I take Leontius’ sexual perversion to 
be due to his appetite (ἐπιθυμητικόν) acting as agent, then, as Brown points out, 
“holding the rational part responsible for such actions seems to blame an innocent 
bystander or, worse, a victim.”64  
                                            
 
 
59 See, for example, Bobonich (2002, 247-254) or Annas (1981, 142-146).  For a different regress 
problem based on the city-soul analogy, see Williams (1997), and Blossner (2007).  Yet another version 
of the regress problem is that if, say, appetite is seen as a homunculus, (therefore having its own 
appetite, reason, and spirit), then appetite’s appetite will in turn be a homunculus, and so on, regressively. 
60 See, among others, Bobonich (2002, 254), or Keyt (2006, 351).  (Obviously I am not claiming here that 
Bobonich is a deflationist, but he raises the point in support of his own argument.) 
61 Price (2009, 8). 
62 Bobonich (2002, 254). 
63 See, for example, Brown (2012) or Bobonich (2002). 
64 Brown (2012, 4).  Davidson (1982, 291) attributes the same point to Sartre, noting that “the notion of 






A third objection deflationists frequently raise is that if the soul-parts are indeed 
homunculi, then Socrates’ primary argument for partition loses its cogency.65  Lorenz’s 
formulation of the objection is typical of many deflationists: 
if the nonrational parts of the soul can reason about how best to satisfy their 
desires, and can form desires and aversions on the basis of such reasoning, 
there seems to be no satisfactory way for Plato to rule out the simultaneous 
occurrence within appetite or spirit of both a desire and an aversion in relation to 
the same thing. For instance, having a burger right now may seem a very 
pleasant thing to do, but it may also seem an obstacle to one's full enjoyment of 
the exquisite dinner party one expects to attend in an hour's time. Suppose that 
appetite, on that basis, forms a reasoned aversion to having the burger now. If 
the person in question nonetheless continues to have a pleasure‐directed desire 
to have the burger right away, that desire must belong to appetite.  
 
As long as appetite does not have goal setting and means-end reasoning 
capabilities, Socrates’ argument is valid; given the principle of non-opposition (4.436b), 
it must be some part other than appetite that resists the desire to eat the burger.  In this 
way, Socrates partitions appetite as distinct from the resisting part (which he calls 
λογιστικὸν).66  But, if appetite does indeed have the capacity to set goals and engage in 
some measure of means-end reasoning in order to attain those goals, it is possible that 
though appetite wants the burger, the part that resists the burger (so as achieve its goal 
of enjoying dinner) is just the reasoning capacity of appetite.  In this case, Socrates’ 
                                            
 
 
attached instead to semi-autonomous parts of the mind”.  Along a similar line, Santas (2013, 178) 
suggests that attributing reason, spirit, and appetite to each soul-part, “may even commit Plato to the view 
that there are several just and/or unjust persons within a person, since agents, like parts, can be 
Platonically just or unjust by his definition of psychic justice”. 
65 See, for example, Santas (2013, 177), or Lorenz (2008, 8), or Gerson (2003, 108), or Stalley (2007, 
72).  
66 6.539d.  Of course, as Lorenz (2006a, 31) points out, it is not clear that we must accept the further 







argument fails to distinguish appetite (and in the same way spirit) from reason as 
separate parts of the soul, and he offers no alternative argument. 
Deflationists differ on how seriously to take tripartition, on how ‘part-like’ Plato 
thought soul-parts to be, and also on which objections to realism they raise.  Overall, 
though, the terms of satisfaction for a passage to count as deflationist seem clear and 
mirror the terms of satisfaction for it to count as realist that were delineated in the 
previous section.  Deflationists do not take Plato to be ascribing agency to lower soul-
parts.  Thus a deflationist would deny that spirit, for example, has goals, is aware of 
other parts, can communicate with or persuade other parts, possesses concepts, can 
perform means-end reasoning, etc. 
To sum up, then, as we move to examine the text in detail, I’ve said that whereas 
realists and some deflationists interpret Plato as taking soul-parts to be parts in the 
strong sense, other deflationists deny this, interpreting Plato to be describing the parts 
of the soul simply as aspects or faculties of the soul itself.  For a description of a soul-
part to count as realist, I’ve claimed that it is sufficient for the part to be said to have any 
one of a set of agentic attributes.  Conversely, I will require that none of these attributes 
be present for a description of a soul-part to count as deflationist.  With these definitions 








Part 2: Exegesis  
2.0 Introduction 
Cephalus begins talking about the soul at the very outset of the Republic and the 
soul is under discussion up through and including the last line of Book 10.  On my view, 
though, there are three passages that discuss soul-parts and their nature in detail, 
namely, 'The Inquiry into Soul-Parts’ (4.435c-441c), ‘The Inquiry into Character Types’ 
(4.441c-445d, 8.544a-9.592b), and ‘The Effect of Poetry On the Soul’ (10.595a-608b). 
Until very recently, as I noted previously, Book 10 has largely been ignored in the 
debate about the parts of the soul.  Moreover, most commentators have tended to 
exegetically ‘jump around’, marrying, for example, an understanding of a few lines in 
Book 8 to a reading of a line in Book 4, and so forth.  As noted at the outset, most 
deflationists focus on 'The Inquiry into Soul-Parts’.  This passage seems to fit well with a 
deflationist account and deflationists leverage the descriptions found there in 
interpreting ‘The Inquiry into Character Types’, which comes later.  Many of them reach 
the conclusion that the entire account of soul-parts in the Republic is deflationist.  
Realists tend to do the reverse.  They focus on the more realist descriptions found in 
‘The Inquiry into Character Types’ and apply those descriptions backward, to reach the 
conclusion that the entire account of soul-parts in the Republic is realist.  I do neither of 
these.  Rather I follow Whiting in viewing it as critical to analyze the different segments 
of the Republic on their own, before putting them together to reach an overall 
understanding.  We need to allow for the possibility that Plato has Socrates intentionally 






pursuing different philosophical goals.  My approach will be to consider each of these 
three key passages on its own, and see whether each section presents the parts of the 
soul as agent-like or non-agent-like.   
Overall, I will argue that the first of these passages introduces the nature of the 
soul’s parts, and although the metaphors need to be interpreted, in his direct speech, 
Socrates never once describes those soul-parts as agent-like.  In the second passage, 
though, Socrates does often directly describe soul-parts as agent-like in nature.  Finally, 
I will argue that in Book 10, Socrates again focuses directly on the nature of soul-parts, 
as he tries to understand how painting and poetry affect the soul.  And in that inquiry, on 
my reading, he returns to an account which again never once directly describes soul-
parts in agent-like terms.  I will conclude this chapter by claiming that these three 
passages are sufficient to incline us toward the deflationist view, even if they leave 
some open questions.  To decide fully how we should combine these passages to form 
an adequate understanding of the nature of the soul, we will need to wait until the 
dissertation’s conclusion, where we sum up the psychological account of the Republic. 
 
2.1 The Inquiry into Soul-Parts (4.435c-441c) 
I have named this section of the Republic ‘The Inquiry into Soul-Parts’ with no 
implication that it is the sole and final word on how the Republic views soul-parts and 
with no intent to beg the question of whether or how subsequent sections (Books 8 and 
9, for example) should be incorporated into our understanding of how Plato saw the 
nature of the ‘parts’ of our souls.  It seems clear that this passage (4.435c-441c) is a 






length, before finally pronouncing the inquiry into that question to be complete.  
Certainly ‘The Inquiry into Soul-Parts’ is part of the surrounding analogy of city and soul.  
Much of the discussion in this passage refers to that surround, either implicitly or 
explicitly.  But we should be wary of either understating or overstating the importance of 
the city/soul surround.  For example, as will be discussed in the paragraph below, we 
must be mindful that we are not here using the parts of the just city to illuminate the 
parts of the just soul.  The subject under discussion, here, is clearly the parts of the 
souls of people in general, both ones who are just and ones who are not.  (Indeed the 
civil war in the soul, which we will find to be a central feature of this passage, would not 
even occur in a just soul.)   Nevertheless, it seems likely that Glaucon and many 
readers will interpret Socrates’ metaphors in light of the city-soul analogy.  Thus, 
although ‘The Inquiry into Soul-Parts’ should be indeed be considered within the context 
of the just city that we have created, we are using the analogy of the just city to peer 
into the soul as such—that is to say, the soul as it is found in both just and unjust 
people.  And this suggests that we should be wary of taking more than we should from 
the metaphor, as opposed to from the argument itself.  
Soul-parts are described in this passage in two ways, namely a) via ‘direct 
speech’ and b) via metaphor, simile, etc.  Regarding the former, my claim is simple.  
Specifically, within ‘The Inquiry into Soul-Parts’ (without prejudice regarding other parts 
of the Republic) Socrates, on my view, never once describes the attributes of soul-parts 
as agent-like.  Interpreting the metaphors, though, is more difficult.  Certainly to Glaucon 
or a reader of the Republic the metaphors might indeed give the appearance of 






the careful re-reader with space to challenge that appearance, and consider the 
alternative, deflationist interpretation, which is consistent with Socrates’ direct speech.  
Though the soul has been a topic of discussion throughout the Republic up to this point, 
it is here, in the ‘Inquiry into Soul-Parts’ that we first move inside the soul to consider in 
detail how it is structured internally, thereby being the first section in which we are 
confronted with the alternatives of realist and deflationist interpretation.  My approach 
will be to analyze the six chunks that seem to me natural subparts of the passage.  
Nothing, though, rests on breaking the section into six or any other number of 
subsections.   
Before diving into exegesis, it is also important to stress that although the city in 
the city-soul analogy is a hypothetical ‘beautiful city’ (Kallipolis), the souls that Socrates 
and his interlocutors are going to examine in this first section (4.435c-441c) are the 
souls of ‘regular’ people in ‘regular’ cities.  This may seem unremarkable, however in 
the context of the Republic it is quite unusual.  Starting in Book 2, the action of the 
Republic is largely set in a series of idealized cities, populated by idealized characters.  
The rustics of Book 2’s ‘City of Pigs’ give way to the idealized world of the Kallipolis, 
populated by guardians and auxiliaries, the like of which would not be found in Athens.  
And most of the text of Books 2-4 is concerned with the nature and education of these 
guardians and auxiliaries.  This idealized setting with imagined subjects will 
predominate throughout books 5-7.  Similarly, the latter part of Book 4, followed by 
Books 8 and 9 will dwell on timocrats, oligarchs, and so forth, (which I will argue, in 
Chapter 2, are idealized types).  Here in ‘The Inquiry into Soul-Parts’, though, the 






types, but rather into the souls of ordinary people like ourselves.  Glaucon and 
Adeimantus’ attention will now be shifted away from the Kallipolis, toward Athens, as 
well as toward non-Greek locales, such as Thrace, Egypt, etc.  Socrates asks Glaucon 
to consider how the soul is “in yourself or anyone else” (4.440b G).  Some of the 
characters are literary figures (such as Odysseus), while others are perhaps historical 
(such as Leontius), but none of them is constructed in words by Socrates, as auxiliaries 
and timocrats are.  After this section, it is not until Book 10, I will argue, that we return to 
the ordinary, non-idealized world, populated by non-idealized characters.  We will 
consider just how significant we should take this shift of subject to be when we sum up 
the account at the end of this chapter.  For now, though, as we go through each 
subsection of the ‘The Inquiry into Soul-Parts’, we will take note of the subject under 
discussion in that subsection. 
 
2.1.1 Opening the Question (4.435c-436a) 
Socrates opens The Inquiry into the nature of the soul with irony (“Then once 
again we’ve come upon an easy question, namely, does the soul have these three parts 
in it or not?” [4.435c G, italics mine]).  He immediately, though, clarifies that the question 
is not at all easy and indeed that the ensuing discussion will yield at best an 
approximate picture of the nature of the partite soul (“we will never get a precise answer 
using our present methods of argument” [4.435c G]).  Socrates says that it is 
undeniable that we must have “within each of us” the same “parts and characteristics” 
as Grube/Reeve renders it, or “forms and qualities” as Shorey has it (εἴδη τε καὶ ἤθη 






all people have at least some measure of each of the three qualities (and that we each 
have within us therefore a ‘part’ of us that is money-loving) he does not say anything, in 
answering this ‘easy question’, to support a claim that we do our money-loving with a 
money-loving part, rather than with the whole soul.67  (In fact, as will be seen in the next 
section, that is precisely the ‘hard question’ that follows.)   
Realists, though, often do take this passage to mean just that.  Keyt, for example, 
reads this passage to show that “(a) polis and psyche each have three parts (b) of the 
same three kinds” and that “The wisdom lovers, honor lovers, and money lovers, who 
compose the parts of a polis, are agents with cognitive powers.  If a psyche must have 
parts of the same kinds, they too must be agents with cognitive powers”.68  In fact, 
though, this conclusion is by no means clear.   
Certainly Keyt has a point.  Justice in the city will turn out to be a matter of each 
part doing its own work; a matter of the relationships among the parts of the city.  And 
since the auxiliaries, for example, have collective agency, there is an invitation to think 
of the spirited part of the soul has having agency as well.  But this is an invitation which 
can (and I will ultimately argue should) be resisted.   The analogy compares a city and 
its parts, which are visible and perceptible, to the workings of the soul, which is invisible 
and imperceptible.  The producers make things; and there is certainly agency in making.  
However, if we have an appetite for something, it is by no means clear that any agency 
is involved in the having an appetite.  When the producer class does its own work 
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English, unlike in Attic Greek, as a helper.  






agency is certainly at play.  But when our appetite does its own work the same is by no 
means certain.   
What warrants us to say that agency, in particular, is the relevant attribute to take 
from the city-soul analogy?  More importantly, why should we think we are intended to 
take anything at all about the attributes of the parts from the analogy?  The goal of the 
analogy is to help discover the nature of justice in the human soul, not to discover the 
nature of soul-parts (2.368e-369a).  Further, even if we did wish to draw from the 
analogy that the parts of the soul resembled the parts of the city in selected respects, 
agent-like soul-parts, with goals, reasoning power, etc., would be difficult to ascribe.  
The parts of the city are guardians, producers, and auxiliaries.  Individual members of 
the producer part (doctors, farmers, arms manufacturers, bankers, etc.) have goals, 
means-end reasoning power, etc., but the producer part as whole does not.  Since the 
analogy is from city-parts (producer class) to soul-parts (appetite), and the producer 
class does not have goals, means-end reasoning, etc., there is not even analogical 
warrant, it seems to me, to ascribe such qualities to appetite.  Indeed, attempts to get 
more precise lead to more problems.  The appetite part of the soul is said to be hard to 
name, since it is a collection of manifold (πολυειδίαν 9.580d) sub-parts, namely 
appetites for food, drink, sex, etc.  The producer class similarly comprises sub-parts 
(producers), each of which is an agent.  Thus even if the producer class as a whole has 
collective agency, the sub-parts (individual producers) even more clearly have agency.  
Therefore, if we were to ascribe agency to the soul-parts by analogy, on account of the 
agency in the city, then, the sub-parts of appetite would be entities that had, like the 






problems, for example, when the agency of my desire for drink came into conflict with 
the agency of my desire for sex.  Keyt and others take from the analogy of city and soul 
that the posing of the question (4.435c-436a) suggests agent-like parts.  But there is 
nothing in what Socrates directly says, here, that requires us to reach this conclusion.  
Plato has Socrates use language that is very vague (e.g. ‘forms and qualities’ εἴδη τε 
καὶ ἤθη as quoted earlier).  This vague language coupled with Socrates’ assurance that 
the picture of the soul will be imprecise, along with the problems that arise from trying to 
apply the city/soul analogy to understand soul parts gives the reader space to resist the 
conclusion that Plato is here presenting the parts of the soul as agent-like. 
  
2.1.2 Posing the Hard Question (4.436a-b) 
But the matter begins to be difficult when you ask whether we do all these things 
with the same thing or whether there are three things and we do one thing with 
one and one with another—learn with one part of ourselves, feel anger with 
another, and with yet a third desire the pleasures of nutrition and generation and 
their kind, or whether it is with the entire soul that we function in each case when 
we once begin. (4.436a-b) 
 
Now Socrates poses a question that is ‘hard to answer’.  However, it is also hard 
to understand the question itself.  What does it mean to learn with one part or with the 
whole soul?  And what is the meaning of “when we once begin” (ὅταν ὁρμήσωμεν 
4.436b)?  Partly the question is confusing because on the face of it, different stages of 
action seem to be named.  “Learn with one part”, (as opposed to, say, ‘desire to learn 
with one part’), sounds like acting on my decision to learn—that is to say, doing the 
learning.  ‘Doing’ the learning sounds very agent-like.  “Desire the pleasures of 
nutrition”, on the other hand, seems to pick out the desiring, but not the eating.  It might 






particular, e.g. an onion bagel.  Either way, though, it speaks of desiring, which we 
earlier set down as not being sufficient to count as agent-like ‘doing’. 
Many commentators, though, take the question overall to push us toward a 
realist interpretation.  Burnyeat says that  
There [436a] too Plato treats the 'parts' of the soul with which we do such things 
as themselves the subjects or agents doing them…What Plato is rejecting, then, 
is the view that the senses have the kind of autonomy that the parts of the 
divided soul have in the Republic”69   
 
Kamtekar, similarly, takes it that Socrates distinguishes “these parts as themselves the 
subjects and agents”.70  However, on my reading, the posing of the hard question, on its 
own, does not push us to see the parts as agent-like subjects of psychological states.  
Certainly it is important to look at the grammar of the question, in order to clarify 
the proper subjects who are the agents of the actions.  These things are things that we 
do (πράττομεν 4.436a) either ‘with’ parts of us or ‘with’ our whole soul.  When I pick up 
the glass with my hand, nothing agentic is ascribed to my hand. The same is the case 
when I get angry with my spirit, or I desire an IPA beer with my appetite, or I learn with 
my reason.71  ‘I’ am the agent of the action here, irrespective of ‘with what’ I do the 
action. Even in the case of learning (although reason is centrally involved) we do not 
really learn with our reason alone.  Just as drinking a specific IPA beer will involve not 
only a specific appetitive desire, but also deliberation, decision, and then lips, hands, 
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70 Kamtekar (2012, 172).   
71 Some IPA (India Pale Ale) beers are more or less hoppy, some more or less fruity, etc.  My intent here 
is to suggest a highly specific desire, such as might come after perusing the beer menu, much as 






throat, muscles, etc., so too, learning will involve not only a desire to learn, but also 
deliberation, decision, and then hands, eyes, ears, calculation, memory, etc.  
In posing the ‘hard question’, Socrates identifies a point in time that is after “we 
begin”, but before we act.  Certainly it is not precisely clear which point Socrates 
identifies that is “when we once begin” (ὅταν ὁρμήσωμεν 4.436b).  Larson ignores ὅταν 
ὁρμήσωμεν utterly, rendering the passage simply  
do we do everything with our whole soul, or does it have different parts, so that 
we learn with one, feel emotions with another, and desire the pleasures of 
nourishment, procreation, and so forth with a third?72   
 
Grube/Reeve also avoids the temporal distinction, ending up with “when we set out after 
something, do we act”.  Most translators, though, preserve the notion of doing x “after 
we get started”.73  Even, Reeve (in his own, later translation), makes this very explicit: 
“Or do we do each of them with the whole of our soul, once we feel the impulse?”74  
On my view, the point in time under discussion, which is ‘after we begin but 
before we act’, must attempt to pick out a moment where we have developed a specific, 
differentiated desire (say an appetitive, or spirited desire to do something), about which 
we are able to have conflict.  Certainly, as Socrates will soon say, sometimes we are 
simply thirsty, and our thirst at that moment is just for drink.  However, in most cases, 
simply being thirsty will not generate the grounds for psychic conflict.  Absent a specific 
desire, it is unlikely that I will reason that satisfying my thirst is bad, or that I will feel that 
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73 See, for example, Shorey (1980), Bloom (1968), Ferrari (2000). 






being thirsty is shameful.75  Psychic conflict often may get engendered though, once I 
have developed a specific desire.  If I desire to quench my thirst with a cold IPA beer, I 
may struggle with the thought that I should be working on my dissertation and not 
getting inebriated.  Or, I may struggle with the feeling that it is shameful to order a beer 
at 9:30am.  Thus Socrates’ question, on my reading, is as follows: once we develop a 
specific desire (i.e. once we begin, or ὅταν ὁρμήσωμεν), do we have that specific desire 
with the whole soul or with one part of the soul?  Once Odysseus’ anger and shame 
translate into a specific desire to kill the servant girls, does he feel that desire with his 
whole soul or with his spirit?  Cooper takes it that the question at hand is one of the 
“psychological determinants of choice and voluntary action”.76  For Cooper, Plato is here 
asking about a point in time when internal struggle, if any, is complete; when, for 
example, Leontius has struggled between the desire to look and his feelings of shame 
and has decided to look.  At that point, he is, as Cooper says, ready for “voluntary 
action”.  But on my view this misses the point, which is the psychic conflict that enables 
Socrates to differentiate the soul-parts.  Leontius displays a very specific appetitive 
desire and Odysseus displays a very specific spirited desire, both of which are subject 
to psychic conflict.  The question Socrates asks here (as to whether, say, we get thirsty 
with our whole soul or with a particular part) regards the moment when we have a 
specific desire for a particular drink, subsequent to the initial state of simple thirst, and 
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prior to the ensuing psychic conflict, deliberation and then decision that precedes 
voluntary action. 
Note that if I’m correct here (about how to interpret ὅταν ὁρμήσωμεν) many 
concerns about the cognitive resources needed by appetite in order to develop a 
specific desire go away.  Surely I might develop an appetitive desire for a specific IPA 
after reading the menu; and nobody wants to give menu reading capacity to appetite.  
However even the worry about how much cognition is required in simpler cases (e.g. I 
see a bottle of IPA beer on the table and feel an appetitive desire to drink) goes away, if 
Socrates is asking whether it is with our appetite or with our whole soul that we have the 
desire for the IPA beer, once that desire is formed (i.e. ‘once we begin’). 
Overall, then, despite the ambiguity of his language, it seems that the ‘hard 
question’ that Socrates poses relates to specific, differentiated desires (e.g. the desire 
to look at a specific group of corpses, and the desire to vent anger on a specific group 
of servant girls).  And since we’ve established in the previous section that desires are 
not, on their own, indicative of agent-like parts, there is nothing in this that pushes us 
toward realism.  The seat of our desires, according to Socrates’ question, is either the 
whole soul or a part of the soul, either of which is consistent with a deflationist reading.  
Indeed, it should be noted, as pointed out by several commentators, a realist reading 
would need a third, different, alternative, namely, do “we learn, feel anger, and desire 






and desire with a second part of the soul; and we learn, feel anger, and desire with a 
third part of the soul”?77   
 
2.1.3 The Principle of Non-opposition (4.436b-439b) 
It is obvious that the same thing will not be willing to do or undergo opposites in 
the same part of itself, in relation to the same thing, at the same time. So, if we 
ever find this happening in the soul, we’ll know that we aren’t dealing with one 
thing but many. (4.436b G) 
 
The principle of non-opposition also seems, on the surface, to be posed in realist 
terms.  The verbs of doing (ποιεῖν at the start of the statement of the principle at 4.436b, 
and then πράττειν at the conclusion of the statement at 4.439b) are the paradigmatic 
verbs of agency.  Since we will ultimately conclude that the ‘doers’ of the opposites are 
different things in our soul, (“For it cannot be, we say, that the same thing with the same 
part of itself at the same time acts in opposite ways about the same thing” 4.439b), it 
might seem as if the discussion regards what actions the soul-parts will or will not ‘be 
willing to do’.  This sounds very agentic.  Certainly when people, in the sensible world, 
‘do things’, they are acting as agents.  Is the same true, though, of internal states; of 
souls or ’parts’ of souls?  Before we form a conclusion we must examine the whole 
passage.   
Although Socrates uses the language of doing, what is actually being highlighted 
here is conflict within the soul.  If we find in our soul true opposites, Socrates suggests, 
then it is different parts of our soul that simultaneously desire to φ and desire to not-φ.  
                                            
 
 







It is important to take note of the fact that throughout this portion of text, Socrates never 
mentions appetite, spirit, reason, nor does he make any reference to the city-parts to 
which those soul-parts are analogized.  Nothing in this section explicitly addresses soul-
parts, or the nature of those parts.  Socrates talks about souls and thirst, but not about 
an appetitive part.  “The soul of the thirsty then, in so far as it thirsts, wishes nothing 
else than to drink” (τοῦ διψῶντος ἄρα ἡ ψυχή, καθ᾽ ὅσον διψῇ, οὐκ ἄλλο τι βούλεται ἢ 
πιεῖν (4.439a)).  But nothing in that statement talks about appetite having goals, beliefs, 
or reasoning powers. 
Still, as mentioned earlier, we need to consider how to interpret the metaphors 
and analogies in this passage.  The ‘doing’ (ποιεῖν, πράττειν) language of the principle 
seems to suggest that parts ‘do things’.  The passage opens with a discussion of how 
our internal states (e.g. desire to eat, or spiritedness) operate.  Socrates then brings 
forward examples (hands, tops) which represent loci of action in the world external to 
the soul.  Socrates seems quite attuned to the internal / external distinction, and sums 
up his explication of opposites by saying “all things like these belong to the class of 
opposite actions or passions [εἴτε ποιημάτων εἴτε παθημάτων]; it will make no difference 
which”.   
Socrates exemplifies contraries in seemingly agentic terms, such as embracing 
versus repelling or assent versus dissent (4.437b).  However, this is metaphor.  Appetite 
does not really embrace; rather we have a desire or appetite has a desire.  As we 
argued in Section 1, desire, as such, does not count as agency.  Similarly, spirit does 
not really assent or dissent; rather we get angry, ashamed, or feel proud.  When 






states, there is inevitably a suggestion of agency, since actions in the sensible world are 
typically done by agents.  Further, Socrates is careful in this passage to keep the 
discussion at the level of the soul, not its parts.  Socrates says that the “soul of one who 
desires …, nods assent to itself thereon as if someone put the question, striving towards 
its attainment” (τὴν τοῦ ἐπιθυμοῦντος ψυχὴν…ἐπινεύειν τοῦτο πρὸς αὑτὴν ὥσπερ τινὸς 
ἐρωτῶντος, ἐπορεγομένην αὐτοῦ τῆς γενέσεως 4.437c).  The soul (not its parts) here 
desires, but it doesn’t really nod.  Even if we take it that when I desire something 
sometimes my soul assents, the simile does not here ascribe agency to appetite or 
spirit.  Plato has Socrates use analogies which raise the question of agency by soul-
parts, but leaves us room, on careful re-reading, to resist that conclusion.  Socrates has 
established a principle which he will employ to individuate soul-parts, but he says 
nothing here that explicitly characterizes those soul-parts as agent-like. 
 One final point before we leave this passage.  I have called this section ‘the 
principle of non-opposition (4.436b-439b)’.  Much has been written about whether or not 
we should take this principle to be an early version of ‘the principle of non-contradiction’ 
which was fleshed out by Aristotle.  Adam and later Shorey, for example, take it that it 
is.78  However more recent commentators, both realists such as Irwin and Bobonich, 
and also deflationists such as Price, Santas, Smith, and Lorenz, take it that the principle 
is not a statement of the principle of non-contradiction.  Those commentators prefer to 
refer to it either as the principle of noncontrariety, contraries, contrariety, non-
                                            
 
 






opposition, opposites, etc.79  Although the distinctions between these English terms for 
the principle that Socrates states (but does not name) are important, they are not critical 
to the argument of this chapter.  Here I examine how Socrates characterizes the soul-
parts, both in metaphor and in direct speech, but do not delve too deeply into the oft-
discussed examples of the top and the man who stands still and waves his hands.  
Thus, for the purposes of this chapter I am content to simply pick one of the more 
common English versions, and I will follow Lorenz, Fred Miller, and others in using the 
term ‘principle of non-opposition’.  In fact, though, a better name than ‘the principle’ of 
non-opposition, (or non-contrariety, etc.) would be ‘the hypothesis’ of non-opposition.  
Note Socrates’ careful disclaimer that we may ultimately need to discard this 
hypothesis, along with everything that was derived from it (4.437a).   And at least some 
commentators think that this is precisely what happens by the end of the Republic.80  
The principle of non-contradiction would be difficult to abandon.  But by avoiding the 
error of conflating the hypothesis of non-opposition with the principle of non-
contradiction, we can potentially accept Socrates invitation to discard the hypothesis, 
which he says will at best yield an approximate, but imprecise answer, without needing 
to thus leave behind the principle of non-contradiction.   
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Irwin switches from ‘Principle of Opposites’ (1977, 327 n 18) to ‘Principle of Contraries (1995,204), 
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2.1.4 Distinguishing Appetite and Reason (439c-439d) 
Now, would we assert that sometimes there are thirsty people who don’t wish to 
drink? Certainly, it happens often to many different people. What, then, should 
one say about them? Isn’t it that there is something in their soul, bidding them to 
drink, and something different, forbidding them to do so, that overrules the thing 
that bids? I think so. Doesn’t that which forbids in such cases come into play—if it 
comes into play at all—as a result of rational calculation, while what drives and 
drags them to drink is a result of feelings and diseases? (4.439c G)  
 
We’ll call the part of the soul with which it calculates the rational part and the part 
with which it lusts, hungers, thirsts, and gets excited by other appetites the 
irrational appetitive part. (4.439d G) 
 
This sounds very realist and agent-like to many interpreters.  Bobonich, for 
example, interprets this as a conversation between two soul-parts, both of which are 
aware of each other, can communicate with each other, and are trying to impose their 
will on the other.81  Certainly Grube/Reeve’s translation quoted above might lead one in 
that direction.  As in the prior passage, though, the metaphors are open to multiple 
interpretations.  When I bid you to drink, or forbid you to drink, those are speech acts; 
but when something in the soul bids me to drink, or something in my soul forbids me to 
drink, the bidding could be simply a desire, and the forbidding simply a thought of 
resisting the desire.  As for the “parts” Grube/Reeve put forward, consider rather 
Whiting’s careful and literal translation of 4.439d: 
Doesn’t that which forbids in such cases come into play -- if it comes into play at 
all -- as a result of rational calculation, while the <things> that drive and drag 
them to drink result from feelings and diseases … We’ll call that [part] of soul with 
which it calculates [the] rational [part] and the [part] with which it lusts, hungers, 
                                            
 
 






thirsts, and gets excited by the other appetites [the] irrational appetitive [part], 
companion of certain pleasures and indulgences.82 
 
 Some things in the soul drag us to drink, eat, lust, etc.  These things result from 
feelings and diseases.83  On those occasions when something opposes them, the 
opposition is the result of calculating.  Socrates distinguishes two things in the soul, one 
that is arational and something else that is rational and often opposes the former.  He 
names them, but very tentatively.  It almost seems like he is trying to assist and 
advance the argument by identifying and naming two aspects of the soul.  
More importantly, even if one does take the passage, as I do, to be individuating 
two soul-parts (at least at this moment in the argument), namely, reason and appetite, 
there is no warrant, on my view, to interpret them as in communication with each other, 
as a realist might.  ‘I’ am (or equivalently, ‘my soul’ is) the subject throughout.  
Something in my soul wants to drink.  As a result of calculating, though, something else 
in my soul may resist drinking.  There are opposites in my soul, but Socrates makes no 
mention, here, of interaction between parts housing those opposites.   
Singpurwalla wants to apply 6.505d-e to 4.439d in order to show that “the 
appetitive part is the part of us that is prone to form beliefs or judgments of value on the 
basis of these appearances of value.”84  “Socrates states”, she argues,  
that ‘every soul pursues the good and does whatever it does for its sake’ 
(505d11-e1).  But if we always pursue what we believe is good, then this 
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83 As Whiting (ibid.) points out, taking the passage to refer to ‘the appetite part’ would result in Socrates 
claiming that “the part itself comes to be as a result of feelings and diseases”. 






suggests that even when we are motivated by the appetitive part, we are 
motivated by beliefs about the good, which in turn suggests that appetitive 
motivations involve beliefs about the good.85   
 
However, although it is clear that when we are motivated by having beliefs about 
the good, we have beliefs, there is nothing in this passage that directly says that the 
beliefs reside in a particular part of us called appetite nor that any reasoning we may do 
about our own good is done by a part called appetite.  Similarly, my desire to drink 
might result in me forming a goal, but nothing here attributes possession of goals to an 
appetitive part. 
 
2.1.5 Distinguishing Spirit and Appetite (439e-440b) 
Then, let these two parts be distinguished in the soul. Now, is the spirited part by 
which we get angry a third part or is it of the same nature as either of the other 
two? Perhaps it’s like the appetitive part. (4.439e) 
 
Again Grube/Reeve smoothly supplies the helping word ‘part’, (four times in three 
sentences), where no such word is found in the Greek.  Shorey, typically, offers a 
translation that preserves the text’s ambiguity about ‘parts’: 
These two forms, then, let us assume to have been marked off as actually 
existing in the soul. But now the Thumos or principle of high spirit, that with which 
we feel anger, is it a third, or would it be identical in nature with one of these?” 
“Perhaps,” he said, “with one of these, the appetitive. (4.439e) 
 
Socrates begins the process of distinguishing spirit as a separate ‘part’ of us by 
bringing forward the story of Leontius, detailing his ignoble desire to look at corpses that 
were lying by the wall of the Piraeus.  I distinguish five moments in this story, namely: 









1) Leontius wants to look, and at the same time feels ashamed of wanting to do so 
2) At first he forces himself not to look 
3) His desire persists, and he struggles with himself, with his hands covering his 
face  
4) His desire to look wins out, he uncovers his eyes, and runs to look at the corpses 
5) As he runs, he reproves his eyes angrily 
 
Before digging in to the Leontius passage, though, I need to say something about 
my decision to characterize the emotion Leontius feels as shame.  Socrates is very 
sensitive both to the existence of shameful (αἰσχρά) actions and to the fact that people 
sometimes feel ashamed (αἰσχύνω)86.  These topics are raised frequently throughout 
the Republic.  Nevertheless, Socrates does not explicitly mention shame here.  Leontius 
is disgusted (δυσχεραίνοι) either by the corpses or at himself and speaks to his eyes 
using a term (κακοδαιμονες) that expresses anger or contempt.  Socrates concludes 
that the story shows that anger sometimes makes war against the appetite.  Some 
commentators, such as Irwin, are careful to keep to the emotion of anger that Socrates 
mentions.87  Despite the lack of an explicit shame word, though, many commentators 
offer persuasive reasons for taking the emotion described to be shame, and I agree.  
Cairns, for example, points out that “Greek definitions of anger tend, rightly or wrongly, 
to stress the reference of that emotion to one’s own honour and status”.88  Also 
suggestive is 3.388d, where Socrates links being ashamed with self-rebuke.  The same 
seems to be the case here.  Leontius rebukes himself because he is ashamed.   
Let us return, then, to the story of Leontius.  Realists take the story to show that 
spirit is agent-like.  Irwin, for example, takes it to show that “The spirited part has 
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evaluative attitudes, resting on some belief about the goodness or badness of its 
object”.89  Similarly, Bobonich concludes that the example shows that “one agent-like 
part believes that X is better overall than Y and thus desires to do X while a different 
agent-like part desires to do Y”.90  On my view, though, the text does not support such 
conclusions. 
The Leontius story runs from 4.439e5 (ἀλλ᾽, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ποτὲ ἀκούσας τι πιστεύω 
τούτῳ: ὡς ἄρα Λεόντιος) through 4.440a7 (σημαίνει γάρ, ἔφη).  However, the first step in 
interpreting this passage is to consider the sentences that immediately follow, namely:  
Besides, don’t we often notice in other cases that when appetite forces someone 
contrary to rational calculation, he reproaches himself and gets angry with that in 
him that’s doing the forcing, so that of the two factions that are fighting a civil war, 
so to speak, spirit allies itself with reason?” (4.440a-b G) 
 
I agree with Irwin that this sentence refers back to the immediately prior Leontius 
passage and tells us that Leontius exemplifies very common behavior, even if his 
particular desires might have been quite unusual.91  I will discuss the issue of spirit 
being an ally below, but here I want to consider what this tells us about spirit and 
reason, and how to properly interpret the Leontius story.  In Leontius’ case and in many 
other cases, when our desires (i.e. our appetites) force us ‘contrary to calculation’ (i.e. 
contrary to what we reason to be right, which is to say, contrary to reason), our spirit is 
roused against that in us that does the forcing.  The fact that reason, in addition to 
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appetite and spirit, is critically involved in the story helps us understand the five 
moments of the passage schematized earlier.  In moment (1), Leontius sees the 
corpses lying at the feet of the executioner, and feels some sort of ignoble appetite to 
look.  However, he feels ashamed, either of the desire, or of being the type of person 
that has those desires, and, in moment (2), he turns his face away.  Note that spirit and 
appetite are not the actors here.  It is ‘he’ who desires (perhaps with his appetite) to look 
(ἰδεῖν ἐπιθυμοῖ 439e), ‘he’ who was unable to resist (δυσχεραίνοι 439e) and ‘he’ who 
feels ashamed (perhaps with his spirit), which he displayed by speaking angrily to 
himself and his eyes (‘ἰδοὺ ὑμῖν,’ ἔφη, ‘ὦ κακοδαίμονες 440a).  And then, in moment (3), 
he struggles internally.  Though the part that calculates is not mentioned here, based on 
our understanding of 4.440a-b (which tells us that his appetite will end up forcing him 
‘contrary to calculation’), we understand that he has reasoned (or calculated) that 
looking is wrong.  Now there is internal conflict between, on the one hand, his desire 
(which still persists) and, on the other hand, his reasoning that to look would be wrong, 
along with his feeling ashamed.  Appetite says yes, but both reason and spirit (in 
different ways) say no.  Different of ‘parts’ of Leontius’ soul are involved in this, but he is 
the agent that is struggling.  Socrates succeeds in individuating the parts by displaying 
the struggle, but does not portray the parts as agent-like.  Finally, Leontius’ struggle 
comes to an end in moment (4), when his desire wins out and forces him contrary to 
what he knows to be right.  He uncovers his eyes and rushes toward the corpses to look.  
As he rushes forward, his desire is still strong, but he is angry and ashamed.  It is not 
clear whether he is ashamed of a) the base impulse to look, b) the weakness of his will, 






appetite, ‘how disgusting of you to want to look at corpses’.  Nor does he address 
himself as a whole, saying to himself, ‘how disgusting to be so weak-willed’, or ‘how 
disgusting to be the type of person who likes to look at corpses’.  Rather the object of 
the remonstrance is his eyes.  His eyes are a stand-in for his appetites and Leontius is 
expressing contempt for his desires, but he, Leontius, is the agent that needs to get 
praised or blamed for how he acts.  Critical, though, is that his appetite overpowers 
‘him’, not ‘his spirit’.  If his appetite were aware of his spirit, struggled with it, and 
overcame it, that would be a very realist story.  But for his appetite to be strong, and for 
him to act on that appetite even against his better judgment, is not.  Further, there is no 
indication that it is his spirit, rather than his reason, that has beliefs about the rightness 
or wrongness of his appetites. 
Now we must return to Socrates’ metaphor of spirit being the ally of reason.  
Socrates tells us that Leontius’ story is just one example of the very common situation 
of appetite forcing us contrary to reason (4.440a-b).  In such cases, Socrates says, 
when it is ‘as if’ appetite and reason are in a civil war, spirit allies itself with reason.  This 
prompts some, such as Annas, to conclude that the parts of the soul are “aware of one 
another”, and thus “can conflict, producing civil war in the soul”.92  Certainly ‘two parties 
engaged in civil war’ sounds like a conflict that must be pursued by agents, and if spirit 
is an ‘ally’ of reason it certainly sounds like spirit is being described as an agent.   
The topic of allies (συμμάχων) comes up several times in the Republic, and 
bears some consideration.  In trying to illuminate the nature of spirit, Socrates uses 
                                            
 
 






similes to compare spirit / reason to auxiliaries / guardians and also to dogs / 
shepherds.  As realists and deflationists struggle to interpret these similes, paramount is 
that auxiliaries, guardians, dogs, and shepherds, all exhibit at least some measure of 
agentic behavior.  When the dog rounds up the sheep, or the army attacks enemies, at 
least some measure of agency seems to be on display.  Further, when they do these 
things in alliance with the shepherds and guardians, the very nature of alliance even 
more strongly suggests agency.  Allies, as we typically think of them, plan together, 
communicate, and though they act in a coordinated manner, each of the allies acts as 
an individual.  Therefore, when Socrates says that spirit is the ally of reason, there is 
good reason to consider that he may be implying that spirit has agent-like nature.  In 
trying to interpret the similes, though, it is useful to consider several relevant passages 
that discuss the nature of spirit. 
We will return to 4.441a-b below, but let us begin by noting that even before 
small children have any significant degree of reasoning capability, “they are full of spirit 
right from birth” (4.441a). In other words, our spirited nature is not here being portrayed 
as getting angry at those things that reason declares to be proper objects of anger, 
rather sometimes we simply get angry at things without the involvement of reason.  
Note that although this comment is made by Glaucon, Socrates does agree.  Indeed, 
Socrates’ agrees by saying “That’s really well put. And in animals too one can see that 
what you say is true.”  This comparison of the spirited nature of humans to the spirited 
nature of animals reinforces the above thought.  We can imagine a mother lion being 






competing male, but in both cases this would seem to be a matter of instinct and not on 
account of some reasoning by the lion about whether anger is warranted.  
But what is it that causes people to get angry at or ashamed of certain things 
rather than others?  Related to our earlier discussion of shame, one important 
difference between humans and animals is that although both humans and animals get 
angry at objects external to themselves, since only humans have a conception of 
themselves as beings, only they have self-directed anger, or shame.  Thus for humans, 
our spirited nature includes both externally directed anger and self-directed anger, or 
shame.  Here it is useful to turn back to Book 3, where Socrates says that a well-trained 
youth will “rightly object to what is shameful, hating it while he’s still young and unable to 
grasp the reason” (3.402a G).  Although Socrates has not yet introduced reason and 
spirit as parts of the soul, a fine young person will feel ashamed of a base thing, even 
without the capacity to reason about why the thing is base. (Again, here, the youth is the 
actor, not some part of him.)  And, Socrates continues, when reasoning does come, 
there will be an “affinity”, as Shorey has it.  On my reading, Socrates is saying that there 
will be an affinity between the reasoned beliefs and the felt shame about the base.93 
With these observations about the nature of spirit, we turn to 3.416b, where we 
find the first explicit usage of the term alliance (συμμάχων) to metaphorically describe 
the relationship of spirit and reason.94  In this section of text, the guardians have been 
                                            
 
 
93 Irwin (1995, 218) interprets this passage differently.  Since Socrates talks about a well-trained youth 
‘hating’ the shameful, Irwin takes him to be talking about an affinity between appetite and reason.  As 
noted earlier, though, Irwin’s account misses the relationship between spirit and shame. 
94 Loeb and Adam have ξυμμάχων where Slings and Burnet have συμμάχων, but note that LSJ says: “for 






distinguished from the auxiliaries, and the particular roles of each as well as their proper 
interaction are under discussion.  Socrates says that it is critical that the auxiliaries not 
become “savage masters instead of kindly allies” (3.416b G ἀντὶ συμμάχων εὐμενῶν 
δεσπόταις ἀγρίοις).  And when Glaucon says that their education in music (μουσική) will 
have taken care of that, Socrates denies that this is affirmable, saying rather that they 
must have the “right education, whatever it is” (3.416c).  The right poetry coupled with 
the right amount of gymnastic training builds harmony in the soul.  A good upbringing 
and the right education causes spirit to have the right nature and to get angry at or 
ashamed of the right things (as at 3.402a).   
Thus, although being allies in a civil war certainly sounds like it ascribes agency 
to spirit, Plato leaves us room to interpret the simile differently.  Socrates goes out of his 
way to preface the phrase, at 440b, with ὥσπερ, which as LSJ points out, is used “to 
limit or modify an assertion or apologize for a metaphor”.95  Socrates says that when 
appetites force a person contrary to what he believes to be right, anger sometimes 
makes war (πολεμεῖν) against the desires “as one thing against another” (4.440a).  
Socrates does not say that spirit is aware of and opposes appetite, but rather, as Bloom 
translates, it is, “just as though there were two parties at faction” (4.440b B).  Thus, 
reason and desires are ‘as if’ in a civil war and Socrates asks where spirit fits into this 
conflict.  The language of the simile demands that spirit be on one side or the other; and 
Socrates says that spirit “allies itself with reason”.  But in these passages, ‘we’ and not 
reason, spirit, or appetite are the actors.  An ignoble desire or action prompts thoughts 
                                            
 
 






of wrongness and feelings of shame.  In feeling ashamed at what one (also) believes to 
be ignoble, it just is the case that one’s spirit just is in ‘alliance’ or in ‘affinity’ with 
reason.  Where realists see the agency of allies, deflationists interpret the metaphor to 
highlight the reinforcing effect of two (not necessarily agentic) things that are aligned.   
Leontius illuminates this.  Leontius reasons that acting on his base appetite is 
wrong, and his spirited emotion of shame at the prospect of that action also helps hold 
him back.  It is ‘as if’ his reasoning and his shame were allies, since both impel him to 
resist his urges.96  Leontius’ spirit is not displayed as an agent, rather his spirited feeling 
of shame is simply aligned with his reasoning, and produces a reinforcing effect, 
namely, his pause and struggle.  Similarly, when I reason that virtue demands that I 
stand firm in battle and I turn to face my enemy, my adrenaline begins to pump.  It is ‘as 
if’ my adrenaline is the ally of my reason.  The adrenaline is not an agent, but it 
reinforces the effect of my reasoning.  Socrates flags his metaphor explicitly, but outside 
of the metaphor, both at 3.402a and at 4.440b, Socrates says nothing to directly 
describe spirit as a soul-part that a) understands reason’s commands and b) chooses to 
align with them. 
This discussion of what happens “when desires force someone contrary to 
calculation” is basically an inquiry into internal conflict.  What happens in those cases, 
Socrates says, is that the person “reproaches himself and his spirit is roused against 
that in him which is doing the forcing”.  Indeed, it is not only appetitive desires that might 
force someone contrary to calculation.  Spirited desires and emotions might do the 
                                            
 
 






same.  Consider a person who is generally a decent sort, but who happens to be very 
competitive.  What happens when his desire for victory leads him to cheat (i.e. when his 
desire to win ’forces him contrary to calculation’)?  His spirit is roused against ‘that in 
him which is doing the forcing’.  On a strongly deflationist reading this is not difficult.  He 
is ashamed of acting ignobly in pursuit of victory.  But on a realist reading, this is 
troublemaking.  Since desire for victory and feeling shame or self-directed anger are 
both said to be things we do with our spirit (or perhaps things that our spirit does), is his 
spirit aroused against itself? Socrates does not go into this here, perhaps so as not to 
complicate the argument, but the question naturally arises for the reader. 
 
2.1.6 Distinguishing Spirit and Reason (440c-441b)   
And what about when a man believes he’s being done injustice? Doesn’t his 
spirit in this case boil and become harsh and form an alliance for battle with what 
seems just; and, even if it suffers in hunger, cold and everything of the sort, 
doesn’t it stand firm and conquer, and not cease from its noble efforts before it 
has succeeded, or death intervenes, or before it becomes gentle, having been 
called in by the speech within him like a dog by a herdsman?  Most certainly, it 
resembles the likeness you make.  And, of course, we put the auxiliaries in our 
city like dogs obedient to the rulers, who are like shepherds of a city. (4.440c-d 
Bloom) 
 
Having begun the process of distinguishing spirited behavior in response to 
purely internal events (by considering what happens when appetite forces us contrary to 
reason) Socrates continues by considering how our spirit behaves in response to 
external events, such as in cases where we are unjust to others or they are unjust to us. 
Socrates continues to use language that is obviously metaphorical, however the 
metaphors still suggest agent-like soul-parts.  Again spirit “forms an alliance with what 






metaphor with ὥσπερ, here, the entire passage is a clear simile.  Glaucon, recognizing 
this, responds by saying: “Your similitude is perfect”.97  Spirit ‘stands firm and conquers’, 
’succeeds’, ‘is called back by reason’.  But first of all, as Bloom and Adam point out, the 
Greek here is very hard to interpret, and, as Bloom says, “It is not clear whether the 
passage refers to spirit or the man with spirit.”98  In the latter case, Bloom says, we 
should translate this as “doesn’t ‘he’ stand firm…until ‘he’ has succeeded”.   
If we do take the passage to refer to spirit, we are again confronted with the 
analogy of allies in battle.  The fact that spirit forms “an alliance for battle with what 
seems just” (4.440c B) impels Moline to take it that Socrates says the spirited part 
“naturally heeds the instructions of the wisdom loving part provided it has not been 
corrupted”. Moline concludes that “if it heeds such instructions ... it must be able to 
understand them”, and so “is not devoid of sense” (italics his).99  Yet I see no evidence 
in this text that one part ‘heeds’ another part.  When I believe that I have been treated 
unjustly (say, I believe that John stole my iPad) anger flares within me.  Yet when I 
become reasonably convinced that it is time to stop pursuing redress for an injustice, 
(say, I discover I had my iPad all the while) my anger naturally subsides.  This in no way 
implies that my spirit understands and concurs with my reasoning. 
But, Socrates asks, is spirit in fact part of our reasoning capacity, or is indeed 
rather a distinct part of our psyche.  To show that the latter is the case, Plato has 
                                            
 
 
97 Bloom calls uses the term “likeness”.  Shorey says that “καίτοι γε calls attention to the confirmation 
supplied by the image.” 
98 Bloom (1968, 457 n31). Adam (1902, 276), also translates 440c with the man, not his spirit, as the 
subject of the action. 






Socrates bring the example of Odysseus, whose anger is aroused but is opposed by his 
reasoning.  Odysseus struggles because on the one hand he is angry at his servants, 
(whom he believes are dishonoring him), and on the other hand, he does not wish to 
disrupt his long term plan to avenge himself on the suitors.  Now Cairns takes this to 
show that spirit has beliefs, citing “Odysseus’ belief that the disloyalty of the maid-
servants diminishes his honour, and this is not a belief that is supplied by the 
logistikon”.100  But, what in the text warrants the view that the belief is not supplied by 
Odysseus’ reason?  Why should we not take Socrates to be speaking clearly here?  
There is that in Odysseus, he says, “that reasons about the better and the worse” (τὸ 
ἀναλογισάμενον περὶ τοῦ βελτίονός τε καὶ χείρονος 4.441c).  In addition, there is “that 
which feels unreasoning anger” (τῷ ἀλογίστως θυμουμένῳ 4.441c). The maid-servants 
were indeed dishonoring Odysseus; they were acting quite disgracefully.  It seems likely 
that when Odysseus reasons about the better and the worse, he is reasoning about the 
rightness of avenging his honor against the maidservants versus the wrongness of 
acting rashly and frustrating his overall plan for vengeance against the suitors.  Thus, 
the belief-content that the maid-servants were dishonoring him could easily be part of 
his calculating about the better and the worse, whereas that in him which feels 
unreasoning anger, (at the dishonor) seems likely to be just that—unreasoning, a 
feeling, anger.  Overall, nothing here logically requires that we situate the reasoning 
within a spirit part; indeed, the words of the text seem to point us away from that 
conclusion. 
                                            
 
 







2.1.7 The Inquiry into Soul-Parts: Conclusions   
Through these waters, then, said I, we have with difficulty made our way and we 
are fairly agreed that the same kinds equal in number are to be found in the state 
and in the soul of each one of us. (4.441c) 
 
Socrates concludes that this inquiry (into soul-parts) is now complete.  It is 
obvious that just as the Kallipolis has within it producers, auxiliaries, and guardians, so 
too we have within us appetitiveness, spiritedness, and reasoning.  On Socrates’ view, it 
is now answered that we, for example, desire to drink, get angry, and calculate with 
different ‘parts’ of our psyche.  Of course, he says, this answer is still very provisional.  
There is a longer way that could provide a more secure answer, but this is our current 
answer—imprecise, but up to the level of the rest of the inquiry.   
The discussion of the nature of the soul and its parts will continue, as different 
character types are considered in Books 4, 8, and 9, as well as in the further 
discussions of Book 10.101  For now, though, let us sum up what the text of the ‘Inquiry 
Into Soul-Parts’ (4.435c-441c), on its own, actually says about soul-parts. 
First we should take note of the subject of discussion.  The discussion of 
appetite, spirit, and reason, has been entirely about how they manifest themselves in 
people in general.  There has been no discussion of differences in the nature of soul-
parts between producers, auxiliaries, or guardians.  Leontius is an example of a person 
with base desires, but we see the same phenomenon he exemplifies “in many other 
                                            
 
 
101 By Book 4, here, i intend 441c-445d.  Books 5, 6, and 7 give some insight into the nature of our 







cases”.   Odysseus is an example of a more noble person, but his struggle between 
anger and prudence is common in all of us.  Overall, we are considering how the 
psyche and its ‘parts’ behave, “in [Glaucon] or anyone else” (4.440b).   
This brings us to the second summary point, namely the language used to 
describe the ‘parts’.  Socrates is clearly talking about ‘things’ in our psyches, and likely 
even ‘parts’ of our psyches, but these aspects of our psyches are never once explicitly 
called ‘parts’ using the clear term μέρος, which will be used subsequently, in ‘The 
Inquiry into Character Types’.   
Third, and most important, Socrates’ characterization of the ‘parts’ in his direct 
speech is uniformly deflationist.  Certainly Socrates often here characterizes soul-parts 
as agent-like when speaking in metaphor, (such as when he says that it is “just as 
though there were two parties at faction” 4.440b).  However, unlike the text that follows, 
Socrates never says directly that appetite and spirit have their own beliefs, goals, or 
powers of means-end reasoning.  The parts are not characterized as being aware of 
each other, or of acting on each other.  Throughout this text, the actor has been the 
soul, not the soul's parts.  We get angry with a different ‘part’ of our psyche than the 
‘part’ with which we desire drink, but it is we, not our soul-parts, who are consistently 
said to be doing the desiring, the drinking, etc.   
‘The Inquiry into Soul-Parts’ is the first time that we peer inside the soul and try to 
understand what is the nature of these parts that our souls have.  Plato has Socrates 
here use language (simile, metaphor, etc.) that at least invites Glaucon and the perhaps 
the first time reader to understand these parts as agent-like.  And there is pedagogical 






like, so if the parts of our souls are like the parts of the city, then perhaps we can 
understand the nature of internal psychic conflict.  But Socrates also gives us strong 
hints that we should resist the temptation to see the soul-parts as agent-like.  Attending 
to the contrast between the uniformly non-agent-like description in direct speech and 
the very agent-like suggestions of the metaphors, though, opens the possibility that we 
are not required to take the soul-parts as agent-like, even in the first, shorter-way, 
exposition.  Thus Socrates shows us a possible reading of the internal structure of the 
soul that breaks with the agent-like parts of the city.  Further, the subject matter of ‘The 
Inquiry into Soul-Parts’ has consistently been psychic conflict when faced with a single 
decision.  Leontius either will look at the corpses or refrain.  Odysseus will either slay 
the servant girls or refrain.  In these cases, although the suggestions (through metaphor 
and analogy) that the soul-parts might be agent-like are useful, they are not necessary.  
In understanding why Leontius fails in his resolve and looks at the corpses, it is useful to 
think of his appetite wanting to look and overpowering his shame.  But it is not 
necessary.  For a single action like this, we can easily understand Leontius’ behavior 
with a notion of non-agent-like soul-parts.  There is in Leontius a desire to look and a 
feeling of shame at the prospect.  The strength of the desire causes Leontius, who is 
the only agent, to look.  Single actions are easy to explain in terms of soul-parts, but 
they do not need to be agent-like soul-parts.102 
                                            
 
 
102 The account in Roochnik (2003, 89-90) differs significantly from mine.  I do agree with him, though, 
that a) “The tripartite scheme of book 4, though a useful beginning…was static…It’s version of the soul 
was locked into a single frozen moment of time by the Principle of Non-Opposition”, and b) “by the time 
Socrates reaches book 9, he acknowledges that ‘we act with the soul as a whole’ [436b] not by means of 






Overall, if the Republic ended here (at 4.441c), or if Book 10 followed next as the 
conclusion (which I think is an interesting thought experiment), I suspect that many 
commentators would be deflationists.  Even so notable a realist as Irwin, as Whiting 
puts it, “more or less concedes that ‘for the purposes of Book IV’ a deflationist account 
will do”.103  Certainly some commentators would still believe that the city-soul analogy 
pushes us to see the parts as agents.  And likely other commentators would put forward 
other reasons to interpret this passage in a realist manner, perhaps because they think 
Plato needs this to explain the nature of weakness of will and/or to argue against 
Socratic Intellectualism.  As I have highlighted during the exegesis, some have argued 
that even absent the characterizations of Books 8 and 9, the text here displays parts as 
agent-like in nature.  On my reading, though, the plain sense of the text, here, strongly 
suggests a deflationist interpretation, but because of the frequent metaphors, leaves the 
question open.  I will argue, however, that subsequent sections will be different. 
 
2.2 The Inquiry into Character types (4.441c-445d, 8.544a-9.592b) 
I have named 4.441c-445d, and 8.544a-9.592b, ‘The Inquiry into Character 
Types’ with no question begging intent.  I make no prejudgment as to whether or how 
the characterization of soul-parts found here should be incorporated into our 
understanding of how Plato saw the nature of the parts of our souls.  Nevertheless, the 
                                            
 
 
103 Whiting (2012, 203).  Whiting is pointing to Irwin’s Plato Moral Theory, where on p.227 he concedes 
that “It is not clear that [the soul parts of Books VIII and IX] are the same parts of the soul as the parts 
with the same names in IV”, and p.327, where he says that “for the purposes of Book IV, then, Plato’s 
general claims about ‘kinds’, ‘parts’, and ‘things’, amount to the claim that there are desires differing in 
kind in a way unrecognized by Socrates.  I have assumed that the archer and the top, with different parts 
or aspects in different conditions, are meant to be parallel to the soul, which is also one thing with 






change of subject matter is clear.  Socrates first says that they have completed the 
difficult inquiry into whether the parts of the soul are like the parts of the city and then 
turns to the description of different the five character types (“πέντε δὲ ψυχῆς” 445d) that 
are ‘worth mentioning'.104  Socrates begins by distinguishing (4.441c-445d) what he 
calls “the just man” (4.444a).  The discussion is then halted while Books 5, 6, and 7 
concern themselves with matters of metaphysics, epistemology, and the education of 
the Philosopher-Kings.  Certainly in these ‘middle books’ people are said to have 
appetites (such as the person who does or doesn't have an appetite for food at 5.475c) 
and to be spirited (such as the spirited person at 5.465a).  Nevertheless, soul-parts are 
not mentioned at all in the middle books, so this chapter will jump over them, resuming 
at 8.544a, where Socrates distinguishes four other character types, namely, timocratic, 
oligarchic, democratic, and tyrannical.105   
Interpreting this section of the Republic raises the same tension between realist 
and deflationist alternatives as was found in the ‘Inquiry into Soul-Parts’ (4.435c-441c).  
In the last section, I argued (with the deflationists and against the realists) that Socrates, 
in direct speech, consistently presented soul-parts as not agent-like, throughout ‘The 
Inquiry into Soul-Parts’.  In this section, though, I am more aligned with the realists.  I 
will argue that here, Socrates does often (though not always) present soul-parts as 
agent-like in direct as well as metaphorical speech.  I claim that this is true in both the 
                                            
 
 
104 Without discussion, I am using the term ‘character’ here, to describe the ‘one just form and the four 
unjust forms found both in the constitutions of cities and people’.  My focus, in this chapter and in this 
section, remains on the nature of soul-parts. In the next two chapters I will dig into just what I take 
Socrates to mean by ‘character’. 
105 Socrates does mention soul-parts once, but only to reiterate that “the statements made at that time 






Book 4 portion of the passage (4.441c-445d) and also the Books 8 and 9 portion 
(8.544a-9.592b).  In both portions, I claim, appetite and spirit are sometimes given 
goals, beliefs, means-end reasoning powers, conversational abilities, and agency.   
My approach here will differ from the previous section.  In the previous section, 
because my claim was that the soul-parts were presented as uniformly non-agent-like in 
direct speech, I worked through the text methodically, arguing that each section was 
best read as deflationist.  Further, I used realist interpretations as objections to answer 
at each point.  Here, though, since I am claiming the frequent but not uniform presence 
of realist depiction of soul-parts in direct speech, I have less need to work through the 
entire text.  I will focus on select passages where Socrates’ direct language supports a 
realist interpretation of soul-parts and will also pick some passages to support the claim 
of non-uniformity.  Also, though I am arguing in line with the realists here, I will not 
attempt to methodically answer deflationist objections, since I will ultimately be aligned 
with the deflationist's overall viewpoint, if not their specific objections to this section of 
Plato’s text. 
 
2.2.1 The Just Character Type (441c-445d) 
Having made his “difficult way through a sea of argument”, Socrates turns to the 
next topic.  The subject under discussion shifts from ‘all of us’ to the person of just 
character.  Along with this shift in subject comes a shift in language.  Whereas in the 
prior section Socrates discussed ‘parts’ of the soul without using the term μέρος, he now 
begins to do so almost immediately (e.g. 4.442b, 4.442c, 4.444b).  Further, Socrates, in 






beliefs, communications capacity, and goals—that is to say, according to the definition 
that we have adopted, they are depicted as agent-like.  
Socrates, in this section, explicitly ascribes to spirit and appetite the possession 
of beliefs.  Spirit “learns and is educated to do its work” (4.442a) by means of “soothing 
stories” (Bloom) or “soothing address” (Adam).  And most explicitly, spirit, appetite, and 
reason “have the same beliefs” (ὁμοδοξῶσι 4.442d).106  Certainly the interpretative 
tension is still with us.  Deflationists can and do argue that Socrates should be taken to 
be speaking metaphorically, but at the surface level of the text of this passage, this is 
not the case.  Spirit is clearly the subject, and ‘learns’ is clearly the verb.  Socrates does 
not say that spirit is ‘like a child that is educated’ or that it is ‘like the auxiliaries that are 
educated’.  In his direct speech, here, he simply says that spirit is educated and has 
beliefs. 
Along with beliefs, lower soul-parts are explicitly shown as being aware of each 
other, and communicating with each other.  Unlike the earlier references to spirit and 
reason as allies, which were couched in metaphor and open to the interpretation that 
spirit naturally acts along the same lines as reason, and thus though acting 
independently, is in a de facto alliance with it, here spirit is explicitly said to be the ally of 
reason because it listens to it and obeys (ὑπηκόῳ 4.441e).  Of course, spirit cannot truly 
‘listen’ to reason since it has no ears, however if it obeys reason, then it must be aware 
of reason.  Again, Socrates speaks directly here.   Similarly, at 4.442c, spirit is said to 
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act in accordance with “the rule handed down by the reason as to what is or is not to be 
feared”, as Shorey translates, and as seems to me to be the intent of the text.  Bloom 
renders the passage “what has been proclaimed by the speeches about that which is 
terrible and that which is not”.  Shorey’s translation depicts an agent-like spirit in 
communication with reason.  Bloom’s translation is even more realist, showing spirit not 
only in communication with reason, but able to understand its speeches, directly, about 
what is and is not to be feared.  Either way, the description, as Socrates gives it, is very 
realist.  Spirit (along with reason) will “watch over” (προστήσεσθον 4.442a) appetite.  
Certainly there is some metaphor at work here, since spirit cannot actually ‘watch over’ 
(or, more literally, stand over) appetite.  Nevertheless, Socrates is saying that spirit is 
aware of appetite, which was one of the criteria we set down for agent-like parts.  
Further, at 4.442c-d the three parts are said to be in a state of friendship (φιλίᾳ) with 
each other.  In the prior section, I argued that when Socrates used the metaphor of two 
parties being ‘like allies’, it might depict two parties independently pursuing the same 
path, thereby being ‘like allies’.  Certainly, despite the fact that Socrates has shifted the 
discussion to a new topic (‘The Inquiry into Character Types’) the prior section is still 
fresh in our minds, so ‘being friends’ will likely call to mind the prior picture of the parts 
being ‘like allies’.  In this sense the metaphor may still be said to be operating, and the 
deflationist will likely argue that it is.  Nevertheless, Socrates does explicitly say that the 
parts will be friends; and to be friends, it seems as if there must be two parties that are 
aware of each other.  
Other examples could be brought forward.  Many, for example, have argued that 






reasoning capability.107  Overall, Socrates here uses direct speech to depict lower soul-
parts as agent-like.  Even as strong a deflationist as Shields calls this “indisputable”.108  
Now Shields (and others) still want to claim that these textual references are 
metaphorical; and the text is certainly open to interpretation.  However, what is clear is 
that in this section, the text itself, in Shields’ words, “does speak in agentive terms of the 
faculties of soul…indisputably”.109   
Nevertheless, although I have argued that in parts of this passage the plain 
sense of the text clearly describes soul-parts in realist terms, it is not uniformly realist, 
either in how it refers to parts or in how it characterizes them.  Though Socrates, as 
already pointed out, does here introduce the strong term for parts (μέρος) of the soul, he 
does not entirely abandon his prior practice of referring to them in weaker terms.  He 
still, for example, refers to parts of the soul as ‘classes’ (γένος, e.g. at 4.442b and 
4.443d.)  And although the parts are sometimes clearly the agents, at other times it is 
the person, not his soul-parts, who is the agent.  Thus it is a person at 4.442b-c who is 
courageous or wise or moderate, and a just person, like the image of justice in the just 
city, who, as Bloom translates, 
doesn’t let each part in him mind other people’s business or the three classes in 
the soul meddle with each other, but really sets his own house in good order and 
rules himself; he arranges himself, becomes his own friend, and harmonizes the 
three parts, exactly like three notes in a harmonic scale, lowest, highest and 
middle.  And if there are some other parts in between, he binds them together 
and becomes entirely one from many, moderate and harmonized.  Then, and 
only then, he acts…he believes and names a just and fine action one that 
preserves and helps to produce this condition, and wisdom the knowledge that 
supervises this action; while he believes and names an unjust action one that 
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undoes this condition, and lack of learning, in its turn, the opinion that supervises 
this action. (4.443b-e Bloom) 
 
Overall, it is the individual, not the parts, that is clearly the agent here.  He, not 
his parts acts; he has beliefs, etc.  And yet, the realist/deflationist ambiguity is very 
evident in this passage.  Though ‘he’ is the subject who doesn’t let his soul-parts “mind 
each other’s business” or “meddle with each other”, minding and meddling seem to 
indicate that those soul-parts have at least the potential for agentic activity, inter-part 
interaction, etc. Socrates refers to soul-parts metaphorically as notes in a harmonic 
scale, and introduces the inter-part interaction in this passage by referring back to the 
city soul analogy, where an ‘image of justice’ (εἴδωλόν τι τῆς δικαιοσύνης 4.443c) 
depicted agentic city parts each doing their own work.   
Overall, then, it seems that the transition that Socrates announces at 4.441c is 
quite significant.  Of course, Socrates might shift subject matter without shifting from 
deflationist to realist description of soul-parts.  But Socrates does more than simply shift 
topic.  The subject under discussion shifts from people in general (just like us), to a 
specific, (and I will ultimately argue idealized) character type.  The language shifts from 
characterizing soul-parts only in very tentative terms, to sometimes calling them ‘parts’ 
in a distinct manner.  And Socrates’ characterization of the soul-parts in direct speech 
shifts from uniformly non-agent-like to often (though not uniformly) agent-like.  Socrates’ 
new practice of describing soul-parts in agentic terms in his direct speech continues 







2.2.2 The Four Unjust Characters (8.544a-9.592b)   
As was the case with the just character type, the subject under discussion is not 
‘all of us’ but rather specific types of unjust characters.  Further, as it was when 
discussing the just character type, Socrates does not here avoid the strong term μέρος 
in referring to the soul-parts of the unjust character types.  At 9.577d, for example, the 
tyrannical city is compared with the tyrannical soul.  In each case, the “best and most 
reasonable parts (μέρη) of it being enslaved, while a small part, the worst and the most 
frenzied, plays the despot”.  Similarly, at 9.581a, Socrates refers to the part of the soul 
(τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ μέρος) that is money-loving or profit-loving.  Socrates also refers to our 
reasoning part as a μέρος, discussing the pleasure of “that part of the soul (τοῦ μέρους 
τῆς ψυχῆς) by which we learn” (9.583a).  Still, Socrates does not abandon his use of 
weaker terms to describe parts of the soul.  He still refers to soul-parts as ‘forms’ (εἴδη), 
e.g. at 9.572a.  He still often avoids the word ‘part’ entirely, though most translators 
helpfully add it (as at 8.550b, to cite one of numerous instances).  Thus, as was the 
case in the discussion of the just character type, Socrates here sometimes uses and 
sometimes avoids strong partite language in referring to parts of the soul.  
More important than his use of μέρος to describe the parts, Socrates often 
describes the soul-parts of the four unjust character types in agentic terms in his direct 
speech, just as he did the soul-parts of the just character type.  Appetite and spirit here 
sometimes seem to have beliefs.  In many people, the baser desires can be controlled 
by an alliance between “the better desires in alliance with reason” (τῶν βελτιόνων 






entities working together.  There certainly seems to be partite agency highlighted here, 
and it also seems that each of the two parts (reason and the better part of appetite), on 
their own, have the belief that the base appetites are wrong and lawless.  Some 
scholars point to 9.586d-e as evidence that reason can persuade appetite and spirit to 
act according to its judgment and that therefore appetite and spirit must be capable of 
understanding arguments and holding beliefs.110  Similarly, at 8.554c, Socrates says 
that the oligarchic soul’s base appetites are held down “not persuading them that it ‘is 
better not’ nor taming them by reason, but by compulsion and fear”.  Many take from 
this that appetite is a part could be persuaded, even if it is not so persuaded in this type 
of character.111  Further, in the tyrannical soul, our appetite has its own beliefs about the 
honorable versus the base (9.574d) and ‘dares’ (τολμᾷ) to undertake any act it 
‘supposes’ (οἴεται) to be desirable (9.571c).112   
Also, as in the case of the just character type, the unjust character types are 
sometimes described as having parts that are aware of one another, can communicate 
with one another, and can act on one another.  As evidence, some commentators point 
to 8.554c-e, where “his better desires master his worse desires”.113  Further, in 9.589a-
b, Shields, among others, points to the fact that the various parts are said to “bite and 
kill one another rather than accustoming them to each other and making them 
friendly”.114  This certainly appears to depict soul-parts as being aware of each other 
                                            
 
 
110 See, for example, Carone (2001, 126-127). 
111 See, for example, Carone (ibid.) or Singpurwalla (2011, 14). 
112 Moss (2008, 37 n4) points to these passages as implying appetite has beliefs about what is fine and 
shameful (574d), and also making it “explicit” that appetite has beliefs (571c).  
113 Bloom’s translation.  See, for example, Singpurwalla (2011, 14), among many. 






and acting as agent upon each other.  Nevertheless, the same realist/deflationist 
ambiguity that we noted at 4.442b-e is very evident in this passage.  Consider the entire 
passage, as Grube/Reeve translate: 
Then, fashion around them the image of one of them, that of a human being so 
that anyone who sees only the outer covering and not what's inside will think it is 
a single creature, a human being. It's done. Then, if someone maintains that 
injustice profits this human being and that doing just things brings no advantage, 
let's tell him that he is simply saying that it is beneficial for him, first, to feed the 
multiform beast well and make it strong, and also the lion and all that pertains to 
him; second, to starve and weaken the human being within, so that he is dragged 
along wherever either of the other two leads; and, third, to leave the parts to  bite 
and kill one another rather than accustoming them to each other and making 
them friendly. (588d-589a) 
 
On the one hand, the parts biting and killing each other, or alternatively getting 
accustomed to each other and becoming friendly makes the parts sound very agent-
like.  On the other hand, the human being that contains the parts is very much in 
evidence as a primary actor as well.  Further, the entire passage is a metaphor that 
admits of alternative interpretations, as opposed to clear and direct speech.  
And yet, Socrates seems to speak very explicitly at 9.586e-587a, saying  
Then when the entire soul accepts the guidance of the wisdom-loving part and is 
not filled with inner dissension, the result for each part is that it in all other 
respects keeps to its own task and is just, and likewise that each enjoys its own 
proper pleasures and the best pleasures and, so far as such a thing is possible, 
the truest. And so when one of the other two gets the mastery the result for it is 
that it does not find its own proper pleasure and constrains the others to pursue 
an alien pleasure and not the true.  (9.586e-587a)115 
                                            
 
 
115 τῷ φιλοσόφῳ ἄρα ἑπομένης ἁπάσης τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ μὴ στασιαζούσης ἑκάστῳ τῷ μέρει ὑπάρχει εἴς τε 
τἆλλα τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν καὶ δικαίῳ εἶναι, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς τὰς ἑαυτοῦ ἕκαστον καὶ τὰς βελτίστας καὶ 
εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν τὰς ἀληθεστάτας καρποῦσθαι.  κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. ὅταν δὲ ἄρα τῶν ἑτέρων τι κρατήσῃ, 









The subject in the final sentence (τι) refers to appetite or spirit.  First, at 9.586d (as in 
many other places), Socrates refers to appetite and spirit as the money-loving (τὸ 
φιλοκερδὲς) and the victory-loving (τὸ φιλόνικον).  Then, in the passage above, ἑτέρων 
refers back to them, picking out ‘one of the two’, i.e. appetite or spirit.  Thus ‘appetite or 
spirit' is the subject of the sentence and the doer of the action.  And the action that 
appetite or spirit undertakes is to gain control over the soul (κρατήσῃ).  Both appetite 
and spirit are able to compel the other parts (τά τε ἄλλ᾽ ἀναγκάζειντά ἀλλοτρίαν) to 
pursue (διώκειν) their distinctive pleasures.  To the realist, this passage ascribes 
agency to appetite and spirit.  Carone, for example interprets this passage to show that:  
the lower parts of the soul are also capable of means-end reasoning, where the 
end can be described as valuable in so far as it is the target of aspiration which 
makes the means instrumentally good to attain the goal.116 
 
In a well ordered soul, where reason leads, each part enjoys its own pleasures, 
but only pleasures that are good for the person.  Appetite, for example, would desire the 
right kind and the right amount of drink.  Left to its own devices, though, appetite is 
“unable to find its own proper pleasure”; it might, for example, desire to consume four 
martinis instead of two glasses of water.  Further, if appetite gains ascendency in the 
soul, it forces the other parts also to pursue, as Shorey puts it, “an alien pleasure”.  
Thus reason will be thinking, say, about how to procure the four martinis instead of 
reasoning about how to procure the right food and drink.  A deflationist, of course, will 
                                            
 
 






read 9.586e-587a differently.  If I am controlled by an appetite for martinis, then I will set 
about obtaining those martinis; but it may be me, not my appetite, that sets that goal. 
Nevertheless, that the soul-parts in Books 8 and 9 have their own goals is 
evident in other passages as well.  Spirit is “wholly set on predominance and victory and 
good repute” (9.581a), which certainly sounds more like spirit having goals than being 
attracted to certain distinctive pleasures.  As for appetite, many commentators point to 
580e to show that it too has goals.117   
We called it the appetitive part because of the intensity of its appetites concerned 
with food and drink and love and their accompaniments, and likewise the money-
loving part, because money is the chief instrument for the gratification of such 
desires. (580e)   
 
That appetite desires money not (or not only) for its own sake, but also instrumentally, 
seems (as has often been pointed out) to give goals and goal-oriented behavior to 
appetite (not to mention the capacity for means-end reasoning). 
In addition to the often agentic description of the soul-parts of the four unjust 
character types, the metaphors used to support the argument also pull many to see the 
soul-parts as agent-like.  For example, many commentators take from the 
man/beast/lion metaphor at 9.588c-d that since the beast and the lion are agents, 
Socrates must be suggesting that appetite and spirit are also agents.118    
Deflationists, of course, will counter-argue (as noted earlier) that the main point 
of this analogy is the lion-like nature of spirit and the beast-like nature of appetite, not 
the agentic nature of the soul-parts that are said to be like them.  In addition to rejecting 
                                            
 
 
117 See, for example, Bobonich (2002, 246), among many. 






the lion/beast/man metaphor as showing that soul-parts are agents, deflationists will 
also point to the many places in Books 8 and 9 where the person, rather than his parts, 
is the agent of the action.119  
 
2.2.3 The Inquiry into Character types: Conclusion 
Overall, on a close reading of the text, there is much here to support a realist 
reading of soul-parts, although the realist/deflationist question is still open.  At the end of 
Section 2.1, after working through ‘The Inquiry into Soul-Parts’ (4.435c-441c), I 
suggested that “if the Republic ended here (at 4.441c) … I suspect that many 
commentators would be deflationists”.  Now that we’ve worked through the rest of Book 
4, and Books 8 and 9, though, the matter is much more complicated.  Unlike the picture 
of soul-parts in ‘The Inquiry into Soul-Parts’, where Socrates used metaphors open to 
realist interpretation, but in his direct speech gave uniformly non-agent-like descriptions 
of soul-parts, here Socrates often describes those soul-parts in very realist terms, both 
in his direct and his metaphorical speech.  Although there is still ambiguity, a realist 
might reasonably argue that Socrates introduced the soul-parts in the first section and 
then elaborated upon them with more detail in the second.  She therefore would feel 
justified in applying the more well elaborated descriptions from ‘The Inquiry into 
Character Types’ to the earlier ‘Inquiry into Soul-Parts’ passage, in order fully to 
understand Socrates’ meaning.  Deflationists, on the other hand, want to take much of 
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well as in metaphor.  Here, though, it is not the spirit-part, but the person who is the agent.  It is he who is 






the language of ‘The Inquiry into Character Types’ to be metaphorical, pointing to the 
philosophical problems that would emerge if the ‘parts’ were truly agent-like. 
Note also the difference in subject matter between ‘The Inquiry into Soul-Parts 
and ‘The Inquiry into Character Types’.  Whereas the former (as noted in section 2.1.7) 
focused on single actions, the latter focuses on whole lives and how people are 
disposed to behave.  Agent-like soul parts are a useful pedagogical tool for explaining 
how particular people are disposed to behave.  If we imagine somebody like the 
oligarchic man, it is easy to understand his behavior in terms of his agent-like appetite 
part ruling his soul and directing his actions.  Thus non-agent-like soul-parts were 
pedagogically useful and sufficient for discussing single actions in ‘The Inquiry into 
Soul-Parts, whereas agent-like soul parts were pedagogically useful for discussing 
whole lives in ‘The Inquiry into Character Types’.  But we must keep in mind Socrates’ 
repeated statements that the description of soul-parts in this shorter-way discussion will 
certainly not be precise or accurate (4.435d), that all of the conclusions must be 
abandoned if the hypothesis of non-opposition turns out be inaccurate, etc.  It is quite 
possible that both the agent-like picture of soul-parts and the non-agent-like picture of 
soul parts are presented because they are pedagogically useful at that moment in the 
argument, but will need to be abandoned because they are just not accurate pictures of 
how the inside of the soul functions. 
If the Republic ended here, at the end of Book 9, the debate between realists and 
deflationists would seem to be unresolvable.  And indeed, as mentioned earlier, until 
recently most commentators did end their consideration of the psychological theory of 






in this debate have ignored Book 10 entirely in trying to understand the nature of soul-
parts.  Irwin and Bobonich, to cite two examples, never mention Book 10 at all.  Annas 
covers Book 10 in a separate section of her An Introduction to the Republic, but does 
not incorporate it into her argument about the nature of soul-parts. Many others have 
done the same. I contend that for this reason, it is not surprising that the debate 
continues to be active.    
But Book 9 is not the end of the Republic.  I suggest that those who regard Book 
10 as an excrescence, appendix, afterthought, etc., sell Plato short.  Further, it seems to 
me that Book 10 concerns itself vitally with human psychology, that is to say, the nature 
of the soul, its putative 'parts,' and the types of character it may develop.  I think that 
Book 10, as some commentators have recently begun to realize, can help us fill out the 
picture of the psychology that Socrates expounds in the Republic, providing, on my 
view, new evidence to push us toward a deflationist understanding of soul-parts. 
 
2.3 Book 10 
Grube/Reeve’s introduction to Book 10 offers a typical summary, namely that a) 
the main argument of the Republic is complete, b) Socrates now returns to the subject 
of poetry, and c) Socrates then turns to the topic of the immortality of the soul.120  
Overall, this summary is certainly fair, but I do not agree that the main argument is 
complete.  On my view, Socrates is still pursuing the stated project of the Republic, 
namely, to argue for the superiority of the virtuous life.  Over the course of the first nine 
                                            
 
 






books, the inquiry has suggested that for most people (including Socrates), virtue 
entails a particular organization of the soul, where your reason (if you are a realist) or 
your reasoning (if you are a strong deflationist) leads and potentially conflicting desires 
and emotions follow the dictates of reason (or reasoning).  On my reading of Book 10, 
as Socrates revisits imitation, and delves into the immortal soul, he also continues The 
Inquiry into psychology.  For our purposes, we can consider Book 10 as comprising two, 
roughly equally sized parts, the first of these being the consideration of poetry and its 
effect on the city and the soul (10.595a-608b), and the second of them being the Myth 
of Er (10.608c-621d).  This section concerns itself with the former, since the latter half 
makes no mention of soul-parts.121  
For the purposes of this discussion, the former (Book 10’s inquiry into poetry, and 
its effect on the soul) will be considered in three main sections: 1) ‘The Charge Against 
Painting’ (10.602c-603c), 2) ‘The Charge Against Poetry’ (10.603c-605c), and 3) ‘The 
Greatest Charge’ (10.605c-606d).  A fourth section, namely ‘The Image of Glaucus’ 
(10.611b—612a), is also relevant to our exegesis on soul-parts and will be briefly 
discussed as well.  
Overall, in this section, I argue that just as was the case in Book 4’s ‘Inquiry Into 
Soul-Parts’ (4.435c-441c), the discussion here concerns the nature of the souls of 
ordinary people in cities similar to the Athens of Plato’s day, where, for example, 
unsupervised theater is present.  Further, at least in direct speech, I will argue that 
Socrates describes the soul and its ‘parts’ in uniformly deflationist terms.  My approach 
                                            
 
 







will be to work through each of the four above mentioned passages that pertain to soul-
parts, testing whether the description is realist or deflationist at each point.  
 
2.3.1 The Effect of Poetry On the Soul (10.595a-608b) 
Socrates opens Book 10 by asserting that it is clear that they were right, earlier, 
in excluding mimetic poetry (μιμητική) from the Kallipolis, now that the forms or parts of 
the soul (τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς εἴδη) have been distinguished.  It is not entirely clear what 
Socrates is referring to by this phrase.  This might be taken to mean ‘now that (having 
ended Books 8 and 9), the various forms or species of soul have been distinguished’.  
Perhaps this is Bloom’s intent, when he renders: “now that the soul’s forms have each 
been separated out”.122  Halliwell similarly renders this as “now that the categories of 
the soul have each been distinguished”.123  This reading seems to connect the 
discussion strongly to the immediately prior ‘Inquiry into Character Types’.  That is to 
say, now that the various types of soul have been distinguished (timocrat, oligarch, 
etc.), it is clear that mimetic poetry should be excluded from the Kallipolis.  This reading 
works well with the flow of the text.  If this were the case, though, one might then expect 
Socrates to contrast how poetry affects the austere oligarch as compared with the 
flighty democrat or the frenzied tyrant, but he does not do so.  There is no mention here 
in Book 10 of any of these character types.124   
                                            
 
 
122 Bloom (1968, 277). 
123 Halliwell (1988, 35). 
124 Indeed, Book 10’s discussion of εἴδωλα puts us in mind of the images of pleasure that the tyrant 
experiences in Book 9 (9.587c).  The same is true for Book 10’s return to the expulsion of poets and 
Socrates’ suggestion, at 8.568b, that “we don't admit [poets] into our city, since they praise tyranny”.  
These similarities, though, make it even more surprising that Socrates never, in Book 10, once mentions 






Alternatively, since Socrates often uses εἴδη to mean ‘parts’, τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς εἴδη 
might rather mean ‘the parts of the soul’, as Grube/Reeve renders: “now that we have 
distinguished the separate parts of the soul”.125   This approach seems to connect Book 
10 with ‘The Inquiry into Soul-Parts’.  However, as will emerge, this reading also entails 
difficulties.  As soon as the inquiry begins, Socrates says that he thinks mimetic poetry 
“is likely to distort the thought (διανοίας) of anyone who hears it.  One might have 
expected Socrates to say that mimetic poetry feeds the appetite, but though the soul 
and its parts are explicitly discussed here, throughout Book 10 appetite and spirit are 
never mentioned at all, at least not by the names we have come to know them in the 
dialogue so far.   
For now, let us put aside the question of what Socrates means by “now that we 
have distinguished the εἴδη of the soul”.  A couple of points should be noted at the 
outset, though.  The Book 4 discussion is heavily referenced throughout Book 10’s 
argument.  At 10.602e, for example, Socrates refers back to the principle of non-
opposition.  Similarly, at 10.603d, Socrates recalls 4.439cff, saying, “we already came to 
an adequate conclusion about all these things in our earlier arguments”.   Secondly, 
although Socrates begins Book 10 with a reference to the Kallipolis (10.595a) and ends 
the section with forward looking comments about the Kallipolis (10.607b-608b), the 
intervening discussion is not in any manner about the Kallipolis.126   Socrates does 
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126 As noted by Halliwell (2011, 248ff) and others.  Verity Harte (2010, 70) for example, writes: "On the 
view I defend, book 10's discussion of mimetic art is focused on the prospects of mitigating the harmful 






reprise a city-soul analogy at 10.605a-b, and this makes us think of the Kallipolis, but 
the city does not seem to be the Kallipolis.  In this city, the people who should rule are 
not ‘philosophers’, or ‘guardians’ but rather ordinary citizens—simply ones who are the 
“better sort” (χαριεστέρους 10.605b) of citizens.  And contrasted with those better sort of 
citizens are not auxiliaries or producers, but simply “bad” (μοχθηροὺς 10.605b) citizens.  
None of the discussion in this first half of Book 10 is about how mimetic poetry affects 
the souls of Philosopher-Kings, auxiliaries, producers, or any of the inhabitants of the 
Kallipolis, but rather how it affects the souls of people in general—the inhabitants of 
existing cities, who attend the theater, look at sticks in water, suffer losses, and so forth. 
As Socrates and Glaucon inquire into how people react to poetry, illusion, suffering, 
etc., they are considering the psychology of people across the board— “the majority of 
people who know nothing” (10.602b), and also “the best of us” (10.605c).  Thus it 
seems that in Book 10’s inquiry into ‘The Effect of Poetry on the Soul’, like Book 4’s 
'Inquiry into Soul-Parts’, considers the social behavior and psychology of ordinary 
people in ordinary cities.  
 
2.3.2 The Charge Against Painting (602c-603c) 
Now, then, on which one of the parts of the human being does [imitation] have 
the power it has…What sort of part do you mean… The same magnitude surely 
doesn’t look equal to our sight from near and from far…And haven’t measuring, 
counting, and weighing come to light as most charming helpers in these 
cases…But this surely must be the work of the calculating part in a soul…And to 
it, when it has measured and indicates that some things are bigger or smaller 
than others, or equal, often contrary appearances are presented at the same 
time about the same things…Didn’t we say that it is impossible for the same thing 
to opine contraries at the same time about the same things…Therefore, the part 
of the soul opining contrary to the measures would not be the same as the part 







Lately, this passage has attracted much attention, and I think rightly so.127  There is 
discussion here of a soul-part that ‘opines’ or in some translations, ‘forms beliefs’.  If it 
turns out that appetite and/or appetite and spirit is the part that opines, this might be 
strong evidence for a realist interpretation, since having strong beliefs (e.g. opinions) 
was one of the criteria of realist soul-parts.128  I am going to spend a significant amount 
of  time with this passage, arguing that the soul-part that opines, here, is not appetite, 
spirit, or appetite and spirit combined.   Further, I am going to argue that even if one 
does take the soul-part under discussion to be appetite, or appetite and spirit combined, 
this passage, on my view, still does not support a realist interpretation. 
Socrates opens the discussion with a question that is worded vaguely.  “What 
sort of thing in a human being” (10.602c, as Sachs, in typically literal manner, has it) is 
affected by imitation?  And Glaucon seems confused, replying, “What sort of thing are 
you talking about?” (10.602c).  It certainly does appear, despite the vague language, 
that Socrates is asking ‘which part of the soul does imitation affect?’  But he seems to 
be almost pointedly avoiding using a word for part, or part-names, like ‘appetite’ or 
‘spirit’.  At times, Socrates says, we measure two things to determine which is larger 
and this act of calculation, of course, is the work of the reasoning part of the soul (τοῦ 
λογιστικοῦ ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἐν ψυχῇ ἔργον, 10.602e).  However, sometimes, at that very 
moment, “the opposite appears to it at the same time” (10.602e G).  Therefore, as per 
the principle of non-opposition, there must exist in the soul some part other than reason 
that forms the opposing belief about the size.  But, it is not at all clear what part of the 
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soul it is that opposes reason.  Is it (a) some inferior part of reason, (b) appetite, or 
appetite and spirit together, but not possessing beliefs, c) appetite, or appetite and spirit 
together, with possession of beliefs, or (d) something else altogether?  The Greek is 
certainly unclear, and Adam devotes an entire appendix to discussing alternative ways 
of understanding the language here.129  (In the discussion that follows, for simplicity and 
with no intention of question-begging, I am going to refer to this part as ‘the opining 
part’, since repeatedly referring to ‘the part that opines contrary to measurement’ is 
unwieldy.) 
Nehamas, Kenny, and Murphy, among others, opt for alternative (a).130  This 
seems to be a reasonable reading of the Greek, since, as Halliwell points out, “in strict 
grammar, the rational element is the indirect object of phainetai”.131  It also fits 
somewhat well with the flow of the argument, in the sense that something is being 
divided according to the principle of non-opposition, and that something seems to be 
reason.  However the notion of divided reason seems contrary to everything Plato is at 
pains to argue, as Adam, for one, points out.132  There is much that could be argued 
both in favor of and also against this position, but we need not do so here.  If you take 
Nehamas et. al., to be wrong, holding that Socrates is not here dividing reason into a 
better and worse part, then nothing further needs to be said about their position.  And if 
you take their position to be right, then appetite and spirit are not involved in the 
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passage, in which case nothing in the realist/deflationist debate is affected by this 
passage.  (No beliefs, on this interpretation, would be ascribed to appetite or spirit.) 
Moss, Lorenz, and others, opt for alternative (b).133  On Moss’ account, the 
opining part discussed here in ‘The Charge Against Painting’ is appetite and spirit taken 
together.  On first glance, this represents a strongly realist claim, in that if the opining 
part is appetite and spirit, and the opining part has beliefs and opinions, then appetite 
and spirit are capable of forming beliefs.  Moss argues, though, that the beliefs are not 
really beliefs at all and that appetite and spirit do not truly opine.134  Rather, according to 
Moss, sometimes things appear good to us and sometimes we simply accept those 
appearances of goodness, instead of reasoning about whether what appears to us 
really is or is not good for us.  Indeed, for Moss, this is just what it means to be an 
inferior part of the soul—to accept appearances.135  Again, as was the case with 
Nehamas and those who argue for divided reason, since we are here focused on the 
debate between realists and deflationists, we do not need to analyze this matter.  If one 
rejects Moss et. al.’s position, then we need not pursue their argument further.  And if 
one accepts their position, since appetite and spirit are not given strong beliefs, or any 
of the other attributes defined as indicating agent-like soul-parts, then passage does not 
support the realist position. 
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It is important, though, to take some time to understand why Moss reads this 
passage as referring to appetite and spirit.  On my view, we should resist this 
identification of the opining part with appetite and spirit, i) because we don't need to do 
so, and ii) because we shouldn't want to do so.  Moss claims that we do, in fact, need to 
make this identification.  Her argument, as I understand it, is that (1) καὶ θυμοῦ καὶ περὶ 
πάντων τῶν ἐπιθυμητικῶν (10.606d) must refer to spirit-part and appetite-part, (2) 
poetry appeals to this part (10.606d), (3) painting appeals to the opining part (of 
10.602c-10.603c), (4) painting and poetry appeal to the same part (10.605b-c), and 
therefore (5) the opining part is appetite and spirit.  Moss sees entailment here, but I 
see none.   
First of all, when we come to 10.606d, I will argue that it is unlikely that 10.606d’s 
ἐπιθυμητικῶν and θυμοῦ refer to the appetite-part and spirit-part, as opposed to simply 
desires and anger; and if this is the case, then Moss’ entire argument that the opining 
part is equivalent to appetite and spirit fails.  Further, even if do we take 10.606d to be 
referring to the appetite and spirit parts, I deny that this entails that the opining part of 
10.602 refers to those same parts.  Socrates says that painting appeals to an inferior, 
opining part of the soul, that, as Grube/Reeve have it, “is far from reason”.  Socrates 
asks whether poetry appeals to that same part, concluding, upon inquiry, that it does.  
But this is all before we get to 10.606d.  Socrates might well be saying that I) painting 
appeals to a part of the soul that wants to opine, II) poetry appeals to that same opining 






passions and appetitive desires within us.136  Read this way, the identity between the 
opining part and appetite or appetite/spirit is not entailed.  On this reading we are not 
obliged to equate the opining part with appetite and spirit, and on my view we have 
good reason not to want to stretch to do so. 
First, the plain sense of Socrates’ account of appetites, throughout the Republic 
up to this point, is that we have appetites for things that satisfy bodily urges, such as 
desires for food, drink, sex, as well as for some related items, like money.  On the face 
of it, one wouldn't conceive of having an appetite to take a straight stick standing in the 
water to be truly bent, at least insofar as appetite has been so far described.  Socrates’ 
example is powerful just because the belief that the stick in water is bent (or that the 
lines in the Müller-Lyre illusion are of unequal length) is so affectless that we accept 
them as examples of appeals to an inferior part of the soul, but not to appetite or spirit.  
Indeed, Socrates’ overall psychological point here seems broader.  Even in cases that 
are less affectless, often we have a desire to follow opinion, even when reasoning 
dictates otherwise.  Imagine that I receive an email with an offer to buy a course for 
$800 that will teach me Attic Greek in one week.  Part of me wants to follow the belief 
that the offer is real, even though my reasoning says that one cannot learn Greek in that 
period of time.  The email appeals to an inferior part of my soul, perhaps to the lazy 
(ἀργὸν 10.604d) part, but not to spirit or to appetite, as they've so far been described in 
the Republic.137 
                                            
 
 
136 Though not making precisely the same point, Halliwell’s notes on 10.606d1 and 10.602e8 support this 
interpretation. 
137 I will argue, in Section 2.3.4, that the new parts of Book 10, such as the laughing part, the weeping 






A second problem arises when we consider Socrates’ statement, at 10.603a, that 
the opining part is “one of the base parts within us” (τῶν φαύλων ἄν τι εἴη ἐν ἡμῖν).  
Moss, et. al.’s ‘things equal to the same things are equal to each other’ argument, as 
schematized earlier (see page 82-83), trades on the notion that appetite, spirit, and 
reason are an exhaustive list of soul-parts.  If this is the case, and appetite and spirit are 
here referred to together, then how can they be ‘one’ of the base things within us?   It 
seems that Moss et. al. relies on Socrates’ shift to the singular, at 10.603a, when he 
says that poetry and imitation in general associate with that part in us which is far from 
reason.  However, such an interpretation requires simply ignoring the plural, 
τῶν φαύλων.  I suggest we rather take Socrates to be saying just what he says, namely, 
that painting appeals to the opining part, which is one of the base things in us, and that 
that part, the opining part, is far from reason.   
A third problem is that reading ‘The Charge Against Painting’ as referring to 
appetite and spirit makes 'The Greatest Charge’ (10.605c-606d) confusing.  If one reads 
10.602c-603c as Moss et. al. do, then the flow of Socrates’ argument becomes tangled.  
Read this way, he argues that a) painting impacts us negatively because it strengthens 
appetite and spirit at the expense of reason (10.602c-603c), b) poetry appeals to 
appetite and spirit just as painting does (10.605b-c), and then says that he has not yet 
brought his greatest charge (10.605c), namely that poetry impacts us negatively 
because it appeals to appetite and spirit.  How, on this reading, is the greatest charge 
different from the prior charge?  We will consider this further when we get to 10.605c, 






to the ‘opining part’, as opposed to appealing to appetite and spirit, leaves an appeal to 
appetites and spiritedness as a new and possibly ‘greatest charge’.    
If the foregoing is correct (that we neither need to equate the opining part with 
appetite and spirit nor should want to do so) then how should we understand the opining 
part?  On my view Socrates is here discussing just that: the ‘part’ of us that ‘forms 
opinions’ (that is to say, our propensity to form opinions) and our inclination, sometimes, 
to follow those opinions rather than the voice of reason.  Consider ‘the summoners’ 
passage, at 7.523a-524c.  “Some objects of sensation do not summon the activity of 
investigation because they seem to be adequately judged by sense."  The example that 
Socrates offers is that each of our fingers "looks equally like a finger" and therefore, "the 
soul of the many is not compelled to ask the intellect what a finger is".  In this case we 
are prepared to accept the appearance as adequately accurate.  This is the case 
because the faculty of sight "at no point indicates to the soul that finger is at the same 
time the opposite of a finger". Socrates contrasts this with the case where the opposites 
appear to the same faculty.  The soul then summons reason (λογισμός 7.524b) to sort 
out the issue.  The similarities between this passage and Book 10’s argument in ‘The 
Charge Against Painting’ are striking.  Socrates, at 7.523b, wants to consider sense 
perceptions that cannot be trusted (οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς).  The opining part is described in the 
same terms at 10.603b (οὐδενὶ ὑγιεῖ). Socrates asks whether Glaucon understands his 
meaning, at 7.523b, to which Glaucon replies that Socrates must be referring to “things 
appearing in the distance and to trompe l'oeil paintings” (7.523b G).  Similarly, in 'The 
Charge Against Painting’, the same subjects are discussed, namely the magnitude of 






is not on painting, at 7.523b, but rather on the cognitive processes that occur when we 
are confused, e.g. by painting or by misleading sense impressions.  When nothing 
appears to contradict our sense impressions, we accept them as accurate.  But 
sometimes the opposite appears to us at the same time (ἐναντίαν αἴσθησιν ἅμα 7.523c).  
Similarly, here in Book 10, the stick in water, if measured, proves to be straight.  
Nevertheless, the opposite appears to us at the same time and the stick still stubbornly 
presents an appearance of being bent. 
Now despite these similarities, the passages, of course, have a different intent.  
In the first, Socrates is trying to help distinguish the intelligible from the sensible, 
whereas in the second, he is investigating the effect of imitation on the psyche.  
Nevertheless, in the 7.523c-524c passage, there is no indication that the cognition 
surrounding sense perception is connected in any way to our appetite, our spirit, or our 
appetite and spirit together.  We see a finger, and recognize it as a finger.  This 
recognition employs perception and thus cognition, but not a lot of calculation.  
Sometimes, though, we are also moved to employ our powers of calculation and 
understanding, for example to consider what it means to be a big finger, or what 
bigness is in itself.  Overall, Socrates says nothing in ‘The Charge Against Painting’ (like 
in the summoners passage) that directly suggests that the cognition surrounding the 
sense perceptions of sticks in water or near and far objects are connected, in any way, 
to our appetite, our spirit, or our appetite and spirit together.   
Further, the passage immediately preceding ‘The Charge Against Painting’ 
similarly makes a distinction between knowledge and opinion.  The flautist has 






listening to the flautist, has the right opinions.  The imitator “will neither know nor opine 
rightly” (10.602a).  The distinction between knowledge and true belief has already been 
raised in the Republic, for example at 9.584e-585b, however we wouldn't take it either 
from the earlier discussions or from this discussion that the flute maker follows his 
appetite, or his appetite and spirit, in making flutes.  The part of the flute-maker that 
‘opines’, in making flutes, simply does not seem to be appetite or spirit. 
And just as the passage preceding ‘The Charge Against Painting’ suggests that 
Socrates is addressing a cognitive and not an appetitive or spirited conflict, a glance at 
the succeeding passages suggests the same.  Socrates says that, as in the case just 
discussed, of sensory impressions versus measurement (“in the domain of 
sight…contrary opinions” 10.603d), so too in the domain of actions, there is internal 
conflict.  But, Socrates continues (still at 10.603d), those conflicts have already been 
discussed.  This is clearly a reference to the discussion at 4.439cff, as noted by many 
commentators.138  And the discussion at 4.439cff, as we have seen, specifically was 
intended to distinguish appetite and spirit from reason.  So since we don't need to 
repeat that discussion, but did need to inquire into contrary opinions “in the domain of 
sight”, then we are supported, in my view, in taking ‘The Charge Against Painting’ to be 
a discussion of cognitive conflicts, rather than conflicts between reason, on the one 
hand, and spirit and appetite, on the other. 
As noted earlier, Nehamas and others come away from this whole discussion of 
how imitation affects our cognition by dividing reason (λογιστικόν) into a superior 
                                            
 
 






(calculating and understanding) part and an inferior (opining) part.  But a strong 
deflationist rather understands Socrates to be indicating that we have many ‘parts’ of 
our psyche.  Some are appetitive (lust, hunger, thirst, greed, etc.) and some are 
emotional (anger, pride, competitiveness, sadness, pity, humor, etc.).  So too, for the 
deflationist, more than one aspect of our soul involves cognition (calculation, opinion, 
dream, fantasy, etc.).   
On my reading, ‘The Charge Against Painting’ argues that imitation harms our 
psyche in terms of cognitive functions.  It makes us more likely to unquestioningly trust 
sense impressions, lazily follow attractive ‘opinions’, impetuously reject unattractive 
‘opinions’, etc.  Imitation instills in us a character that is less likely, overall, to summon 
our powers of reason and understanding.  Further, when we do summon our reasoning 
powers, but there is conflict between our reasoning and appearances, imitation makes 
us more prone to follow appearance rather than better judgment.  This is a serious 
charge, though not yet the ‘most serious charge’, which will concern imitations impact 
on our appetites and spirited emotions.  
Most important for the purposes of this discussion, I see no support for a realist 
reading of soul-parts here in 'The Charge Against Painting’.  There is no mention, here, 
of appetite or spirit, or even of appetitive desires or spirited emotions—only the ‘opining 
part’.  Those who would interpret the opining part as appetite and spirit together seem to 
already be abandoning the realist notion of soul-parts, since the entire notion of partite 
agency seems at odds with such an amalgam.  And those who would interpret the 
opining part as just appetite need to explain why they select appetite over spirit or over 






appetite, and you take its beliefs and opinions to be strong beliefs, I still do not see a 
realist description of appetite here.  The opining part has no goals and there is no 
evidence of agency.  Appetite does not contend with reason here.  Rather an 
appearance presents itself to us, causing ‘part’ of us to form an opinion about it.  And 
even if we calculate that the appearance is false, we, not our opining ‘part’, may choose 
to follow the opinion we formed rather than reasoned calculation.  ‘The Charge Against 
Painting’ argues that imitation appeals to this opining ‘part’ of us, but I see no evidence 
in this section of an agent-like appetite-part or spirit-part.  
 
2.3.3 The Charge Against Poetry (10.603c-605c) 
let’s now go directly to the very part of thought with which poetry’s imitation 
keeps company and see whether it is ordinary or serious…the best part is willing 
to follow this calculation…whereas the part that leads to reminiscences of the 
suffering …is irrational, idle, and a friend of cowardice…the imitative poet …is 
like the painter … by the standard of truth; and he is also similar in keeping 
company with a part of the soul that is on the same level and not with the best 
part…he awakens this part of the soul and nourishes it, and, by making it strong, 
destroys the calculating part…gratifying the soul’s foolish part, which doesn’t 
distinguish big from little, but believes the same things are at one time big and at 
another little. (10.603c-605c Bloom) 
 
Bloom’s translation, as usual, follows the text closely and is very readable.  Yet it 
must be noted that in the fragment quoted above, Bloom supplies the word part eight 
times, despite that fact that Socrates does not once use ‘part’ words, such as εἶδος, 
γένος, or μέρος.  Again, I do not fault Bloom for inserting the word part, but as always, 
we should be mindful that the word ‘part’ in the translation might lead us to overestimate 
the extent to which Socrates is definitely talking about agent-like soul-parts as opposed 






section Socrates does refer (as Shorey translates) to “the irrational and idle part of us” 
(10.604d), and “the fretful part” (10.604e), as well as (as Bloom has it above) “the 
foolish part” (τῷ ἀνοήτῳ 10.605b).   
Crucial for this argument is the fact that Socrates never directly describes any of 
these parts of the soul as having beliefs, goals, reasoning powers, agency, etc.  Faced 
with misfortune, Socrates says that:  
We must accept what has happened as we would the fall of the dice, and then 
arrange our affairs in whatever way reason determines to be best.  We mustn’t 
hug the hurt part and spend our time weeping and wailing like children when they 
trip.  (10.604c G) 
 
Although in his direct speech “we”, and not a soul-part are the actors, one might 
take the simile to imply that it is the foolish part of the soul is the actor.  The foolish part 
of the soul is similar to the child, and a child is an actor, so perhaps the foolish part of 
the soul is similarly an actor.  But the point of the simile, it seems to me, is not to 
suggest an agent-like foolish part of the soul, but rather to describe the ‘part’ of us to 
which poetry appeals. Socrates wishes to argue that “like a painter…[poetry] appeals to 
a part of the soul that is similarly inferior” (10.605a G).  Socrates also offers an analogy 
between city and soul, though different from the one in the earlier Books.  He charges 
that “in just the way that someone destroys the better sort of citizens when he 
strengthens the vicious ones” (605b G), so too the poet damages the souls of each 
individual.  The person (who does damage in the city) is analogized to the poet (who 
does damage in the soul) and the better and worse citizens are analogized to the better 
and worse parts of the soul.  One might take it that since the analogy’s poet and his 
targets are agent-like, Socrates is ascribing agency to the ‘worse’ part of us (or perhaps 






though, the plain sense of the passage certainly seems to aim at describing the poet 
and his impact, not the soul parts and their capacities.   
Indeed, if one did try to attribute agent-like attributes to soul-parts here, the 
difficulties for a realist interpretation would multiply, irrespective of whether the realist 
took the passage to refer to a two-part, three-part, or many-part soul.  It is especially 
hard to find support for a realist interpretation of a three-part soul in this passage.  As 
many commentators have noted, on the surface of the text, as well as in the simile, 
Socrates is talking about the ‘better’ part of the soul and the ‘inferior’ part of the soul.139  
How would one fit the ‘better part’ and the ‘weaker’ part of the simile into reason, spirit, 
or appetite, none of which is explicitly referred to here, or anyplace else in Book 10?140.  
But taking the passage to refer to either a two-part soul or a many-part soul also makes 
difficulties.  To take the simile to suggest that the soul does indeed have an agent-like 
‘superior part’ and an agent-like ‘inferior part’ would make a mess of the realist’s view 
that divides the soul into three canonical agent-like parts, namely, appetite, spirit, and 
reason.  That problem is compounded if one takes the passage to pick out a set of 
agent-like soul-parts, such as lazy-part, weeping-part, etc.  In any of these cases, the 
                                            
 
 
139 See, for just one example, Belfiore (1983, 50). 
140 In the next section, I will argue against taking θυμοῦ and ἐπιθυμητικῶν in 10.606d to be references to 
spirit-part and appetite-part.  Even the one canonical part explicitly named in Book 10, the λογιστικόν, is 
hard to reconcile with the λογιστικόν of earlier parts of the Republic.  As Belfiore (1983, 53) properly 
points out, Socrates seems to be speaking seriously, not metaphorically, when he says that poetry 
destroys the λογιστικόν.   The λογιστικόν of Book 4, obviously, is “a necessary part of every living soul”.  
Further, as Annas (1981, 339) points out, reason, in Book 10, “is said to obey nomos,’law’ or ‘convention’, 
in a way that makes it look like the kind of motivation developed in the Auxiliaries”.  If reason, in 'The 
Charge Against Painting’ and 'The Charge Against Poetry’, is the inclination to calculate and the tendency 
to follow calculation over the lazy acceptance of attractive appearances, then we can see how that could 
be destroyed, responding to Belfiore’s point.  It would also, in agreement with Annas, be the part of us 
that obeys nomos.  However, if reason is indeed here the calculative part of Book 4, we are left with 






realist either needs to simply ignore Book 10, or claim that the psychology of Book 10 is 
simply unrelated to the rest of the Republic.141  Either way, though, a realist view of 
appetite or spirit is not supported by the simile. 
By contrast, the deflationist interpretation fits well with this passage.  Faced with 
life’s vicissitudes, part of us deliberates about how to best respond.  Another part of us 
just wants to give free rein to the suffering and misery we feel.  Socrates raises the point 
that in addition to appetites and spirited emotions related to victory and honor, we have 
within us laziness, silliness, irrationality, and suffering.  For the deflationist, these are all 
‘parts’ of our soul that can come into conflict.  Socrates does not, here, directly say that 
the inferior part or parts of us are agents—only we are.  Though “a person” is conflicted, 
and “he” is at war with himself, there is no part on part awareness or action.  Similarly, it 
is the man, not his parts, who is directly displayed as the actor in dealing with grief at 
10.603e-604d.  
 
2.3.4 The Greatest Charge (10.605c-606d) 
What is by nature best in us, because it hasn’t been adequately educated by 
argument or habit, relaxes its guard over this mournful part…Doesn’t the same 
argument also apply to the laughing part…that in you which, wanting to make 
jokes, you then held down by argument, afraid of the reputation of buffoonery, 
you now release…and as for sex, and spiritedness, too, and for all the desires, 
pains, and pleasures in the soul that we say follow all our action, poetic imitation 
produces similar results in us. For it fosters and waters them when they ought to 
be dried up, and sets them up as rulers in us (10.606d Bloom) 
 
                                            
 
 







First of all, we should not be deceived into assuming that θυμοῦ and 
ἐπιθυμητικῶν in 10.606d are explicit references to spirit-part and appetite-part; and most 
translators do not do so, in their renderings of “καὶ περὶ ἀφροδισίων δὴ καὶ θυμοῦ καὶ 
περὶ πάντων τῶν ἐπιθυμητικῶν τε καὶ λυπηρῶν καὶ ἡδέων ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ” (10.606d).  
Ferrari is quite literal and not at all atypical in rendering the phrase as “also to sex, 
anger, and all the desires, pains and pleasures in the soul”.  Bloom, Sachs, Shorey, 
Reeve, Grube/Reeve, Grube, Larson, and others follow a similar line.  Although 
unfortunately confusing, θύμος is used in the Republic both to mean anger and to mean 
the soul-part called spirit.  Halliwell, in his detailed notes, is especially persuasive as to 
why we should take the current passage to be referring to anger.142  Similarly 
ἐπιθυμητικόν is used to mean both desire and to mean the soul-part called appetite.  
Here, though, there is strong reason to take τῶν ἐπιθυμητικῶν to refer desires rather 
than appetite part.  The word order in this passage is striking.  First Socrates mentions 
sex, which throughout Book 4 was one of the three iconic examples named in relation to 
the appetite-part, and then names anger, which was similarly one of the iconic 
examples named in relation to the spirit-part.  If Socrates had ended the list there, one 
might have been tempted to take him to be referring to appetite-part and spirit-part 
through these paradigmatic examples.  But he goes on to list other ‘parts’ in the soul, 
starting with “πάντων τῶν ἐπιθυμητικῶν”.  For one thing, though ἐπιθυμητικόν (singular) 
is used in Book 4 to refer to the appetite-part (or at least to the form in the soul that is 
analogous to the producer class in the city), here we find ἐπιθυμητικῶν (plural), 
                                            
 
 






suggesting appetites, not appetite part.  Secondly, the πάντων in “πάντων τῶν 
ἐπιθυμητικῶν” gives us pause.  Since sex was listed first, and in Book 4 sex was 
certainly part the appetite-part, then listing ‘sex and all of the appetites’, especially with 
anger listed in between points us away from taking the phrase to mean appetite-part.  
Rather it suggests a list of ‘parts’ or ‘things’ in our soul, not amalgamated into spirit-part 
and appetite-part, so it is not surprising that the translators take in just that manner. 
As was the case in 'The Charge Against Poetry’, Bloom here inserts the word 
‘part’ in rendering the “mournful part” (τοῦ θρηνώδους 10.606a) and the “laughing part” 
(τοῦ γελοίου 10.606c).  Still, though no explicit ‘part’ word is here, Socrates does refer to 
these ‘parts’ of the soul very similarly to how he has referred to soul-parts throughout 
the Republic How, then, should we understand these soul-parts?  Are we to take the 
laughing part and the mournful part to be a) perhaps some of the ‘in-between parts’ of 
4.443d, b) sub-parts of an appetite/spirit amalgam, c) sub-parts of appetite and spirit 
respectively, or d) none of the above?  The first of these seems highly unlikely.  Why 
would Socrates introduce, here, nearly at the end of the Republic, the notion that the 
soul is in fact mass of agent-like parts (laughing-part, weeping-part, angry-part, etc.)?  
The second option also seems unlikely.  Some take Book 10s ‘inferior part’ of the soul 
to be a union of spirit and appetite, but why would a union of appetite and spirit want to 
weep or laugh?  Option (c) shares a similar problem; would either appetite (as it has 
been described up to here) want to laugh, or spirit (as it has been described up to here) 
want to weep? Further, to slightly adapt Whiting’s example, when I struggle between the 
desire to laugh (at a pompous and inappropriate eulogy during my grandmother’s 






struggling?  If the laughing part at 10.606c is appetite and spirit together, then how does 
the realist reconcile spirit (desire for honor) struggling with itself (laughing part)? Worse, 
if the weeping part is part of spirit, we could easily imagine a conflict between my desire 
to weep (along with the hero in the theater) and my desire to maintain my dignity.  This 
kind if intra-part conflict threatens the entire notion of three canonical parts.  
The fourth option seems the most likely.  When Socrates talks about that in me 
that wants to weep or laugh, he is identifying things in me.  I am the focus, not my parts.  
I want to weep at one moment, or laugh at another. This is very consistent with the 
deflationist reading.  It is easy to understand an impulse to just give in weeping and 
enjoy it, but it is much harder to fit that impulse into a realist story, which wants to find 
three canonical parts.  
Also unclear is exactly what the charge is, here in ‘The Greatest Charge’.  In ‘The 
Charge Against Poetry’, Socrates charged that poetry puts a bad constitution into the 
soul of the decent and reasonable man (ἐπιεικὴς 10.603e).  Here too, the subjects of 
'The Greatest Charge’ are good and reasonable men (τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς 10.605c).  And the 
charge here too regards imitative poetry’s ability to damage (λωβᾶσθαι 10.605c) them, 
again by nourishing the inferior parts of us, thereby causing us to be controlled by 
inferior ‘parts’ instead of reason.  Thus there is much that is the same in 'The Charge 
Against Poetry’ and 'The Greatest Charge’ and work is needed to tease out what 
specifically makes 'The Greatest Charge’ different and greater.  We will take this issue 
up when we turn to character in Chapter 3 of this dissertation.  For our purposes here, 
though, we simply need to determine whether the part or parts of us to which imitative 






On first look, agent-like parts might be described here, when Socrates speaks of 
inferior parts of us being installed as “rulers in us when they ought to be ruled”.  This 
language is reminiscent of the city/soul analogy, where justice entails that the guardians 
rule, with auxiliaries and producers willingly following their lead.  Here, though, as 
already argued, we have a list of inferior soul parts that are very hard to reconcile with 
appetite and spirit.    
The deflationist does not deny that we can be controlled by some appetite (say 
greed, or lust), either on one particular occasion, or frequently, on account of our 
character.  The deflationist simply denies that there is a homunculus-like part called 
appetite that struggles with reason or spirit to gain control.  And no homunculus-like part 
is displayed here, in 'The Greatest Charge’.  The inferior parts are not described as 
having their own goals, beliefs, means-end reasoning powers, or agency.  Parts are not 
displayed as aware of or struggling with other parts.  Rather the person is the actor 
throughout.  This simile images how inferior ‘parts’ of our soul might become installed 
as rulers.  But 10.605c-606b considers how we behave when we hear Homer in public 
versus how we behave in private.  Similarly, it is we, at 10.606d, that want to “become 
better and happier instead of worse and more wretched” (βελτίους τε καὶ 
εὐδαιμονέστεροι, in the masculine plural). 
 
2.3.5 The Image of Glaucus (10.611b—612a) 
let’s not suppose … that soul by its truest nature is such that it is full of much 
variety, dissimilarity, and quarrel with itself…It’s not easy…for a thing to be 
eternal that is …composed out of many things, as the soul now looked to us…we 
were telling the truth about [the soul] as it looks at present…Just as those who 
catch sight of the sea Glaucus would no longer easily see his original nature…so, 






Glaucon, one must look elsewhere…then one would see its true nature—whether 
it is many-formed or single-formed, or in what way it is and how (10.611b-612a 
Bloom) 
 
Some deflationists, such as Shields, argue that this passage strongly supports 
the deflationist view.143  Socrates says that it is not easy for immortal entities to be 
composite (σύνθετόν 10.611b), and not put together beautifully.  And, he says, we will 
find that the soul in its essential true nature is much more beautiful (πολύ γε κάλλιον 
10.611c).  Thus he suggests that it is possible, and perhaps even likely, that the soul, 
when unencumbered by the body, is incomposite.  This point comes into focus when set 
against the souls in the Myth of Er.  We will delve into the myth in detail in Chapter 3, 
but here, note that some souls were said to be deliberative (10.620c, 618d), others 
craved honor (10.620b), and others were gluttonous or greedy (10.619b).  All three 
characteristics previously assigned to the three canonical parts are present in souls in 
the Myth of Er, but there, as we will see, parts are not mentioned.  Consistent with the 
Glaucus passage, the soul in the Myth of Er is not depicted as composite at all.  It is the 
soul as a whole, not appetite, that is gluttonous, and the soul as a whole, not reason, 
that deliberates.144    
The picture of the soul presented by Glaucus and Er presents no difficulty for the 
deflationist.  For the deflationist, ‘part’ of me may be greedy, but there is no need for an 
agent-like appetite in order to accommodate greed.  For the realist, though, Glaucus 
and Er may pose challenges.  If greediness is the province of an agent-like part called 
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appetite, and disembodied souls are, like those in the Myth of Er, incomposite, then how 
do they manage to be greedy? These claims are certainly debatable, however what is 
abundantly clear is that the Glaucus passage is consistent with the rest of Book 10.  
Appetite and spirit are not mentioned at all, and there is certainly no suggestion that 
they are agent-like.  Further, the same continues to be the case throughout the rest of 
Book 10.    
Before leaving the Glaucus passage, we should take note of Socrates’ 
reconsideration of whether the soul is composed of many elements “as now appeared 
to us” (ὡς νῦν ἡμῖν ἐφάνη 10.611b).  Adam takes this phrase to refer back to the 
“psychology of Book 4, in which to soul was treated as composite”.145  Adam is pointing 
to the hypothesized Principle of Non-Opposition, which was the basis for soul-partition, 
and the resulting tripartite picture of the soul.  Shorey rather takes ὡς νῦν ἡμῖν ἐφάνη to 
refer back to 10.603d, where Socrates seems to at least partially reaffirm the 
principle.146  Halliwell takes ὡς νῦν ἡμῖν ἐφάνη to refer to both the psychology of Book 4 
and the reaffirmation of the principle at 10.603d.147  I agree with Halliwell.  Socrates 
began his investigation into the interior of the soul by saying that although there was a 
‘longer way’ that would yield a precise answer to the questions about the nature of the 
soul’s parts, they would follow a ‘shorter way’ that would be imprecise but good enough 
for the argument they were pursuing.  Along that ‘shorter way’, Socrates hypothesized 
the Principle of Non-Opposition, which yielded a tripartite soul—though he said at the 
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time that the principle and all that stemmed from it might need to abandoned further 
down the road.  By the time we get to Book 10, the tripartite soul, on my account, has 
been left behind, though the soul was still displayed as partite and the principle is at 
least partially reaffirmed at 10.603d.  But by 10.611b, (following Halliwell, Adam, and 
others), Socrates suggests that indeed even the Principle of Non-Opposition, along with 
the tripartite psychology that ensued from it, now needs to be left behind.  I will argue, in 
the coming chapters, that they were steps along the way to a better account. 
 
2.3.6 Book 10 Part 1: Conclusion 
Each of the four sections of Book 10 that refer to ‘parts’ of the soul are consistent 
in subject, setting, and deflationist part-description.  As was the case in the original 
‘Inquiry into Soul-Parts’ (4.435c-441c), the subject is the ordinary person and the setting 
is the ordinary city.  There is no mention here of how poetry affects the guardians or 
auxiliaries in Socrates’ Kallipolis, despite the detailed descriptions of those actors in 
earlier books of the Republic.  There is no consideration of whether poetry affects 
timocrats differently than tyrants, though one might have expected it, given what came 
immediately before Book 10.  Alhough much psychic activity is discussed and detailed, 
Socrates consistently refers to what happens inside us directly, and not as the activity of 
a soul-part.  We, not our soul-parts, opine, lust, lament, etc.  And most important for this 
discussion, the ‘parts’ of us that opine, lust, etc., are never described as homunculi that 
set goals, make plans, and strive to achieve those plans. 
At the beginning of this section, we put aside the question of what Socrates 






that we could finally understand the effect of imitation, now that the different soul-parts 
have been distinguished, or did he mean that we could finally understand its effect now 
that the different character types had been delineated?  On my view, Socrates, was 
pointing to both soul parts and character types, but for each of them, he was speaking 
with what Gregory Vlastos called “complex irony”.148  Socrates meant that we have 
distinguished the εἴδη of the soul by the end of Book 9 (both in terms of parts and in 
terms of character types), but that we have not yet distinguished either soul-parts or 
character types adequately.  In this section I have argued that Book 10 helps fill out the 
account of soul-parts. I think that the new and different soul-parts introduced here in 
Book 10, coupled with the return to the non-agent-like description prevalent in Book 4, 
indicate that Socrates was signaling that the part-psychology of the soul was not 
complete at the end of Book 9.  Similarly, on my view, the character-psychology of the 
soul, had also not been adequately distinguished by the end of Book 9.  In the next two 
chapters, I will argue that the remainder of Book 10 helps fill out the account of 
character types. 
The core of Socrates’ dialectic is to posit an answer to a particular question and 
then put that answer to the test.149  By the end of the first half of Book 10, it seems that 
the tripartite picture of the soul has been left behind.  Rather the embodied soul seems 
to be more multi-part (or, as the deflationist might say, incomposite with multiple 
aspects).  And the soul in its truest nature, if we could ‘see’ it, might also turn out in its 
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essence to be without ‘parts’.  In people, psychic conflict is common.  Describing this 
psychic conflict as a conflict between different ‘parts’ of us seems very apt.  The picture 
of the embodied soul is one with many ‘parts’, which can be grouped together 
descriptively as the argument demands.  We do not have ‘reason’ so much as 
reasoning, and this is what poetry damages.  We do not have ‘spirit’ and ‘appetite’ so 
much as spirited emotions (anger, pride, shame, guilt, laziness, humor, etc.) and 
appetitive desires (food, drink, sex, etc.). And, most importantly, we, not our psychic 
parts are the actors in all matters.   
The second half of Book 10 (which we will get to in Chapter 3) takes us even 
farther along the same path.  The souls that are described are not described in terms of 
parts at all, but they are greedy, angry, etc.  If it is not a realist money-loving part 
gaining control that makes us greedy (and I have argued that Book 10 leads us to think 
it is not) what is it that causes one individual to be greedy and a different individual not 
to be?  This question will be the subject of chapters 2 and 3. 
 
 
3.0 Chapter 1: Conclusion  
Focusing the account individually on the various sections that detail the soul’s 
parts is suggestive of a deflationist reading, on my view, though not conclusive.  In 'The 
Inquiry into Soul-Parts’, Socrates tries to determine how soul-parts function in real 
people who live in real cities.  Psychic functions and psychic conflict occur between 
different ‘parts’ of the psyche and Socrates in his direct speech gives us uniformly non-






the thread of ‘The Inquiry into Soul-Parts’ and is similar in topic, subject, and 
characterization.  Again Socrates discusses the nature of the soul’s parts, though this 
time the emphasis is how imitation affects the different ‘parts’ of the soul.  Again the 
subjects seem to be real people in real cities, despite the fact that most of the Republic 
discusses imagined people in imagined cities.  And again the soul is deemed to have 
‘parts’, and as before, in direct speech those parts are described in uniformly non-agent-
like terms.  Notably, the parts seem very different in the two sections, which is just what 
a deflationist would expect.  For a deflationist, the soul can be divided along more than 
one dimension, so the deflationist is not surprised that one set of ‘parts’ will be the focus 
in discussing some things, while other ‘parts’ the focus in other discussions. 
In between, we have ‘The Inquiry into Character Types’, which seems different in 
each respect.  The primary topic is not how soul-parts are, but how character types are.  
The subjects are not real people in real cities, but rather character types (or, as I will 
argue in Chapter 2, archetypes), such as timocrats or oligarchs, in imagined cities ruled 
by those types.  And the soul-parts, which are described in the service of understanding 
those character types, are often cast in highly agent-like terms, both in direct speech 
and in metaphor.   
If one comes to the end of Book 9 with the conviction that Socrates sees soul-
parts as inherently agent-like in nature, then one needs to either ignore Book 10’s 
psychological discussion, as Irwin and Bobonich do, or force Book 10’s many ‘parts’ of 
the soul into reason, spirit, and appetite, as Singpurwalla, for example, does.  The 
former leaves many of Plato’s psychological insights lying on the table, such as Moss’ 






significant degree of forcing.  One might be tempted to try to read the lion-like spirit of 
9.588d back into the description of Odysseus’ spirit at 4.441b.  It is difficult, though, to 
read it forward into Book 10, where the spirited part does not appear at all, rather we 
have the weaker part that sees a straight stick as bent and other parts that want to 
weep and tell jokes.  Those who come to Book 10 with a deflationist view of soul-parts, 
on the other hand, need not struggle. 
Overall, on my view, the content of these three sections pushes us toward a 
deflationist understanding of the nature of soul-parts.  Sometimes Socrates is explicitly 
working to understand soul-parts, whereas at other times his focus is elsewhere.  In the 
former cases, Plato’s psychology is best understood on a deflationist account.  I think it 
is also suggestive that Socrates sometimes jumps out of the constructed worlds that 
populate so much of the Republic, and again, when outside those constructed worlds, 
he avoids direct descriptions of the soul’s ‘parts’ as having agency.  Further, I think that 
Plato’s sequencing of the three sections that were analyzed in this chapter matters.  
After the initial ‘Inquiry into Soul-Parts’, we are left with the isomorphism between city 
and soul, yet we have good reason to resist the notion that the parts of the soul are 
agent-like. ‘The Inquiry into Character Types’, though, pushes us to reconsider that 
notion.  The agent-like depiction of soul-parts there pushes us to consider that perhaps 
Socrates first introduced soul-parts with a partial description and then built on that, to 
detail their agent-like nature.  Following this path, one would expect Book 10 to continue 
to elaborate the nature of those agent-like soul-parts.  Building on the first nine Books, 
Socrates could have described how imitation affects reason, appetite, and spirit, and 






Socrates does nothing of the sort.  Indeed, he moves in the other direction.  On my 
reading, Book 10 pushes us toward an even more deflationist view than Book 4’s 
‘Inquiry into Soul-Parts’.  In Book 4 we seemed to have a tripartite soul, but the parts 
themselves were not directly described as agent-like.  Now, in Book 10, tripartition has 
been left behind.  The first part of Book 10 displays the soul as having either two parts 
(on some accounts) or many parts (as others claim).  Either option is deflationary to the 
notion of three agent-like parts, especially since the parts are not described as agent-
like in direct speech.  The second half of Book 10 does not describe the souls as having 
parts at all, although they are depicted as being greedy, thoughtless, irresponsible, etc. 
On my account, the soul has many non-agent-like ‘parts’, which are really faculties or 
forces within the soul.  Only the soul itself acts as agent, that is to say, only the person 
acts as agent.  
Bobonich raises the possibility that Plato describes the parts as agent-like for 
“explanatory value”, but rejects this notion on two grounds.  “First, Plato’s commitment 
to agent-like parts of the soul pervades the Republic and he never suggests that such 
talk is intended as a metaphor or convenient way of speaking and not as a literal truth 
claim.”  I hope that this chapter has shown that the first half of this claim is false.  Plato 
does not pervasively describe the soul as agent-like.  In the Book 4 ‘Inquiry into Soul-
Parts’ and in the first half of Book 10, which I suggest are the most important places to 
examine in order to understand how Plato saw soul-parts, those parts are consistently 
described in non-agent-like terms.  But Socrates plainly says at 4.435c that the 
description of the soul is not precise (ἀκριβῶς), although there is a “longer way” that 






the parts are most displayed as agent-like (e.g. 9.588b, where Socrates describes the 
soul and its parts by “fashioning in our discourse a symbolic image of the soul”).  
The ‘parts’ of the soul and the internal struggle between parts are vividly and 
explicitly in the forefront of the dialogue throughout the majority of the Republic.  The 
struggle between 'parts' of the soul explains the psychic conflict that we often face.  
Also, in the virtuous person, the soul must be educated and harmonized such that 
reasoning leads while all other 'parts' willingly follow.  Through the end of Book 9, 
though, whether Plato conceived of those parts as agent-like or non-agent-like parts 
remains a live question.     
Once we emerge from Book 10 with a conviction that the person is the only agent 
of each of her actions, we are pushed to reexamine the text with a view to finding a 
vocabulary to better conceptualize the person as a whole.  Of course the ‘parts’ are still 
important.  We still have psychic conflict, which even in Book 10 is the result of 
conflicting desires in different ‘parts’ of the soul.  And of course the organization and 
harmony of the ‘parts’ of the soul are still critical components of virtue.  But with the 
decision that the text favors a view of the soul where soul-‘parts’ can be divided up and 
grouped in different ways at different times and for different purposes, the primacy of 
the part recedes somewhat.  We no longer think that the whole story of the interior of 
the soul is a matter of parts in action.   
At this point we are moved to interrogate the text once again, trying again to 
understand Socrates’ main claim that the life of one with a virtuous soul is the happiest 
life.  If this claim is indeed about the whole soul as the only actor, the soul as a whole 






to describe the soul that does not fully depend on the language of parts.  Over the 
course of the next two chapters, I’m going to argue that when we read the whole text 
with a conception of non-agent-like parts in mind, the language of character emerges as 
a constant, albeit a quiet one, throughout the ten Books of the Republic as the way in 
which the person is described.  It is the notion of character that emerges from the text, I 
will argue, that helps us understand just how we can move forward along the path of 









Chapter Two: Moving from Parts to Wholes: 






 With our focus shifted from soul-parts to the person as a whole, we continue to 
consider a central question of the Republic: which life is the better one, the just life or 
the unjust life?  In this chapter and the next I am going to argue that teasing out the 
Republic’s notion of character is critical to unpacking Socrates’ account of the 
superiority of the just life. 
 Of course, developing an account of the nature of justice is also critical to the 
inquiry into whether the just life is superior.  Over the course of the early books, 
Socrates’ interlocutors bring forward various views of the many about the nature of 
justice.  We get at least three main claims from them about justice.  First, justice is seen 
as simply a matter of refraining from conventionally unjust deeds (e.g. not cheating, not 
lying, not failing to render sacrifices due to the gods 1.331b).  The many “name the 
commandment of the law the lawful and the just, and this is the genesis and essential 
nature of justice” (2.359a).  
 A second claim that emerges is that injustice is desirable, whereas justice is 
undesirable.  In his prime, Cephalus did not value justice.  It is only now, as he reaches 
old age, that he begins to see justice as something that is desirable, not in its own right, 
but so as to avoid punishment.  This notion is also shared, to some extent, by the other 






think I meant pickpockets? Not that such crimes aren’t also profitable, if they’re not 
found out, but they aren’t worth mentioning by comparison to what I’m talking about” 
(1.348d G).  Glaucon’s account also depicts most people as preferring to commit 
injustice, but afraid that they cannot commit injustice without getting caught. “People 
value [justice] not as a good but because they are too weak to do injustice with 
impunity.” (2.359a G). 
 Third, and related to the two prior claims, Glaucon and Adeimantus articulate the 
view of the many that what is important is to have the reputation for justice.  Actually 
being just is neither important nor desirable.  “No one”, says Glaucon, “believes justice 
to be a good when it is kept private, since, wherever either [the just or the unjust] person 
thinks he can do injustice with impunity, he does it” (2.360c G). Of course he is careful 
to assert that this is not his view—it is simply the view of the many (2.361d-e).  
Adeimantus makes a similar point about ‘the many fathers’. “When fathers speak to 
their sons, they say that one must be just, as do all the others who have charge of 
anyone. But they don’t praise justice itself, only the high reputations it leads to and the 
consequences of being thought to be just” (2.362e-363a G).  
 Thus the view of the many that emerges is that justice consists in obeying law 
and convention, is undesirable, and that what matters is possessing the reputation for 
justice.  Socrates will turn out to have an opposite view on all three counts.  Although 
obeying the law is important on Socrates’ account, for him being just is a matter of 
developing a particular organization of the soul (ψυχὴ), or, as we might say, the 
organization of one’s psyche — one’s psychology or personality or character.  Socrates 






we should desire above all other things.  Finally, although Socrates is not opposed to a 
good reputation earned on account of fine actions (e.g. 5.468b), the reputation is not 
what matters; what really matters is whether one’s actions are fine or not, and even 
more, whether one’s soul is or is not just. 
 Plato does not develop a formal technical vocabulary for describing character (as 
Aristotle does).  Rather his notion of character must be gleaned from a close 
examination of the characters that populate the dialogue, as well as a close reading of 
the text.  On my reading, examining all occurrences of specific terms related to 
character reveals a significant measure of consistency in how they are used.  Therefore, 
proper translation of the Greek terminology is crucial.  Plato uses a variety of Greek 
terms that are relevant to what we might call character, personality, nature, etc.  For 
example, he uses ἦθος (disposition, character), φύσις (nature, character, constitution, 
etc.), τρόπος (manner, habit, nature, character, custom etc.), βίος (mode of life or 
manner of living), ἔθος (custom or habit), κατασκευή (state, condition, or constitution), 
τάξις (arrangement or order), etc.  Translators differ in which English terms they use to 
render the relevant Greek terms and often render a particular term differently in different 
contexts.  For example, Plato often uses the word ἦθος.  LSJ has ’character’, as one of 
its definitions of ἦθος, citing Republic 3.400d as the source.  At 3.409d Shorey does 
render ἦθος as character, but at other places he chooses different translations (e.g. 
‘disposition’ (3.400d), ‘type’ (6.497b), ‘nature’ (6.496b)).  I cannot tell whether Shorey is 
trying to use what he takes to be English synonyms for the sake of stylistic variation, or 
rather that he thinks the word has different meanings or valences in the different places.  






related to character occur supports the position that Plato used each of them with a fair 
degree of internal consistency.  Overall, I think most of the translators I have consulted 
obscure our understanding of character by unnecessary variation in how these different 
key terms are rendered at different spots in the Republic.  
 In addition to the difficulty of deciding how to best translate the Greek terms, 
another difficulty is that Socrates, surprisingly, never poses the question of precisely 
what constitutes character.  Although character is discussed pervasively throughout the 
Republic, Socrates never goes after a definition or launches an inquiry into exactly what 
sort of thing it is.  Perhaps because of this, the topic of character has been largely 
neglected in the literature.  Nevertheless, over the course of the first nine Books of the 
Republic a picture emerges of a) what it means to have one’s own specific character 
and one’s own specific character traits, b) how one develops that specific character, c) 
how virtuous or vicious one’s overall character seems to be, and d) how likely one is to 
succeed in developing a just character.  The picture evolves and gains specificity as the 
discussion proceeds, but remains consistent in key areas. 
 Absent a localized inquiry into the nature of character in the Republic, then, how 
should we organize our inquiry into the text in order to tease out this picture of character 
and character development?  It seems to me that two moments in the trajectory of the 
dialogue are relevant to this question.  The first of these moments is the shift from the 
highly dramatic depiction of Socrates and the discussion in Polemarchus’ house in Book 
1, to the methodical investigation of the value of living justly in response to the 
challenges of Glaucon and Adeimantus.  This shift involves not only dramatic tone and 






outside the city of Athens.  By contrast, the vast majority of the discussion in Books 2-9 
is about cities constructed in speech by Socrates (e.g. the City of Pigs, the diseased city 
which is gradually purified to become the Kallipolis, and the descriptions of a Timocracy, 
an Oligarchy, a Democracy, and a Tyranny).  It is only in Book 10 that the dialogue 
returns to the ‘real world’ to consider how theater affects people in a real city.150  
Accordingly, although there will be some references to Book 1 in this chapter, most of 
the attention will be on Books 2-9. We will return to Book 1 in the next chapter (whose 
focus is on Book 10) where the setting is again the ‘real world’.    
 The other key moment occurs at the end of Book 4.  Socrates has completed 
what he (at that moment in the dialogue) terms his description of the perfectly just city 
and soul and is about to complete the picture by examining four degenerate forms of 
city and soul.  His interlocutors, however, break in, resulting in the long (ostensibly 
interruptive) digression of the ‘middle books’ (Books 5-7).  Books 8-9 then resume the 
discussion of the four types of unjust cities ‘worth mentioning’, along with the types of 
character that resemble them.      
 I will organize the discussion in accord with the above two dramatic moments.  
After laying the terminological groundwork (Section 2) and considering the factors that 
the Republic highlights as contributing to character development (Section 3), I will 
examine the picture of character in three sections (4.1, 4.2, and 4.3), as delineated by 
the dramatic breaks outlined above.  I will begin by focusing on the initial picture of 
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character that emerges from Books 2-4, then consider how that picture is enhanced by 
the ‘digressive middle books’ (Books 5-7), and finally look at character as it appears in 
the unjust cities constructed in Books 8-9.  I will argue that each of these sections 
enhances our understanding of Plato’s conception of character.  Nevertheless, on my 
view, in spite of these various changes and interruptions in Socrates’ narration, 
Socrates’ treatment of character will turn out to be remarkably consistent.   
 Overall, I will argue that character develops as a result of a number of factors, 
including innate constitution or nature, early rearing, education, one’s city of residence, 
and habituation.  As to the nature of character itself, I will argue that from Books 2-4 we 
can tease out a picture of character as something that can be described in terms of a 
set of morally relevant traits.  Second, character as a whole is described or depicted as 
being relatively more virtuous/vicious (or, equivalently, in Socrates’ usage, healthy/sick).  
Third, character traits emerge as propensities to act in certain ways (even though these 
propensities are not actualized all of the time).  By the end of Book 4 we have an initial 
picture of an ideally just character, as well as a great deal of detail on what it means for 
anybody to have his own character and what factors may have contributed to 
developing that character.  Further, although it is not fully fleshed out in the text, the 
emerging picture of character suggests an explanation of human behavior in terms of 
motivation and decision that does not rely on soul-parts as motivators and agents.  
Chapter 1 rejected the notion that Plato conceived of ‘parts’ of the soul as agent-like.  
Rather, I argued, agent-like soul-parts serve as explanatory artifacts that can be 
presented in different ways as best supports the argument at different points.  






to Plato (some of Socrates’ figurative discourse notwithstanding) the view that we can 
explain our actions as being the outcome of combat between two agent-like parts of the 
soul (what Korsgaard calls “the familiar Combat Model”).151  When the symposium 
participant wants a fifth cup of wine and he decides to have it (even though he thinks 
that it is a bad idea), it is not his ‘appetite part’ that desires and wins the fight with his 
reason.  Rather, both the desire and the action-decision are his and are partly related to 
the nature of his character.  He has a disposition to overindulge, as well as a habitual 
failure to deliberate and give weight to his reasoning when deciding on which action to 
choose.152  All of us reason and desire (to highlight the two terms relevant in the above 
example), and it is our character that plays the major role in influencing our decision 
making (along with circumstances and other factors, of course).  The above example is 
not drawn from the text; indeed, I do not think that Socrates articulates a fully worked 
out theory of action in the Republic.  Nevertheless, on my view, Plato’s portrayal of 
character and character traits contributes to a partial understanding of how psychic 
conflict within us gets resolved into action. 
 But before Socrates’ discussion related to character can be continued (by looking 
at the four unjust character types ‘worth examining’) Books 5-7 intervene, adding a key 
layer of metaphysics and epistemology.  By the end of Book 7, we have a picture of an 
“even finer type of man” (8.543d) than Book 4’s man of “perfectly just” (5.472c) 
character.  Ultimately, with the whole of the Republic in mind, I will argue that Socrates 
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asks us to revise the view that Book 4 man is “perfectly just”.  Indeed, ‘Book 4 man’ will 
be seen to be an explanatory artifact that was helpful at that stage of the discussion but 
gets replaced by the Philosopher-King.  The Philosopher-King, when faced with a 
decision, consistently reasons about what constitutes the just choice—and then 
chooses the just action, with his whole soul in harmony.  His fifty years of education, 
training, and testing have given him some measure of knowledge of the Forms, above 
all, the Form of the Good.  His soul will be in harmony not only as a result of his nature, 
rearing, education, etc., but also by virtue of the fact that he consorts with the Forms 
and his reasoning will be supported by a significant understanding of which act, in any 
given situation, truly is or is not good.  But even leaving aside the ideally just 
Philosopher-King, the metaphysics and epistemology of Books 5-7 highlight the 
importance of knowledge or true belief in enabling any of us to deliberate well—that is, 
to reach a sound decision.  Thus Books 5-7 add important specificity to our 
understanding of character and its relation to action.  Nevertheless, the overall picture 
we have of character by the end of Book 7, though deepened, remains consistent with 
the picture from Books 2-4 in the key areas outlined above. 
 Books 8-9 then resume the discussion of character types (as Socrates had 
originally planned) picking out four unjust character types “worth mentioning” (4.445c).  
Again our picture of character is extended and enhanced now, especially in our 
understanding of how widely character as a whole can vary in terms of its virtue.  The 
overall picture, though, is consistent with that which emerged from the first seven 
Books. 






namely that the vast majority of people are very unlikely to develop a perfectly just 
character.  Perfectly just character is much discussed, as are the limitless number of 
forms of vice.  But where does somebody like Glaucon (who is clearly not perfectly just, 
but also does not seem to be vicious) fit?  Books 1-9 leave Glaucon (as well as many 
readers of the Republic) yearning to live the happiest life, which is associated with 
developing a truly virtuous character.  But the perfect virtue described depends on the 
early rearing, education, and laws of the purified city, which, as Glaucon points out, 
“exists in words (λόγοις), since I do not think it exists anywhere on earth” (9.592a R).153  
On the one hand we are persuaded of the value of this ideal virtue and feel moved to 
strive for it.  On the other hand, people live in real cities such that are filled with very 
imperfect education, many poor norms, and many lawless citizens.   This is a moment 
of great conflict for the reader of the Republic. If we feel too discouraged about the 
difficulty inherent in our inner resources and social situation we may be unable to 
muster the endurance to continually strive for virtue; and in that case, Socrates’ answer 
to Glaucon and Adeimantus would be a failure.  Thus it is crucial for Socrates not to 
stop here at the end of Book 9.  Fortunately, there is one Book left.    
Consistently, along the course of the first nine Books, it seems that most of us 
are likely to develop a character which is either some undiscussed form of less than 
perfect virtue, or one of the “unlimited number of forms of vice” (ἄπειρα δὲ τῆς κακίας 
4.445c). Book 10 calls us to revisit that picture, thereby helping Socrates to offer 
Glaucon (and Plato to offer us) a sense that we might indeed be able to succeed in 
                                            
 
 
153 Quoted is Reeve’s rendering.  Shorey, Bloom, and Sachs have “exists in speeches”.  Grube/Reeve 






developing a character which is sufficiently virtuous to yield a reasonably flourishing life.  
In this current chapter, though, I will focus on establishing the baseline picture of human 
character that emerges, on my account, from the first nine Books. 
 
2.0 Plato’s Terminology   
 In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle inquires into human character in detail.  In 
so doing, he develops a rigorous formal vocabulary.  Thus Shorey describes Plato’s 
usage of the word ἕξις at 6.509a by saying: “ἕξις is not yet in Plato quite the technical 
Aristotelian ‘habit’”.154  Similarly, as will be noted subsequently, Irwin asserts that for 
Aristotle, ἕξις denotes a state, but “is not merely a tendency to behave…that is why 
‘habit’ and ‘disposition’ are misleading translations of ἕξις”.155  The situation is quite 
different in Plato’s Republic.  As noted previously, Plato does not develop a formal 
technical vocabulary for describing character (as Aristotle does).  On my reading, 
though, he does maintain a high level of consistency in the use of each of the terms he 
employs as a vocabulary related to character.  Nevertheless, I think it is critical to avoid 
the temptation to understand Plato’s vocabulary through the lens of Aristotle’s precise 
technical terms. 
 As noted, Plato’s terminology for words related to character needs quite a bit of 
interpretation.  The various translations understandably differ significantly in how they 
construe these words.  Further, they are often not consistent within a single text.  For 
example, I will argue below that ἦθος, when used in the plural and applied to a single 
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person, signifies character traits.  But consider that plural applied to a single person 
(ἤθη) in its appearance at 3.402d.  Bloom translates ἤθη as ‘dispositions’, which I take 
to be the same or very similar to my preferred ‘character traits’.  Of the twelve 
translations I examined, seven translate ἤθη as a singular (six of them say character, 
one says disposition)156, whereas 5 of them translate ἤθη as a plural (dispositions, 
characteristics, mental characteristics, habits, and states of character).157  Now the term 
ἤθη (applied to a single person) occurs eight additional times in the Republic.  Unlike 
Bloom who translates each of the eight as ‘dispositions’, Reeve translates each of them 
differently, sometimes in the singular and sometimes in the plural.158  In the subsections 
below, I base my understanding of key terms by examining every passage in the 
Republic where those terms appear.   Although the procedure may seem somewhat 
circular, the text gives us a basis for understanding that vocabulary; and that vocabulary 
is essential in understanding the text.  Context gives us the basis since each individual 
statement in the Republic that uses a key term (e.g. ἦθος) is clear enough in its 
particulars (e.g. that character is shaped by acculturation) and the set of those 
statements reveals a consistency that helps establish the vocabulary.  The vocabulary, 
in turn, is obviously essential in understanding the text, especially since some of these 
psychological concepts were first articulated in this text. 
 
                                            
 
 
156 Those seven being: Shorey (disposition), Grube, Lee, Grube/Reeve, Cornford, Griffith/Ferrari, and RA 
Allen (character) 
157 Those five being: Bloom, Larson, Waterfield, Reeve, and Sachs.  
158 habits (4.424d), qualities (4.435e), conditions (7.541a), character (8.557c), traits of character (8.558d), 







 In the singular, ἦθος is one of Plato’s primary terms for character.  At 3.409d, 
Socrates says that an evil man cannot recognize a healthy character (ῆ̓θος).  Similarly, 
at 8.577a he says that the best judge is the one who can look into the character (ῆ̓θος) 
of a person.159  The other occurrences of ῆ̓θος in the singular are consistent with this 
usage.160  Most of the footnoted passages will be discussed in the coming sections, so 
to avoid repetition they are not set out here. 
 In the plural, ἤθη signifies one of two things.  In some cases, it still means 
character, only in relation to multiple people; one person has her particular character 
and many people have their particular characters.  For example, at 8.544d-e Socrates 
asks “do you suppose that constitutions spring from the proverbial oak or rock and not 
from the characters of the citizens?”161   In other cases, Socrates refers to the ἤθη of a 
single person.  When used thusly, on my view, ἤθη means character traits.  Consider 
3.402c-d.  First, Socrates sets the stage by naming several character traits directly 
(“temperance, courage, freedom of spirit, and magnificence”) and points to others (“their 
opposites”, meaning intemperance, cowardice, etc.)  Socrates then goes on to talk 
about those character traits using the term ἤθη: 
                                            
 
 
159 Again, here I am just focusing on the terminology.  The import of passages such as these two will be 
considered in Section 4.  
160 The other occurrences of ἦθος in the singular are at 2.375c, 2.375e, 3.400d, 3.400e, 3.401a, 3.401b, 
6.490c, 6.492e, 6.496b, 6.497b, 8.549a, 10.604e, and 10.605a. 
161 The other occurrences of ἦθος in the plural referring to the characters of multiple people are at 3.409a, 
4.424d, 6.500d, 6.501a, 6.501c, 6.503c, 7.535b, 7.541a, 8.544e, 8.545b, 8.548d, and 8.557c.  It should 
be noted, though, that at 7.541 it is syntactically unclear whether the ἠθῶν adhere to the children under 
10 years of age, or rather to their parents. (The eight translators I consulted were split evenly between the 
two possibilities.)  It is also textually unclear as to whether Plato could be saying that children under 10 
have stable characters, though it seems unlikely given the rest of what is said about character 






when there is a coincidence in the soul (ἔν τε τῇ ψυχῇ) of fine character traits 
(καλὰ ἤθη) and corresponding and harmonious beauties of the same type in the 
bodily form (3.402d translation Shorey with my adaptations). 
 
This is a critical point, on my view, in understanding Plato’s notion of human 
psychology.  As noted above, seven of the translators I have examined translate καλὰ 
ἤθη as beautiful character or beautiful disposition.  Casting the plural ἤθη as a singular, 
on my view, obscures the passage’s explicit reference to an array of different character 
traits. If Plato had wanted to refer to character, he could have used the singular (ἦθος), 
as he so often does in the Republic.   Distinguishing the idea that Plato had a notion of 
both character and character trait helps fill out the picture of how he understood human 
psychology.  Further, on my reading, the other occurrences of ἤθη when applied to one 
person are consistent with this.162 
 Overall, ἦθος stands as a primary designator for human character.  My ἤθη are 
my character traits.  My character can be described in terms of those traits, and/or with 
                                            
 
 
162 The other occurrences of ἤθη meaning character traits are found at 4.435e, 8.558d, 8.561e, 9.571c, 
and 9.572d.  In the one instance (8.561e) where Plato applies the plural genitive of ἦθος (ἠθῶν) to a 
single individual, it is very unclear as to whether he intends character traits or not, so it is not surprising 
that translators differ widely about how to render this passage.  It is unclear whether, given the context of 
the democratic type, the passage is better understood to say that the democratic character type has the 
largest number of character traits, or the fewest number of stable character traits. Perhaps this is why 
Shorey translates ἠθῶν here as ‘differences’, Griffith/Ferrari and Lee as ‘characteristics’, Waterfield as 
‘varied, etc.  I have argued that a good translation will try for as much consistency as possible, in order to 
make the Greek as transparent to the reader as possible.  In this case there is a legitimate argument to 
be made for using a different English term because of the contextualization of the passage. This 
complexity will be raised again in the next section where we consider the plural genitive τρόπων. 
 
Still, we can contrast Plato’s rigorous use of ἦθος and ἤθη with Xenophon’s in Memorabilia 3.10.  First, 
Xenophon uses ἦθος in the singular just as Plato does: “do you also reproduce the character of the soul, 
the character that is in the highest degree captivating, delightful, friendly, fascinating, lovable?” (τὸ 
πιθανώτατον καὶ ἥδιστον καὶ φιλικώτατον καὶ ποθεινότατον καὶ ἐρασμιώτατον ἀπομιμεῖσθε τῆς ψυχῆς 
ἦθος; 3.10.3).  But the only time Xenophon uses ἤθη, at 3.10.5, he is referring to character or characters, 
not character traits: “Now which do you think the more pleasing sight, one whose features and bearing 
reflect a beautiful and good and lovable character” (πότερον οὖν, ἔφη, νομίζεις ἥδιον ὁρᾶν τοὺς 






respect to its overall goodness or badness.  As we will see below, there are other 
features that contribute to what makes me distinctively me (e.g. habits I’ve developed, 
innate characteristics of body or psyche, characteristics that have developed over time 
and now are part of my second nature, and even things like my social status).  By 
contrast with terms that pick out distinct qualities, ἦθος seems to be the term Plato uses 
most frequently for the core of who one is; that is to say, one’s character. 
 
2.2 τρόπος 
 According to LSJ, τρόπος has as its primary meanings ‘turn, direction, course, 
way, manner, fashion’.  As such, it appears frequently throughout the Republic, for 
example in the first sentence of the dialogue. (Socrates wants to see the ‘manner’ or 
‘fashion’ in which the festival is conducted.)  But, as LSJ also points out, when applied 
to persons, τρόπος refers to a person’s “way of life, habit, custom” or “a man's ways, 
habits, character, temper”.  Plato does seem to use the word τρόπος (in the singular) to 
mean character.  This sense of the word first appears at 1.329d when Cephalus says 
that what counts is the character of a person (ὁ τρόπος τῶν ἀνθρώπων).  He goes on to 
specify a character which is “temperate and cheerful” (Shorey), or “balanced and good-
tempered” (Bloom).  Socrates replies by using the same term (τρόπος) to refer to 
Cephalus’ character.  Thus in several places in the Republic the word τρόπος (in the 
singular) is used as a synonym for ἦθος (character).163  The plural, τρόποι sometimes is 
used not in reference to human beings (e.g. τρόποι μουσικῆς 4.424c) and also, in three 
                                            
 
 
163 Other examples of τρόπος in the singular applied to persons include: 1.329d, 1.329e, 3.368b, 3.400d, 






places, in reference to human beings.  All three references are in the genitive.  At 
8.544d, Socrates says that it is inevitable that there are as many forms (εἴδη) of human 
characters (τρόπων) as there are forms of government.  Here τρόπων is similar to ἤθη 
in referring to the characters of more than one person.    
 At 8.561e and 9.575a, on the other hand, τρόπων is used in relation to a single 
individual.  Just as the meaning of ἦθος, in the one case where it is used in the plural 
genitive and applied to a single individual is very unclear (as discussed previously, in 
section 2.1 note 162), so too the meaning of τρόπος in both cases where it is used in 
the plural genitive and applied to a single individual is unclear.  In the first of the two 
cases, as discussed above, although it is clear that the democratic character exhibits 
the greatest variety of behavior, it is not clear whether these should be seen as stable 
character traits.164  In the second case (9.575a) ‘character traits’ might fit, though none 
of the twelve translations I consulted render τρόπων as character traits.  Here Bloom’s 
translation that the basest ‘part’ of the tyrant’s soul is “freed by his own bad character” 
seems to ignore the plural.  Most translators render τρόπων as “habits”, though Allen 
has “dispositions”, Sachs has “tendencies” and Cornford and Lee have “practices”.165  
Again, ‘τρόπων’ only appears twice in the Republic and given the lack of context, it is 
hard to determine how to best render it at those two spots.  
 
                                            
 
 
164 White (1979, 216), among others, notes this point: “Plato does not treat of the democratic man in two 
distinct sections, one on his development and another on his characteristics as he has done of the other 
types of men…his development extends late into life, and he never has any fully fixed pattern of activity”. 








 Plato uses the term φύσις frequently in the Republic (148 occurrences).  He uses 
the term, though, in four different senses, three of which are relevant to the psychology 
of a person.  The first sense of φύσις is one’s ‘first nature’, described either in terms of a 
single innate characteristic (e.g. some people are innately faint-hearted [ἄθυμον 
3.411b]), or in terms of a set of these innate characteristics (e.g. the person who by 
nature is both gentle and great spirited (2.375d), or the person who by nature has love 
of wisdom, quickness, high spirit, strength [2.376c]).  Note that these characteristics 
might be of the soul or of the body.166  For example, at 9.591b Socrates contrasts the 
benefits of fine characteristics of the soul, e.g. moderation and justice (σωφροσύνην τε 
καὶ δικαιοσύνην) with the benefits of fine characteristics of the body e.g. strength of 
body (as LSJ translates it) and beauty (ἰσχύν τε καὶ κάλλος), while pointing out that “the 
soul is more precious than the body”.  Of course soul and body act upon each other and 
it is the embodied soul that is at issue in Books 1-9.  Some practices may lead to the 
development of characteristics of both soul and body.  Gymnastic training builds bodily 
strength and health (3.404e), but can also lead to the development of savageness (if not 
mixed properly with musical training 3.410d) or courage (if properly mixed).  Unlike 
character, which as we’ve seen is describable in terms of character traits, one’s first 
nature may be described in terms of physical or psychic characteristics.  Moreover, 
φύσις, in the sense of first nature, always appears in the singular.  Plural references are 
                                            
 
 
166 Other relevant examples of φύσις in sense 1 include 1.366c, 2.359c, 2.375b, 2.375c, 2.375e, 3.401c, 
3.408d, 3.409d, 3.410b, 3.415c, 4.424a, 4.430a, 5.455e-456a, 6.485a, 6.487a, 6.510a, 7.526b, 7.526c, 






always to the first natures of multiple people. 
 Sense 2 of φύσις is what might be called second nature.  Unlike the innate 
characteristics described above, certain habits, if practiced over many years, become 
part of one’s second nature.  For example, if I imitate a liar all of my life (and therefore 
consistently lie) lying becomes part of my nature (3.395d).167 In addition to developing a 
second nature by repeated actions, intrinsic parts of one’s nature can be corrupted by 
poor rearing, poor education, or by living in a city filled with vicious people.  This is 
discussed at 6.489e-492e.  Similarly, 6.495a: “these, then, are the many ways in which 
the best nature—which is already rare enough, as we said—is destroyed and corrupted” 
(my emphasis).  I may start out with a first nature blessed with quickness and strength.  
But if I adopt a regimen of overeating coupled with no exercise, my nature will develop 
into one of slowness and weakness.  (Habits are related but importantly different.  
Second nature refers to how we are, not to our habitual actions.)168  Overall, then, like 
first nature, second nature (sense 2 of φύσις) is described in terms of physical or 
psychic characteristics and always appears in the singular, except when referring to 
multiple people.   
 Plato clearly establishes the distinction between first and second nature.  When 
Socrates says that “the first thing to understand is the nature that they must have from 
birth” (6.485a) or discusses the nature (φύσις) of the children born to gold parents 
(3.415c), he is clearly referring to the first nature with which a child is born.  On the 
other hand, when Socrates says that “imitations, if they are practiced continually from 
                                            
 
 
167 Other relevant examples of φύσις in sense 2 include 3.410e, 10.611d, and 10.618d. 






youth onwards, become established as habits and nature (φύσις)” (3.495d B), he is 
clearly referring to second nature.  Indeed, Shorey translates φύσις, here, as “(second) 
nature”.  Because the distinction is clearly established in the text and because the 
notion of first versus second nature will be important in the accounts of later 
philosophers (notably Aristotle) I will continue to use the terms first nature and second 
nature.  It should be noted, though, that for the purposes of the Republic’s account of 
psychology, the distinction does not play a key role.  When Socrates says that “each 
one man must perform one social service in the state for which his nature (φύσις) is 
best adapted”, it makes no difference whether the nature in question was inborn or 
acquired.   
 Sense 3 of φύσις is the occupational nature of a person.   In this third sense, 
one’s nature is everything about one that makes one suited to a particular role in life, 
such as character, physical attributes, wealth, status, etc.  Physical attributes may or 
may not be relevant. At 5.454c Socrates compares the nature (φύσις) of bald and long-
haired men, noting that baldness would not be relevant to whether one is suited by 
nature to be a cobbler.  The same holds for the natural capacity to bear children. Along 
with such minor physical attributes as hair on head, childbearing will not be relevant to 
one’s suitability for being a guardian.  On the other hand, somebody who, along with 
other qualities, was quick with numbers, friendly, weak, and poor sighted might be good 






of φύσις is much discussed in book 6, when Socrates considers the nature of a 
philosopher.169  
 The fourth sense of φύσις, of course, is simply the nature of things, such as the 
nature of ’white’ (4.429d) or ‘sight’ (2.367d) or ‘plants and animals’ (3.401a).  φύσις is 
often used in this fourth sense, but this sense is not relevant to our discussion of 
character.  
 
2.4 ἐθ́ος and ἐπιτήδευμα (or ἐπιτηδεύματα) 
 Plato sometimes uses the term ἐθ́ος to mean simply custom, as at 
5.452a: “women exercising naked with men is beyond current custom”.  But Plato also 
uses the word ἐθ́ος in relation to character.  Sometimes it refers to either a character 
trait or to the second nature that a person has, while at other times it refers to how he 
habituated himself to be disposed to that certain behavior.  The latter sense is mostly 
found where Socrates refers to things being produced ‘by habit’, using the dative.  Over 
time habituation can create character traits or instill some quality into one’s second 
nature.  Socrates says, “[virtuous character traits] are not really there beforehand and 
are later produced by habits (ἔθεσι in the dative) and exercises” (7.518e B italics mine).  
Similarly, at 7.522a, he says that music educated the guardians by habit (ἔθεσι, italics 
mine).  Socrates sometimes uses the dative of the related word ἐπιτήδευμα (habit or 
practice) in a similar manner.  Socrates says that a man “becomes tyrannical in the full 
                                            
 
 
169 Other relevant examples of φύσις in sense 3 include: 2.370b, 2.374e, 3.395b, 4.433a, 4.434a-b, 
4.443c, 5.453a, 5.453b, 5.453c, 5.453e, 5.454b, 5.454d, 5.455a, 5.456a, 5.473d, 5.474c, 6.495a, 6.495d, 






sense of the word…when either by nature or by habits (ἐπιτηδεύμασιν) or by both he 
has become even as the drunken, the erotic, the maniacal” (9.573c, italics mine).  In 
other words, one might not have a natural predisposition to give in to sensual pleasures, 
but by habitually over-drinking (for example, at college) still develop the character trait of 
being a drunk (i.e. by habit).  On the other hand, one might have such a natural 
predisposition, but by habitually drinking, this person might also develop the character 
trait of being a drunk (i.e. by both nature and habit).  
 By contrast with the above uses of ἐθ́ος and ἐπιτήδευμα (in the dative) Plato 
often uses the term ἐθ́ος or ἐπιτήδευμα (in the genitive or accusative) to refer to a 
character trait or disposition to act in a particular manner.  Socrates says that the 
guardians must imitate:  
men who are courageous, moderate, holy, free, and everything of the sort; and 
what is slavish, or anything else shameful, they must neither do nor be clever at 
imitating, so that they won’t get a taste for the being from its imitation. Or haven’t 
you observed that imitations, if they are practiced continually from youth 
onwards, become established as character traits (ἔθη) and nature (φύσιν)” 
(3.395c-d Translation Bloom, modified by me).   
 
Similarly, Socrates says that over time, music inculcates “harmoniousness” and 
“rhythmicalness” (7.522a B), and other character traits (ἔθη) akin to these.  There are 
additional examples in line with these.170   
 
                                            
 
 
170 At 4.424d, Socrates says of music that “establishing itself bit by bit, it flows gently beneath the surface 
into the characters (τὰ ἤθη) and character traits or practices (τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα)” of people (4.424d 
translation Bloom, with my modifications). Similarly, Socrates says that if someone with a philosophic 
nature takes residence in a vicious city he degenerates into an “alien character” (6.497b ἀλλότριον ἦθος).  
But if he finds himself in an ideal city, we will see that the other “natures and practices“ (6.497c τά τε τῶν 







 The term ἕξις has many meanings, only some of which are pertinent to character.  
Among the definitions given by LSJ, ἕξις can mean “condition”, “state or habit of body” 
and also “state or habit of mind”.  For the latter, LSJ points to 9.591c.  On the face of it, 
this seems a bit strange, since the text in question is “not only won’t he turn the habit 
(ἕξιν) and nourishment of the body over to the bestial and irrational pleasure.” (9.591c 
B).  But the ‘habit of the body’ does not here seem to be a bodily habit in the way that 
we sometimes use it, e.g. “John has the habit of nodding and smiling when people are 
speaking”.   Here ἕξις seems to refer to state or condition, as Sachs translates, “he’s not 
only not going to live as if he’d entrusted the condition and sustenance of his body to 
irrational animal pleasure”.  There are a few places in the Republic where it seems that 
Plato uses ἕξις not to mean ‘state’, but rather to mean habit, in the sense of something 
that one typically does.  For example:   
the city was thought to be just because three natural kinds existing in it 
performed each its own function, and again it was sober, brave, and wise 
because of certain other affections and habits (ἕξεις) of these three kinds. 
(4.435b) 
 
Similarly, at 7.511d, Socrates refers to the “habit (ἕξιν) of geometers”.  
 On the whole, though, Plato seems to generally use ἕξις to mean “having a 
certain state as a result of practice”.171  This is the sense used by Aristotle.  For 
                                            
 
 
171 This could include “being in a certain state” of soul or body.  For our purposes, the former is relevant.  
Hippocrates, on the other hand, uses ἕξις in the latter sense, e.g. “A healthy state (ἕξις) is superior in all” 






Aristotle, as Irwin points out, ἕξις denotes a state, but “is not merely a tendency to 
behave…that is why ‘habit’ and ‘disposition’ are misleading translations of ἕξις”.172  
 
2.6 βίος and διαιτάω 
 The word βίος is used extensively throughout the Republic and although it will be 
of primary significance in the next chapter, I will discuss its meaning briefly here 
because it is part of Plato’s vocabulary related to character.  βίος can have several 
meanings, but two are used in the Republic.  One of these is simply ‘life’ or ‘lifetime’, for 
example at 3.406c when Socrates says that “no one has the leisure to be sick 
throughout life and treat himself” (Bloom).173   
 As pointed out by LSJ, though, another meaning for βίος is “a life, biography, as 
those of Plu[tarch]”.  In this sense ’a life’ refers to the sum total of an entire life and 
generally takes a backward looking, biographical perspective.  This is the meaning that 
is most relevant to Platonic psychology and also to a central question of the Republic.  
At the beginning of Book 2, Glaucon asks whether it is true ‘as they say’ that ‘the life of 
an unjust person is much better than the life of a just person.  (πολὺ γὰρ ἀμείνων ἄρα ὁ 
τοῦ ἀδίκου ἢ ὁ τοῦ δικαίου βίος, ὡς λέγουσιν 2.358c).  What does Glaucon mean, here, 
by ‘life’?  When Glaucon and all of Socrates’ other interlocutors think about “a life”, they 
think about things external to the soul—about a lifetime of events, outcomes, 
possessions, etc.  And when they evaluate a life they evaluate it in terms of things 
                                            
 
 
172 Irwin (1999,349). 
173 Other examples of βιός meaning simply life or lifetime can be found at 1.328e, 2.344e, 2.360e, 2.361d, 
2.374c, 3.403d, 3.404a, 3.405b, 3.407d, 3.410c, 3.411a, 3.412e, 3.417b, 6.486a, 6.498d, 8.549b, 7.515b, 






external to the soul.  A good life is a life of success in business, marriage, wealth, etc., 
as described by Glaucon at (2.362c).   This is the “better life” potentially provided by 
injustice.  I refer to this sense of the word life as the ‘external’ sense of the word.174 
 By contrast, a careful examination of a concordance reveals that Socrates never, 
in Books 1-9, uses the word ‘life’ in the external sense.175  When Socrates uses the 
term, he invariably is referring to a person with respect to that person’s soul.176    He 
looks at internal features rather than external features.  His focus is on a person’s 
character (ἦθος). Socrates speaks of a life as virtuous, or moderate, or courageous, or 
pious, or just.  In crafting a musical education, Socrates wants to “observe what are the 
rhythms of a life (βίου) that is orderly and brave” (3.399e).  By contrast with Glaucon’s 
description of the happy life in terms of (among other things) wealth—meaning money, 
Socrates says: 
If you discover a life (βίον) better than ruling for those who are going to rule, it is 
possible that your well-governed city will come into being. For here alone will the 
really rich rule, rich not in gold but in those riches required by the happy man, 
rich in a good and prudent life. (7.520e-521a B italics mine) 
                                            
 
 
174 The interlocutors (including Er, whose story is repeated by Socrates) always and only use βιός in this 
sense, i.e. 1.331a, 2.358c, 2.358d, 2.361e, 2.362c, 2.364b, 2.365b, 2.367d, 5.450b, 10.619b, and 
10.620a.  Now some might challenge the first of these, namely when Cephalus quotes Pindar on the joys 
of living a “just and pious life” (1.331a).  But since Cephalus cashes ‘just and pious’ out in terms of being 
rich so you don’t need to cheat men or gods, it is clear that he too is thinking of ‘a life’ in terms of 
externals, just as the other interlocutors do.  
175 See, for example, 1.347e, 3.399e, 3.400a, 4.425e, 4.442b, 5.465d, 5.466a, 5.466b, 6.484a, 6.495c, 
6.496e, 7.518a, 7.520e, 8.561e, 9.575a, 9.581e, 9.583a, and 9.588a.  The one possible exception is 
2.372d, which will be discussed in the next footnote. The concordances used were Ast (1908) and the 
Perseus on line toolset. 
176 The sole possible exception to this in the Republic is at 2.372d, where Socrates says that the people 
of the pure city will ‘live out their lives in peace and health…and will hand down other similar lives to their 
offspring’.  Now the lives are indeed described in seemingly external terms; they make honest cakes, 
recline on beds strewn with yew and myrtle, feast with their children, drink wine, etc.  But this city, 
Socrates says, is the healthy city, and by analogy, the people are depicted as healthy people.  And by 
healthy, Socrates must mean healthy in soul.  Therefore, on my view, even here, Socrates is focused on 
the internal state of the soul, not the external events that the interlocutors take to constitute a life.  Even 







Thus for Socrates, although a good life might contain good and/or evil external events, it 
is always a lifetime of a person with good character.  
 Interestingly, Socrates does have a way of talking about external events.  For 
matters external to the soul he consistently uses the term διαιτάω.  Indeed, Socrates is 
the only speaker in the Republic to use this term at all.  For example, at 3.372aff 
Socrates says: 
let us consider what will be the manner of life of men (διαιτήσονται) thus 
provided. Will they not make bread and wine and garments and shoes? And they 
will build themselves houses and carry on their work in summer for the most part 
unclad and unshod and in winter clothed and shod sufficiently? 
 
When Socrates wants to talk of matters external to the soul, such as how an athlete 
eats and comports himself in order to stay fit, he uses the word δίαιταν (3.404d).177  
Similar examples can be found at 3.373a, 3.373d, 3.406e, and 3.407c.  Although 
Socrates’ term ‘way of life’ is slightly different from Glaucon’s ‘a life’, both describe the 
external events in a person’s life. 
 
2.7 Plato’s Terminology: Conclusion 
 Although he does not have Socrates raise an explicit inquiry into the nature of 
character, Plato depicts and discusses it extensively throughout the Republic.  Further, 
on my view, he makes distinctive, consistent, and nuanced use of everyday Greek 
words, offering insight into how he understands human character and the various 
aspects of what makes for a morally good and wise life.  Thus Plato provides a 
                                            
 
 
177 Socrates also uses διαιτάω to refer to a person’s regimen (also external), e.g. at 3.404a, 3.406b, 






vocabulary with which to describe virtuous and vicious characters and character traits. 
We are born with a first nature (φύσις) consisting of an innate set of physical and 
psychic qualities.  Over time, we develop characteristics (ἐθ́ος or ἐπιτήδευμα or 
ἐπιτηδεύματα in the accusative or genitive) by performing actions repeatedly.  That is to 
say that we develop these characteristics ’by habit’ (ἐθ́ος or ἐπιτήδευμα in the dative).  
Sometimes characteristics that are part of one’s first or second nature are equally 
character traits (ἤθη or τρόποι).  If I have a vicious nature (7.519a) then I have a 
character that includes the trait of viciousness.   But if I am a runner who by the happy 
gift of nature can outrace all competitors, that characteristic is part of my nature, but not 
part of my character (ἦθος or τρόπος).  Finally, when Socrates wants to argue for which 
life (βίος) is best, he focuses internally on one’s character.  When he wants to describe 
ways of life that are external to the soul he uniformly uses the term διαιτάω.178  Of 
course these might affect one’s character, but in that case he would revert to describing 
the life (βίος) with respect to character. 
 
3.0 Character Development in the Republic   
   Socrates’ methodology in Books 8-9 is to look first at how a particular 
paradigmatic polity arises, after which he examines the resulting city.  Similarly, he first 
looks at how the person who resembles that city comes to be, after which he examines 
the individual himself.  Sara Brill argues that this methodology is necessary: 
an analysis of the character of city and soul … would be incomplete without an 
account of the genesis of this character. Socrates’ persistence in providing an 
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account of the transformation of character (in addition to a description of the 
character) identifies causal mechanisms common to city and soul and makes this 
identification a necessary part of the analysis.179  
 
I think the same approach is useful in understanding the Republic’s picture of character.  
Much of what the Republic has to tell us about human character emerges from its 
account of character development.  Therefore, this section will focus on character 
development, after which, in Section 4, I will turn to how the Republic depicts character 
itself.   
 In contrast to the vexed issue of how agent-like the ‘parts’ of our souls are, it 
seems to me that that Socrates offers a fairly straightforward and consistent picture of 
how character develops.  There are five factors, each of which plays a critical role, 
namely 1) breeding and first nature, 2) rearing, 3) early and adult education, 4) city of 
residence, and 5) habituation.  Deficiencies in any of these, I will argue, will make it 
extremely difficult (but not impossible) to develop the fully virtuous character that 
Socrates describes.   
 
3.1 Breeding and First Nature  
 Although 4th Century Greeks did not have our science of genetics, they were 
very aware of breeding and its effects.  Socrates frequently raises the issue of breeding, 
both of animals (e.g. 1.333b, 1.342c, 5.458e-459b) and of people (e.g. 5.459b).  Good 
breeding usually produces offspring with a good first nature (“for the most part you’ll 
produce offspring like yourselves” 3.415a B), though not invariably (“it sometimes 
                                            
 
 






happens that a silver child will be born from a golden parent, a golden child from a silver 
parent, and similarly all the others from each other” 3.415b B).  This is because luck and 
other factors play a role.  Although Socrates does indeed seem to be “playing and 
jesting with us as if we were children” at 8.545e-546d, the point of the passage seems 
clear.  Whether it is the “whole geometrical number” that “controls better and worse 
births”, or chance (as suggested here at 8.546d and perhaps also in the Myth of Er at 
10.619d), or some other factors, Socrates says that the decline of the Kallipolis begins 
with children who are born without a good (first) nature (οὐκ εὐφυεῖς 8.546d).  When 
those children become rulers, because of their nature they will begin to neglect music 
and gymnastics, and develop a character that is less than virtuous.180 
 Being born with a good first nature is extremely rare in human beings (6.491a-b).  
Further, even for such rare people, being born with an excellent first nature is not 
enough to ensure that they will develop virtuous characters.  As will become clear, poor 
rearing, poor education, or other factors might well corrupt an excellent first nature, 
resulting in a person with a vicious character.  For example, at 6.494b-495b, Socrates 
describes a boy born with an outstanding first nature— “first among the children in 
everything”.  If he lives in a bad city, though, or has bad parents who do not raise their 
children properly, his family and the citizenry alike will flatter him, try to make use of 
him, etc., to the point that he develops a character “brimming with pretension and pride 
that is empty and lacks understanding”.   This is said in relation to what often happens 
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that causes distrust in philosophers, but as usual, Socrates broadens the point to apply 
to everybody:  
the very qualities that make up the philosophical nature do, in fact, become, 
when the environment and nurture are bad, in some sort the cause of its 
backsliding…but a small nature never does anything great to a man or a city 
(6.494a-b). 
 
 Nevertheless, one’s first nature is significant and heavily influences the kind of 
character one will develop.  For this reason, in the Kallipolis, “If an offspring of [gold 
parents] should be found to have a mixture of iron or bronze, they must not pity him in 
any way, but give him the rank appropriate to his nature and drive him out to join the 
craftsmen and farmers” (3.415b-c G).  Indeed, at 8.558b Socrates suggests that 
somebody with a surpassingly excellent first nature (ὑπερβεβλημένην φύσιν) might even 
overcome the results of bad rearing and become a good person.  But this is only for 
somebody with an exceptional first nature.  Generally, “the best nature fares worse, 
when unsuitably nurtured, than an ordinary one” (6.491d G). 
 In sum, one’s first nature appears to be largely a result of one’s genetics.  Luck 
and other matters might have an effect, but generally only good stock will produce good 
offspring.  But very few people are born with a good first nature.  Thus, although first 
nature is not sufficient for the development of a good character, one’s first nature 
significantly impacts the character one is likely to develop, for good or for evil, which is 
why so much attention is paid to this matter in the Kallipolis.  Certainly moving back and 
forth between the city and the soul can sometimes be misleading, but in this case, as 
Socrates has made clear (e.g. at 6.491a-b) the rarity of good first nature and the impact 







3.2 Rearing  
Along with breeding and first nature, rearing is crucial to developing good 
character.  Even before early education, children's characters begin to develop for the 
better or the worse by virtue of the games they play and the stories and the music that 
they hear.  This is because the soul of the very young child “is most malleable and takes 
on any pattern one wishes to impress on it” (2.377a G).  Therefore, Socrates urges that  
 
we must first of all, it seems, supervise the storytellers. We’ll select their stories 
whenever they are fine or beautiful and reject them when they aren’t. And we’ll 
persuade nurses and mothers to tell their children the ones we have selected, 
since they will shape their children’s souls with stories (2.377b-c G).   
 
Similarly, for the games that the young children play:  
our children’s games must from the very beginning be more law-abiding, for if 
their games become lawless, and the children follow suit, isn’t it impossible for 
them to grow up into good and law-abiding men? (4.424e G).   
 
Again, it is important to emphasize the universality of the claims in the passages above.  
Though said in context of the Kallipolis, Socrates’ claim here is that even outside the 
Kallipolis, it is “impossible” (ἀδύνατον 4.425a) to develop virtuous character without a 
good rearing. 
 As they get a bit older and begin their education, first nature and rearing are 
major factors in determining whether the education will be successful: “because they 
had the proper nature and rearing, they would absorb the laws in the finest possible 
way” (4.430a G).181   Rearing comes from many sources, not only mothers and 
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nursemaids, but also from fathers and from the norms and inhabitants of the city in 
which one is reared.  For example, the account of how the man who resembles the 
timocratic city comes to be (8.549e-550c) details his rearing and the influence of his 
mother, father, the family servants, and the people of the city.  Each plays a role in the 
development of his character. 
 As was the case with breeding and first nature, rearing on its own is not at all 
sufficient to ensure development of a particular type of character.  As noted earlier, 
even the best natures can become outstandingly bad if subjected to poor rearing 
(6.491d).  Indeed, in any city where “there are thieves, pickpockets, temple-robbers, and 
all such evildoers”, their presence is partly due to “bad rearing” (κακὴν τροφὴν) (8.552d-
e G).  Overall, rearing emerges as a second critical factor in character development.   
 
3.3 Early and Adult Education (παιδεία) 
 Along with first nature and rearing, education (both early and adult) plays a key 
role in character development.  Certainly, education in Plato’s Athens was very different 
from ours.  First of all, as Burnyeat points out, “The Greek word παιδεία means both 
education and culture, because culture is what educates and forms the soul”.182  In 
addition, the emphasis on acting out works of ‘poetry’ (μουσική) in early education, as 
well as the importance of the theater in adult education mattered greatly to the specifics 
of character development in Plato’s day.   In the Republic, Socrates discusses at length, 
especially in Books 2-3, just how early education builds character in the young 
                                            
 
 






guardians-to-be.  Subsequently, in Books 5-7, we get a detailed account of the adult 
education which leads to the finest character of all—the Philosopher-King.  Finally, in 
Book 10, we get a picture of how poetry in the theater impacts the character of ordinary 
people.  
 Early education is critical, and is considered in the context of the education of the 
guardians (οἱ φύλακες) of the Kallipolis.  Socrates says that “the direction of the 
education from whence one starts is likely to determine the quality of what follows” 
(4.425b-c). The future leaders are educated in music so that they might develop the 
finest possible set of character traits: 
they must imitate from childhood what is appropriate for them, namely, people 
who are courageous, self-controlled, pious, and free. (3.395c G) 
 
But the underlying dynamic is general in nature, applicable to all people: 
Or have you not observed that imitations, if continued from youth far into life, 
settle down into character traits and nature (ἔθη τε καὶ φύσιν 3.395c-d translation 
mine adapted from Shorey) 
 
This pattern of prescribing specifics in the education in the Kallipolis while ascribing the 
impact of education on character to people at large runs throughout Books 2 and 3.183  
The specifics regarding the proper content of the music to be used in education are 
covered at length, since, as quoted above, that content and the style of the delivery of 
that content build virtuous or vicious character.  Also the meter and harmony are 
discussed in depth, since they too are instrumental in character development (3.400c-
e).  Content, style, meter, harmony, etc., matter especially since the youths participated 
in tragedies by taking part in one chorus or another, which involved them in imitation 
                                            
 
 






more deeply than just watching a play would involve us.  These as well as the impact of 
the proper mix of music and gymnastic education on the development of fine character 
traits (e.g. 3.410a-412b) are well covered in the secondary literature and do not need to 
be reviewed for the purposes of this chapter.184  What is relevant, though, is that clearly, 
on Socrates’ account, childhood education is critical to the development of character 
traits.  Bad education promotes the development of servility (ἀνελευθερίας), insolence 
(ὕβρεως) and other bad character traits (3.400b), whereas good education promotes 
courage (e.g. 3.399e, 4.429e-430b), moderation (3.399b, 3.404e), rationality (3.401d-
402a), and other good character traits.  Overall, good education promotes the 
development of a “truly good and fine character” (ἀληθῶς εὖ τε καὶ καλῶς τὸ ἦθος 
3.400e).  Nevertheless, like the developmental factors discussed in section 3.1 and 3.2, 
it is not sufficient on its own.  Even the young guardians who receive an excellent 
education might still fail to develop virtue of character, for example, the person who acts 
out of cowardice at 5.468a.    
 Early education is more formative to one’s character than later-stage education, 
but the latter still plays some role.  First of all, just as the imitation inherent in the 
education of the youth shapes their characters, so too the imitations adults experience 
in the theater, at symposia, and all around them affect their characters.185  This is why 
the ‘versatile imitator’ (as Belfiore calls him) is not permitted into the Kallipolis at 3.397e-
398b.186  Images that elevate slavery over death, for example, promote the 
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development of cowardice in adults as well as children (παισὶ καὶ ἀνδράσιν 3.387b).  In 
addition, the continuing education of the guardians is built upon the early education in 
music and gymnastic and is clearly intended to further shape the character of these 
young adults.  Burnyeat, for example, makes a convincing case that 
The mathematical curriculum is part of a long, unitary argument to establish that, 
if talented men and women with a passion for knowledge are educated in the 
right studies, they will rule both reluctantly (hence without being corrupted in the 
manner of the rulers we are familiar with) and wisely (hence to the benefit of the 
whole community).  The crux of the argument is the claim that true ethical insight 
presupposes an intense mathematical training, which neither Glaucon nor the 
reader has had…Success in this task will be an important test of which Guards 
are fitted to go on to five years’ dialectic, for only someone who can view things 
synoptically has a truly dialectical nature (7.537c).187 
 
 
From age 30-35 they study dialectic, which is prerequisite to gaining knowledge of the 
Form of the Good and thereby developing philosophic virtue. Then, at age 35, they must 
go back down into the cave to complete their education through 15 years of ruling in 
offices suitable for young adults in order to gain experience (ἐμπειρίᾳ 7.539e).188  
During these 15 years they will be tested as to whether will they remain steadfast and 
faithful (ἐμμενοῦσιν 7.540a) or will “shift their ground” or “change” (7.540a 
παρακινήσουσι).189  Thus the testing is about the nature of their character.  Socrates 
does not detail how these 15 years develop character; he simply tells us that they are 
intended to do so and that the future leaders will be tested on whether or not the 15 
                                            
 
 
187 Burnyeat (2000, 64-67).  Italics are mine. 
188 The consensus view, e.g. Adam (1902,153), is that at this point they have not yet gained knowledge of 
the Form of the Good; rather this occurs when they reach age 50.  Vasiliou (2015, 49) argues, to the 
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years succeeded.  In other words, the 15 years of practical service will test (at the 
outset) whether their initial education produced good character traits, as well as (as the 
years progress) whether their years of practical education have succeeded in further 
developing their characters in the direction of virtue.   
 Those who pass the tests will spend most of their time continuing the study of 
dialectic.  But they must also spend part of their time, when their turn comes, using the 
Form of the Good “as a pattern for the right ordering of the state and the citizens and 
themselves” (7.540a).  They will use their knowledge of the Good to rule the city and to 
educate “others of the same sort as them” (7.540b) for the remainder of their lives.  
These others that they are educating are clearly adults (future rulers) and the goal of the 
education is at least partly to improve their students’ characters, building on the early 
education that those students received.   We see from this account that although primary 
education has the greater impact on character development, secondary education also 
strongly affects character.  It too, though, is not sufficient to ensure that an individual will 
develop a virtuous character.  These guardians have been a) selected for breeding and 
excellence of first nature, b) well brought up, and c) excellently educated.  Nevertheless, 
some of those who still fail to ‘survive the tests’ (540a) fail on some weakness of 
character (e.g. they do not stand firm).   
 As usual, Socrates gives much of the detail in the context of the Kallipolis, but 
assures us that character development is the same in Athens and other non-ideal cities.  
At the end of Book 9 Socrates says: 
Then won’t the man who has intelligence strain all of his powers to that end as 
long as he lives; in the first place, honoring the studies that will make his soul 






prudence], while despising the rest? (9.9591c B, bracketed material from 9.591a 
B) 
 
Burnyeat argues that this must apply to the philosopher living in a non-ideal city, since 
Socrates goes on to apply this to how the man ‘who has intelligence’ will employ his 
education for the acquisition of money (at 9.591d) and take part in the politics of the city 
of his birth (at 9.592a).190  Perhaps Burnyeat is correct, but coming (as it does) right 
after the image of the soul (i.e. the multi-headed beast/lion/man wrapped in the shape of 
a man 9.588c-d), I take this passage to refer as much to the effect of education on 
human character overall.  Each of the three factors we have examined, breeding/first 
nature, rearing, and education is critical to character formation, but none of them is 
sufficient on its own.  
 
3.4 City of Residence 
 Another critical factor in character development is the nature of the city in which 
one resides.191 This includes its culture, its norms, and its citizens.  All aspects of the 
culture come into play.  Even the architecture of one’s city of residence is formative to 
one’s character.  Architecture admits of being graceful or graceless (3.401a).  
Gracelessness in the architecture of one’s city of residence (like the other facets of its 
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culture) gradually accustom one to mediocrity and ugliness, forming base character 
(κακοηθείας 3.401a) whereas gracefulness in architecture has the opposite effect.   
 More important, in the good city of Book 4, the laws help a person develop good 
character traits as well as an overall good character.  For example, in the good city, one 
who internalizes the laws in a fine way develops the positive character trait of (civic) 
courage (4.430a-b).  The good laws also promote harmony among the citizens (5.462a-
e)—they “bind [the city] together and make it one” (5.462b B).  It is just the same in the 
souls of the individual inhabitants of the good city (“the city with the best regime is most 
like such a human being” 5.462c B). Further, in the pure city, the norms of behavior 
(respect for elders, care of parents, “hair-dos, clothing shoes…and everything else of 
the sort” 4.425b B) will foster fine character development.  Socrates argues at length 
(4.425b-427a) that regarding these matters it is both unnecessary and also impractical 
to pass laws (in a good city with good people i.e. the future guardians).  Regarding 
these matters, it would not be fitting to dictate to fine and good people (οὐκ ἄξιον, ἔφη, 
ἀνδράσι καλοῖς κἀγαθοῖς ἐπιτάττειν 4.425d).  
 Of course, the above comments are describing the purified city that can produce 
the perfectly virtuous person.  So it is unsurprising that Socrates says that no city that 
exists in his time is worthy of the “philosophic nature” (φιλοσόφου φύσεως 6.497b).  As 
quoted earlier, a good first nature typically develops into a bad character if one resides 
in a city where the inhabitants are of bad character (6.494b-495a). The good nature of a 
person who resides in such a city is corrupted by the city, shaping a good character into 
a bad one: 
This is just the cause of its perversion and alteration; as a foreign seed sown in 






kind does not preserve its own quality but falls away and degenerates into an 
alien type. (6.497b) 
 
 Socrates says that when “lawlessness (παρανομία) has established itself there, it 
flows over little by little into characters” (τὰ ἤθη 4.424d G).  Ostensibly ‘there’ refers to 
‘the choice of musical modes’, but the passage seems to also gesture at how in a city 
where lawlessness reigns, the impact is on the characters of its citizens.192  As noted 
earlier, evildoers develop their corrupt character as result of poor education, bad 
rearing, and living in a bad city (ἀπαιδευσίαν καὶ κακὴν τροφὴν καὶ κατάστασιν τῆς 
πολιτείας 8.552e).  Along the same lines, Socrates describes (6.492a-c) the corruption 
of character that happens when a person of good nature and even good education sits 
in the assembly of a bad city: 
what kind of private education will hold out for him and not be swept away…so 
that he’ll say the same things are noble and base as they do, practice what they 
practice, and be such as they are? (6.492c) 
 
Similarly, in Books 8 and 9, the progressive degradation of city and soul are partly a 
result of lawlessness.193  Living in a bad city is nearly certain to prevent one from 
developing a truly virtuous character.  Socrates himself might seem to represent an 
exception. For example, he suggests that maybe one who is “a great soul born in a little 
town scorns and disregards its parochial affairs” (6.496b) might escape corruption.  But 
such a thing is so unlikely, he says, that it might only happen because of divine 
intervention (6.492e-493a).  Of course, both avoiding politics and divine intervention are 
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associated with Socrates.  Thus, although Socrates might be an exception, he confirms 
that exceptions would be extremely rare. 
 Overall, living in a good city is not, on its own, sufficient to developing a perfectly 
virtuous character.  First nature, rearing, education, and city of residence, all matter 
greatly in influencing character development.   Nevertheless, living in a good city is 
critical to the possibility of developing perfectly virtuous character.  Socrates’ account 
persuades us that it is extremely unlikely that somebody can succeed in developing 
perfectly virtuous character while living in a bad city.  What he does not discuss in 
Books 1-9, though, is whether somebody who lives in a bad city might still develop 
some measure of decent character that falls short of perfect virtue. 
 
3.5 Habituation  
 Last, and at least as important as the others, is what Vasiliou refers to as the 
‘habituation principle’.194  Habituation is crucial in character formation on its own, but 
also works in conjunction with other formative forces (such as education).  With respect 
to character formation on its own, habituation operates with effect throughout one’s life, 
irrespective of whether one lives in a good city or a bad city.  Socrates, in the Republic, 
is very clear that actions, if done repeatedly, eventually become part of one’s second 
nature and overall character.  Somebody who consistently tells the truth over a long 
period of time (even in situations where telling the truth is uncomfortable or 
inconvenient) eventually develops the character trait of honesty.  Thus habituation, on 
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its own, shapes our character throughout our lives by virtue of the choices we make.  
Although we are born with innate predispositions in psyche and characteristics of body, 
most of our physical and psychic characteristics in their actualized forms are developed.  
As quoted earlier, Socrates says, “[virtuous character traits] are not really there 
beforehand and are later produced by habits and exercises” (7.518e B).  For example, 
repeatedly doing just actions produces the character trait of justice, whereas repeatedly 
doing unjust actions produces the opposite (4.444c).   “Then”, continues Socrates, 
“does not doing just acts engender justice and unjust injustice” (4.444c-d).  “Of 
necessity (ἀνάγκη)”, replies Glaucon.  Socrates does not waver from this position.  
When he famously “fashions an image of the soul in speech” (εἰκόνα πλάσαντες τῆς 
ψυχῆς λόγῳ 9.588b-591c B) he argues that nobody should say “that it’s profitable for 
this human being to do injustice, and that it’s not advantageous for him to do just things” 
since, again, doing unjust deeds builds unjust character, while doing the reverse builds 
character of the opposite sort.  Character traits such as stubbornness, bad temper, 
luxury, cowardice, flattery, and illiberality, result when a person habituates” (ἐθίζῃ 
9.590b) himself from youth onward. 
 But habituation also works in conjunction with some of the other factors which 
contribute to character development.  For example, education (especially early 
education) is clearly said by Socrates to be a major factor in character development.  
Part of how education shapes our character is through habituation.  In the very young 
this may take the form of games (e.g. 4.424e-425a) or, during early education, poetry 
and imitation (e.g. 2.377a-b, 3.395c-d, 7.522a).  Whether playing, imitating, or 






actions (as an example) develops bravery, whereas performing or imitating cowardly 
actions develops cowardice. 
 Thus habituation is a fifth critical component of character development.  As with 
the other four, the passages already cited make clear that habituation is critical to the 
development of fine character, but not sufficient on its own.  In the extreme case, it 
would be very difficult for somebody who was born with a bad nature, badly brought up, 
badly educated, and who lived in a bad city with bad culture and bad citizens, to find it 
within himself to simply do just deeds on a consistent basis until a just character was 
formed. 
 
3.6 Character Development in the Republic: Conclusion  
   The Republic discusses character development at great length.  Unlike some 
topics (e.g. the nature of soul parts, as discussed in Chapter 1) Socrates neither denies 
knowledge of how character develops, nor hedges the account as partial, an image, or 
inadequate in any way.  And unlike some topics, the account seems quite consistent 
and straightforward.  People are born with a first nature comprising various physical and 
psychic characteristics.  Their rearing and education, as well as the culture, norms, and 
inhabitants of their city of residence, shape the character traits and character they 
develop.  Finally, practices that people engage in frequently become habits and may 
become second nature.  These too are part of their character.   
 Importantly, character development is a lifelong process.  Certainly people are 
most impressionable when they are young, so rearing and early education shape their 






both for philosophers (as described in Books 5-7) and also for people in general (e.g., 
as noted earlier, the imitations adults experience in the theater, at symposia, and all 
around them).  Further, the choices people make have the power to continue to develop 
and change their characters throughout the arc of their lives. 
 
4.0 Character in Republic Books 1-9  
 Having first considered the account of character development, we now turn to 
examine the picture of character itself that emerges in the Republic.  (Again, following 
Socrates’ methodology in Books 8-9.)  As already noted, although Socrates does not 
raise the issue of character (i.e. ἦθος or τρόπος) as an explicit subject for inquiry, a 
picture emerges over the course of the Republic.  My claims in this section are that a) 
character is consistently portrayed as something that can be described in terms of 
character traits, b) that character traits are dispositions to act in a certain manner (and 
people’s patterns of action are evidence we use in judging the character traits we take 
people to have), c) that character as a whole can be described or depicted as being 
relatively more or less virtuous, and d) that fully virtuous character is portrayed as 
something that is very desirable, but at the same time, something most readers of the 
Republic are very unlikely to develop.  As noted in the introduction, I will first examine 
the picture of character that emerges from Books 1-4195, then from Books 5-7, and 
finally from Books 8-9.  On my view, each of these three sections offers a consistent 
picture of character, but each adds specific detail to the evolving and unfolding picture.  
                                            
 
 








4.1 Character in Republic Books 1-4 
 The introduction of human character comes immediately at the beginning of the 
nightlong discussion at the house of Polemarchus.  As the conversation begins, 
Cephalus claims that the character (τρόπος) of a human being is what determines 
whether life (both youth and old age) will be troublesome or not (1.329d-e).  Cephalus 
does not go into too much detail regarding his notion of good character, but indicates 
that good character involves an absence of strong passions and desires.  He says that 
old age causes the “fierce tensions of the passions and desires” to relax.  His notion of 
good character also includes being “well behaved and cheerful” (κόσμιοι καὶ εὔκολοι 
1.329d).  By the end of Book 4 we will see that Socrates would have had sympathy with 
the notion that good character includes not being ruled by strong passions and desires, 
although he would not endorse Cephalus’ method of waiting until old age causes them 
to wither on their own.  In addition, Socrates’ account of what lies at the core of good 
character goes far beyond being simply ‘well behaved and cheerful’. 
 
4.1.1 Character Can Be Described in Terms of Character Traits 
 Socrates’ presentation of character does coincide with Cephalus’ in one respect, 
though, namely that character can be described in terms of morally relevant traits.  Klein 
points to a key distinction when he says that  
“[Plato] considers the qualities necessary in the Guardian—in the broad sense of 






material out of which courage is formed.  But spiritedness is related to 
aggression, and this is, of course, dangerous to the citizens of the community.”196 
 
Being spirited can be a characteristic of one’s first or second nature, and in either case 
may be the foundation for the morally good character trait of courage, or equally, for the 
morally bad character trait of savageness.   
 Books 1-4 give a long list of positive and negative character traits, as Socrates 
describes which character traits the Guardians must and must not develop.  The 
Guardians need to have “fine character traits in the soul” (ἔν τε τῇ ψυχῇ καλὰ ἤθη 
3.402d), such as gracefulness, soberness, goodness, (3.401a), temperance, courage, 
freedom of spirit, magnificence(3.402c), bravery (3.399a), and steadfastness (3.399b).  
On the other hand, they must not develop character traits such as drunkenness, 
idleness, sloth (3.398e), viciousness, unrestrainedness, slavishness, gracelessness 
(3.401b), and lawlessness (4.424d).  Also, as already mentioned, the mix of gymnastic 
and music is critical.  Too much of the former engenders character traits like brutality, 
whereas too much of the latter builds character traits like softness; the right mix builds 
bravery (3.410d).  A virtuous person (4.443a) can be described as not being 
untrustworthy, adulterous, or impious whereas vicious people might well have those 
traits. 
 
4.1.2 Character Traits Are Dispositions to Act in a Particular Manner 
 Kupperman suggests that a folk-psychological notion of a character trait is  a 
                                            
 
 






propensity to act in a certain manner.197  As he says in an earlier work, “someone's 
character may be the engraving of ways of thinking and acting which have become 
predictable but which do not preclude a person's acting out of character.”198   By 
describing in people or assigning to dramatic characters in the Republic dispositions to 
act in a certain way, Plato has Socrates show us character traits in just this light.  It is 
important to distinguish somebody’s character trait (e.g. Glaucon’s ‘contentiousness’ as 
Shorey renders φιλονικίας at 8.548d) with somebody else’s judgment of the presence, 
absence, strength, etc., of that character trait (e.g. Adeimantus and Socrates’ joint 
judgment that Glaucon is indeed ‘contentious’ 8.548d-e).  Both character traits and the 
judgment of character traits will play an important part in the picture of character that we 
can mine from the Republic, but it is important to keep them separate. Judgments of 
character traits are complex and often wrong for a variety of reasons.  People are 
fallible, some character traits (e.g. self-restraint) are not always visible, sometimes a 
disposition is present but will only emerge in a particular situation, etc.  Overall, though, 
our judgment that somebody possesses a particular character trait will often be based 
on the pattern of their prior behavior and will also influence our expectations as to how 
they are likely to behave in the future.  We would expect the courageous person that 
Socrates discusses at 4.429a-b to generally act in a courageous manner and the 
cowardly person to generally act in a cowardly manner.   
 Similarly, the Guardians must do what they “at any time believe to be best for the 
state” (3.413c).  Socrates says that he, Glaucon, and Adeimantus, as the founders of 
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Kallipolis, must select those youths who are ‘least likely’ to forget this principle (3.413c).  
Let us say that these Guardians would possess the character trait of ‘faithfulness to the 
state’.  That is to say, they would have a disposition to act in the best interests of  
state.  The evidence of that disposition would be that they would be likely to act 
faithfully; perhaps they would not always do so, but the disposition would always be 
there.   
 Importantly, the passage highlights other youths that fail to reach this mark and 
must be rejected (τὸν δὲ μὴ ἀποκριτέον 3.413d).  The best of those youths, though, 
despite being rejected as not being the most faithful, will likely be ones with a weaker 
but still present disposition to act faithfully.  This suggests the notion that character traits 
may be present in people to a greater or lesser degree.  In the section below, when we 
discuss the overall virtue of someone’s character, we will find a similar type of relativity.  
 This notion of ‘likelihood of acting in a certain manner’ is often brought forth as 
evidence of a particular disposition.  At 4.421a-b Socrates talks about the ones “least 
likely to harm the commonwealth” (ποιοῦμεν ἥκιστα κακούργους τῆς πόλεως).   
Similarly, at 3.412c, Socrates says that the Guardians must be most watchful 
(φυλακικωτάτους) in guarding the city.199  He then says that “one would be most likely to 
be careful of that which he loved” (3.412d κήδοιτο δέ γ᾽ ἄν τις μάλιστα τούτου ὃ 
τυγχάνοι φιλῶν), and that “one would be most likely to love that whose interests he 
supposed to coincide with his own” (3.412d).  A character trait like watchfulness or 
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bravery is a disposition to be attentive or to act bravely.  One with that disposition is 
most likely to act accordingly.  The propensity is always there, but will sometimes be 
trumped by circumstances or bad judgment.200  On balance, though, one’s behavior 
over time often gives us an indication as to one’s character. 
 
4.1.3 Character is Illustrated as Being Relatively More or Less Virtuous 
 Socrates and other figures in the Republic often describe a person in terms of the 
virtue (or vice) of his overall character.  ‘The just man’ and ‘the good man’, as well as 
their opposite numbers, are pervasively referred to in the dialogue.  These are notions 
of overall virtue of character.  But reference is also often made to the ‘most just’ or ‘best’ 
man as well as to the ‘most unjust’ and worst man.  These are notions of relative virtue 
of character.   As was the case with respect to character traits (discussed in the 
previous section) it is important to distinguish between the character itself and 
judgments of that character.  Both are important.  For example, as noted, Socrates 
agrees that both Glaucon and the man who resembles the timocratic city-state are 
victory-loving or contentious (8.548d-e).  But the ensuing description of the vicious 
aspects of the timocrat (e.g. he is stubborn, two-faced, and ultimately, a lover of 
money), contrasts sharply with the description of Glaucon, who seems to be a fairly 
admirable character.201  Thus, it seems clear that in some manner Socrates is judging 
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that Glaucon’s overall character is more virtuous than the timocrat’s.  Similarly, in Book 
2, Glaucon and Adeimantus imagine a “most completely just” man (who will be judged 
by all to be the most unjust), and a “most completely unjust” man (who will be judged by 
all to be the most just).  Socrates accepts both the relative virtue of character and the 
fallible judgment of character as a basis for the ensuing discussion, commenting: “how 
vigorously you polish up each of the two men—just like a statue—for their judgment” 
(2.361d B).  
 Imagine a continuum within which we can situate a person according to the 
relative degree of vice/virtue of their overall character.  In Book 4, Socrates completes 
his description of the “perfectly just man” (τὸν τελέως δίκαιον 5.472c), who is sometimes 
referred to in the secondary literature as the ‘psychically just person’.  With the whole of 
the Republic in mind, the picture of Book 4’s ‘perfectly just man’ (who is reason led with 
the other parts of his soul following in harmony) must be seen as an interim description 
of the perfectly just man, one that is relevant at that point in the argument but ultimately 
must be discarded as an explanatory artifact.  The harmony of his soul depends on 
tripartition, which we have argued needs to be reinterpreted as a stepping stone to a 
finer understanding.  Further, despite his overall harmony, his partite appetite by nature 
still always threatens to grow large.  His epistemic state is also imperfect, because he 
lacks knowledge of the Forms.  Thus he is unlikely to rob a temple—but it is not a 
matter of certainty.  Later, in Books 5-7, we will be introduced to the figure who is truly 
the ‘perfectly just man’, namely, the Philosopher-King.  Insofar as Socrates describes 
the Philosopher-King, he or she would sit at the absolute right limit of the continuum.  By 






sit at the absolute left limit of the continuum. 
 In Book 2, Glaucon and Adeimantus also envision “the most completely just and 
the most completely unjust man” (τόν τε δικαιότατον καὶ τὸν ἀδικώτατον 2.360e).  
Although Glaucon and Adeimantus have a very different conception of what counts as a 
just or unjust man, compared with Socrates’ conception, nevertheless if they were right, 
these two men would sit at the left and right limits of the continuum, respectively.  Again, 
Glaucon and Adeimantus’ perfectly unjust man (τῷ τελέως ἀδίκῳ 2.361a) will seem to 
be just, and their just man will seem to be unjust.  Thus, although the perfectly just man 
would actually sit at the right limit of the continuum, if we were asked to place him we 
would mistakenly put him at the left limit. But even if we were rarely as completely 
mistaken as that, we wouldn’t be able to determine an absolute location on the 
continuum where any particular soul (including our own) sits.  (The gods, as we will see 
in the next chapter, will be able to accurately determine the true degree of virtue of an 
individual, even though we cannot.)  In part we might be deceived by reputation or, 
more generally, appearances (as was the case with the Book 2 people just described) 
and in part we would be unable to determine an absolute location because one cannot 
sum up character traits to yield a precise degree of virtue.  Nevertheless, we can often 
infer from the text the apparent relative position of two souls.  Consider, for example, 
three of the non-virtuous individuals depicted in Books 1-4.   
 Cephalus is a colorfully drawn character about whom much has been written.  
Ruby Blondell’s detailed discussion of his character begins by noting some of the 
positive aspects of his character: 
[Cephalus] is not a bad man.  He respects the gods, rejects materialism in its 






passionate emotion. As someone guided by traditional authorities, he may be 
thought to embody the unphilosophical virtue of the ordinary citizen (430c).202  
 
As her analysis proceeds, though, Blondell’s picture of Cephalus grows increasingly 
negative: 
Kephalos’ bodily feebleness is a trope for moral and intellectual inadequacy…his 
moral judgments are based not on inquiry but on the authority of tradition, as 
enshrined in poetry, myth and anecdote…The old man’s outlook is indeed, as he 
says in self-congratulatory fashion, a product of his personality (tropos, 329d3), 
but Plato represents neither outlook nor tropos uncritically. The rest of the work 
will validate the implication that the right kind of character is essential to 
happiness, but in doing so confirm that Kephalos’ own character, as well as his 
version of happiness, beneath its good-natured veneer, is deeply suspect.203  
   
Cephalus helps typify the conventional virtue that will be described, by the end of Book 
9, as one of the unlimited number of forms of vice.   
 Leontius is even more vicious than Cephalus.  Like Cephalus, Leontius is also 
appetite-led and also law abiding.  But Leontius’ appetites are perverse and outside the 
normative behavior for Athenians.  He has enough goodness to know that his desires 
are detestable.  He is ashamed of those desires and indeed he chooses to resist his vile 
behavior, but cannot abide by his choice (4.439e-440a).  Although his shame and his 
choice are admirable, he is still both appetite-driven and incontinent.   
 Last, consider the temple robber.  We don't know much about his character but 
he is also clearly appetite driven.  Unlike Cephalus and Leontius, though, he also 
contravenes the laws of the city and blasphemes against the gods.  On the vice/virtue 
continuum, Cephalus is to the right of Leontius, who is to the right of the temple robber.  
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 The most important character in Books 1-4 is the already-mentioned psychically 
just man drawn at the end of Book 4, who sits to the right of Glaucon and Adeimantus.  
We know quite a bit about him.  He was born with an outstanding first nature to good 
parents.  As a youth, he heard noble tales from his mother and nursemaid, and played 
enriching games.  He received the excellent education described in Books 2-3.  In 
addition to fine educational content, he was supervised to blend just the right mixture of 
gymnastics in with his learning.  All of this took place in a noble city, with a good 
constitution, fine culture, and many excellent citizens.  Surrounded by them, he was 
constantly tested and corrected when he went astray, habituating himself to do the fine.  
Over time he developed a harmonious soul; when faced with a decision, he either 
doesn’t need to reason (e.g. when offered money to abandon his post he simply 
refuses) or else he first reasons, after which all other ‘parts’ of his soul happily follow the 
path of his reasoning. 
 Having hammered out the picture of this man, Socrates says: “Then that dream 
of ours has reached its perfect fulfillment.…we have found the just man” (4.443b-444a 
B).  Then, on the next and last page of Book 4, Socrates concludes by saying “it looks 
to me as though there is one form for virtue and an unlimited number for vice” (4.445c 
B).  Socrates makes or affirms this remark three times in the Republic (4.445c, 5.449a, 
and 8.544b), so it seems to be quite significant.  As we will see, in Book 5 Socrates 
refers back to this character as the “perfectly just man” (5.472c B) and casts doubt as to 
whether he could ever come into existence.  This notion that there is one form of virtue, 
which might well never be realized in a man, gives rise to a significant concern.  By the 






desirable, but further as something that we are extremely unlikely to be able to develop. 
In this case, we may not be able to summon the persistence to strive for virtue in the 
face of temptations like those of the Ring of Gyges.204   
  
4.1.4 Perfectly Virtuous Character Appears to be Extremely Difficult to Attain 
 Here we need to return for a moment to the beginning of Books 1 and 2.  The 
Republic opens with Socrates accompanied by Glaucon son of Ariston.  Glaucon is a 
fine and intelligent youth, “fired with the ambition to help achieve justice on earth, and 
convinced that it can be done”.205  They meet Polemarchus, Adeimantus, and several 
other youths.  The company persuades Socrates to go to the house of Polemarchus.  
Though they do not fully state their purpose in so persuading him, their overall intention 
is clear; they wish to engage in discussion with him (“we’ll be together with many of the 
young men and we’ll talk” (1.328a B)).  They are probably not surprised when he turns 
the focus of the conversation to his favorite subject, namely virtue.  Thus the company 
includes a variety of intelligent youths, many of whom are already inclined toward virtue 
and inclined toward Socrates and his views. 
 At the beginning of Book 2 Glaucon and Adeimantus make clear that most 
citizens are not in this situation.  They are neither inclined toward virtue nor toward the 
views that Socrates holds.  Adeimantus has challenged Socrates to present a defense 
of justice which will be persuasive to “young men who are quick-witted and capable of 
flitting, as it were, from one expression of opinion to another and inferring from them all 
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the character and the path whereby a man would lead the best life” (2.365a-b).  I take it 
that the argument needs to persuade not only the unseen ‘young men’, but also the 
reader.  The main challenge (presented in the story of the Ring of Gyges) is that the 
delicious temptations of vice, especially if they can be enjoyed undetected by others, 
may be irresistible, even for people who have grown up ‘knowing’ that it was better to be 
virtuous. 
 By the end of Book 4, Glaucon seems ready to end the discussion with the 
description of the ‘perfectly just person’, saying that inquiring into whether acting 
unjustly even if one can escape the consequences is profitable “looks to me as though it 
has become ridiculous by now” (4.445a B).  But even if Glaucon is ready to end the 
discussion at that point, I do not think he is right to do so.  I, for one, come to the end of 
Book 4 feeling even more convinced of the value of pursuing the virtuous life, yet at the 
same time feeling very pessimistic about my chances of succeeding in developing and 
sustaining the perfectly virtuous character Socrates has described.   
 Many commentators seem to have a similar view.  Vlastos, for example, asks an 
“awkward question: justice is mandatory for everyone; how then could it be conditioned 
on so rare and difficult an attainment as psychic harmony?”206  Subsequently, he 
continues: 
If Plato thought psychic harmony a necessary condition of a morally just 
disposition, he must have thought the latter attainable only by the people of his 
ideal state and, in the present world, by Platonic philosophers and their moral 
dependents (and, on a lower plane, by some of the citizens of the best 
timocracies); and this would cut out the vast majority of our fellow-men”207  
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Lear argues persuasively that the Myth of Metals tells us that even such fine people as 
Glaucon and Adeimantus, having grown up in a bad city, will not have a virtuous 
character.208  Gill makes a similar point: 
communal involvement is an indispensable basis for pre-reflective 
virtue…however…the only community in which this pre-reflective development 
can occur properly is one which is shaped by those whose wisdom is based on a 
combination of proper pre- and post-reflective virtue.209 
 
 Vlastos, Lear, and Gill see that Glaucon and Adeimantus will not be able to attain 
the “perfect justice” of the man in Book 4, but Glaucon and Adeimantus do not seem to 
see it.  If they did, they might press Socrates to describe their situation and the situation 
of many other ‘somewhat virtuous’ people.  What kind of less than perfect virtue is 
possible for them?  Socrates refers to the man who is “nearest (έγγύτατα) to [perfect 
justice]” (5.472c).  He doesn’t, though, give us any detail on how such less than perfect 
justice might be developed, or what kind of life such a person will have. 
 Returning to Glaucon and Adeimantus, then, is the life of the less than perfect 
virtue they might attain better than the pleasures of the possessor of Gyges’ ring?  We 
will return to this question after the introduction of the Philosopher-King, but for now, 
even if they do not ask the question, it seems as if the external reader is called to do so.   
The prospects for attaining psychic virtue do indeed seem discouragingly slim to me 
(and I suspect to most of ‘the many’ as well).  The biological demands (good genes), 
social demands (good rearing, good education, good city, etc.) and behavioral demands 
(habitually choosing the virtuous act and accepting correction when errors are pointed 
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out) of attaining psychic virtue of character seem extremely challenging.  Most of us, 
rather, live in bad cities and have sub-optimal rearing and education, etc.  Socrates 
draws a very stark picture.  There is only one form of virtue, every other character type 
being one of the unlimited number of forms of vice.  Are we likely to develop a character 
with that one form of virtue?  At least for most readers, it seems to me that the answer 
would be: ‘likely not’.   
 Thus at the end of Book 4 we are at an interesting juncture.  The vision of the city 
is beautiful, as is the picture of the perfectly just man.  But I share Glaucon’s original 
challenge to Socrates: convince me that I should eschew the delights of vice in favor of 
the life of virtue.  So far I am not convinced that the latter is a likely live option for me, so 
tempting as it is to be led by Socrates (whom I admire and love), I may not have the 
energy not to give in to the former. 
  
4.2 Character in Republic Books 5-7 
 Books 5-7 describe character in a manner which is consistent with the picture 
painted in Books 1-4.  Character is described in terms of traits, character traits are 
described as dispositions to act in a particular manner, character is described or 
depicted with respect to its virtue/vice, and the even more perfectly virtuous character 
described in Books 5-7 seems to be something we are very unlikely to develop.  The 
first three of the above will be argued briefly, since the account here does not 






of developing perfectly virtuous character, is where Books 5-7 significantly extend our 
view of this matter. 
 
4.2.1 Character is Described in Terms of Character Traits 
 Books 5-7 continue to describe character in terms of character traits.  Socrates 
describes people in terms of positive character traits such as steadfastness (6.503c), 
gracefulness (7.522a), etc.  Some people are described as steady, courageous, tough, 
truthful, moderate, magnificent (7.535a-536a), gracious, friendly, truthful, just, brave, 
sober (6.487a), playful, serious (5.452e), prudent (5.461a), or gentle (5.470e).  One key 
passage is 6.500b-d.  The philosopher, whose attention is turned to the “things that are” 
(τοῖς οὖσι 6.500b B), will not have character traits such as envy and hate.  Rather he will 
try to make himself as much as possible like those ‘things that are’.  If, then, he was to 
try to mold not only his own character, but also the characters of other people, he would 
strive to instill character traits such as moderation and justice. 
 Socrates also refers to people in terms of negative character traits such as 
incontinence (5.461b), cowardice (5.469d), pettiness (6.486a), lawlessness (7.537e), 
susceptibility to flattery (7.538a), knavishness (7.519a), etc.  Some people are 
inconsiderate, distrustful, hostile (5.450d), foolish (5.452d), illiberal, greedy (5.469d), 
boasters (6.486b), uncouth (6.487d), or useless (6.490e). Socrates calls Glaucon “an 
erotic man” (5.474d B).  Glaucon doesn’t seem to like the attribution of that character 
trait, but lets it go “for the sake of the argument” (5.474d B).  These are just samples; 







4.2.2 Character Traits Are Dispositions to Act in a Particular Manner 
 Again, a character trait is also represented as a propensity to act in a certain 
manner.  For example, a man with the character trait of being quick to anger will be 
“less likely” to take his anger to an extreme in the good city (5.465a).  Similarly, at 
7.537e-538d, Socrates describes cases where one is “more likely to honor” parents, 
and “less likely” to: overlook their needs, do or say anything unlawful to them, or 
disobey them.  Socrates says that in selecting guardians one should seek out the most 
courageous (ἀνδρειοτάτους 7.535a) people.  The passage again exemplifies the 
important notion of degrees of propensity.   Thus, for example, we might say that 
Achilles and Glaucon are both courageous, but Achilles is the much more courageous 
of the two.  They both have a propensity to respond courageously, but the propensity is 
stronger in Achilles. 
 
4.2.3 Character is Illustrated as Being Relatively More or Less Virtuous 
 Again character is described or depicted as fitting somewhere along the 
vice/virtue continuum, i.e. as being worse or better as a whole.  Socrates asks as plainly 
as he can whether Glaucon thinks that “one man is better and another worse? Or do 
you believe them all to be alike?” (5.456d).  Similarly, at 5.459d, he urges that the “best 
men” from among the Guardians (all of whom are fairly virtuous) have the greatest 
number of children.  But in reference to people in general, outside of the Kallipolis, 
Socrates plainly asserts that most philosophers are either useless or “completely 
vicious” (6.490d B) and as to the non-philosophers, he asserts “the inevitableness of the 






 Of course, the most important individual introduced in Books 5-7 is the 
Philosopher-King.  Referring again to the vice/virtue continuum, the Philosopher-King 
would sit at the far right limit.  The Philosopher-King’s harmony and virtue come not only 
his nature, rearing, education, etc., but also from keeping company with the Forms 
(500c-d).  Similarly, since he is in touch with the Forms as much as is humanly possible, 
he is in the best possible epistemic state.  Philosopher-Kings will “use [the Form of the 
Good] as a pattern for ordering city, private men, and themselves for the rest of their 
lives” (7.540 a-b B).  This is why most (if not all) of a Philosopher-King’s actions will be 
objectively good.  As she deliberates about each action she takes, she takes the Forms 
into account.  Since her soul is harmonious and reason-led, she rarely (or perhaps, 
since she is a fictional representative of an ideal of perfect virtue, never) goes wrong.    
 Books 5-7 suggest other somewhat virtuous character types that are less 
virtuous than the Philosopher-Kings who have “survived the tests” (7.540a).  Consider 
the prospective Guardians who fail the tests at some point (either in the mathematical 
studies, the dialectical studies, or the practical service between ages 35 and 50).  These 
individuals would not have advanced to the adult education without some measure of 
virtue, but as will become clear, Books 1-9 do not seem to provide us with a clear view 
of how they would fit into the vice/virtue continuum.  All of these individuals, though, 
seem to exist only in the context of the Kallipolis. 
 
4.2.4 Perfectly Virtuous Character Appears to be Extremely Difficult to Attain 
 The aspect of character that Books 5-7 fill out the most, though, is the difficulty of 






nature combined with the social challenges of getting a good rearing, getting a good 
education, and living in a city with a good constitution, good culture, and good fellow 
citizens seem daunting (at least for most of those who lived in ancient Athens or we who 
live in modern day New York).  As noted, Socrates ends Book 4 by proclaiming that 
there is one form of virtue only.  Book 5 opens with a reaffirmation of that claim: 
Good, then, and right, is what I call such a city and regime and such a man, while 
the rest I call bad and mistaken, if this one is really right; and this applies to both 
governments of cities and the organization of soul in private men. (5.449a B 
italics mine) 
 
Socrates seems to be reaffirming that only the Kallipolis is a good city and that only the 
ideal of psychic virtue described in Book 4 counts as virtue.  Further, Books 5-7 seem to 
add a great deal of support to the notion that being born with a nature suitable to 
developing virtue is very uncommon, as is the likelihood of developing virtue in a bad 
city (even if one is well-born).210  
 Very few human beings are born with a good first nature (6.491a-b, 6.495a) and 
even a good first nature can be corrupted without a good rearing (6.510a-b).  Indeed, 
except in a good city, a good first nature is usually corrupted (6.494b-495b, 6.489e-
492e).  And no city in Plato’s time, including Athens, qualified as a good city (6.497b).  
Any person growing up in one of these cities is “likely” to develop a vicious character 
(6.497b).  Outside a good city, almost everybody (including most philosophers) is of 
vicious character (6.489d, 6.490d) and the few philosophers who are not vicious are 
useless (6.490e).  It is a pretty grim picture and one that Socrates does not try to hide.  
                                            
 
 
210 Many of the passages cited here were previously noted in the section regarding character 






 But then we arrive at a key passage, namely, 5.471c-473e.  On the one hand, 
this passage underscores the point that for most of us, attainment of virtue is extremely 
unlikely.  But on the other hand, it leaves open the door to the possibility of virtue that is 
less than perfect.  First Glaucon says: 
And I see all the good things that they would have at home and are left out in 
your account. Take it that I agree that there would be all these things and 
countless others if this regime should come into being, and don’t talk any more 
about it; rather, let’s now only try to persuade ourselves that it is possible (5.471c 
B) 
 
Socrates concludes this passage by introducing the third wave of paradox, with a 
stunning statement that seems to underscore the extreme unlikelihood that Glaucon or 
the external reader has much chance of developing a fully virtuous character: 
Unless, I said, the philosophers rule as kings or those now called kings and 
chiefs genuinely and adequately philosophize, and political power and philosophy 
coincide in the same place, while the many natures now making their way to 
either apart from the other are by necessity excluded, there is no rest from ills for 
the cities, my dear Glaucon, nor I think for human kind, nor will the regime we 
have now described in speech ever come forth from nature, insofar as possible, 
and see the light of the sun. This is what for so long was causing my hesitation to 
speak: seeing how very paradoxical it would be to say. For it is hard to see that in 
no other city would there be private or public happiness. (5.473c-e B italics mine) 
 
On the one hand this seems to confirm the prior picture; perfect virtue in the individual 
depends on the pure city and the pure city is very likely never to exist.  But on the other 
hand, in between these two quotes Socrates says the following: 
But if we find out what justice is like, will we also insist that the just man must not 
differ at all from justice itself but in every way be such as it is? Or will we be 
content (ἀγαπήσομεν)211 if he is nearest to it and participates in it more than the 
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others… It was, therefore, for the sake of a pattern that we were seeking both for 
what justice by itself is like, and for the perfectly just man, if he should come into 
being…We were not seeking them for the purpose of proving that is possible for 
these things to come into being…Then don’t compel me necessarily to present it 
as coming into being in every way in deed as we described it in speech. (5.472b-
473a B italics mine) 
 
This is something new!  Socrates here introduces the notion a person who is virtuous, 
but less than perfectly so.  He does not give us any detail about the nature of that 
partially virtuous person.  In what way does she differ from the purely virtuous person 
whose soul is in harmony and who is led by reasoning with the Form of the Good in 
view?  Is she led by her reasoning but lacks that full harmony of her appetites, spirited 
emotions, fantasies, etc. (which calls to mind Aristotle’s continent individual)?  Or 
perhaps all the ‘parts’ of her soul are in harmony, but although she is mostly led by 
reason, at other times she is in the grip of her appetites or spirited emotions.  Socrates 
gives no detail and the notion of less than perfect virtue does not reappear throughout 
Books 5-7.212  
 Thus Books 5-7 emphasize the question regarding how likely we are to develop a 
virtuous character.  On the one hand there are a great many statements that suggest 
                                            
 
 
boys not less but by some slight measure more than my inheritance”.  On the other hand, on the same 
page Shorey translates with the stronger sense: “you appear to me not to be over-fond (ἀγαπᾶν) of 
money”.  Bloom translates similarly.  Shorey and Bloom’s translations seem to me to fit.  Although all 12 
of the translations I consulted choose to render ἀγαπήσομεν at 5.472b in the ‘weaker’ sense, I wonder 
which is the better choice.  In either case, as I argue in what immediately follows, Socrates is introducing 
a new notion and one which produces hope.  The suggestion here is that one might have a character that 
falls short of the perfect virtue Socrates has been describing, while at the same time such a person might 
live a flourishing life.  We should certainly feel content with that prospect.  Even better, I think, is to say 
that we would be very happy if that turns out to be the case (as I will argue (in the next chapter) is indeed 
where we end up with the whole of the Republic in mind).  We should be happy since in this case the 
better life afforded by virtue will potentially be available to those of out outside the Kallipolis, as well as to 
Philosopher-Kings. 






that we will very likely not develop fully virtuous character, as well as statements that 
suggest that only fully virtuous character counts as virtue.  On the other hand, there is 
this one suggestion that less than perfect virtue also exists, along with the possibility 
that perhaps it will be sufficient to make us content or live reasonably flourishing lives.  
At this point in the text, I suspect the ‘quick-witted young men’ (and many readers of the 
Republic) will be unsure as to whether the less than perfect virtue that may be 
attainable will yield benefits that are preferable to the pleasures offered by the Ring of 
Gyges—but the question is still live. 
 
4.3 Character in Republic Books 8-9 
 Books 8-9 are critical to the developing story of character in the Republic, but 
not, perhaps, in the manner that many people would expect.  Returning from the 
interlude of Books 5-7, Book 8 resumes the discussion of the timocratic, oligarchic, 
democratic, and tyrannical cities, as well as the people who resemble them.  Many, I 
think, are misled by Socrates’ comments that “there are four forms of badness” (5.449a 
B) and “if there are five arrangements of cities, there would also be five for the soul of 
private men” (8.544e B).  I suspect that many agree with Johnstone, who says that 
Socrates “describes five main kinds of person”.213  Similarly, Gerson takes it that that “At 
maturity, whenever this occurs, the person becomes sufficiently like one of the types of 
soul described by Plato in order to be characterized as such”.214  This view raises three 
significant concerns.   
                                            
 
 
213 Johnstone (2013, 143). 






 First, on this view, each of the four “is described as in some way relinquishing 
rule or control to either the spirited or the appetitive part of his soul”, as Gerson puts 
it.215  If the spirited ‘part’ of the timocrat’s soul is in control, then it sounds as if we have 
returned to the notion of agent-like parts as the explanation for why a person acts as 
she does.  But the notion of agent-like soul-parts was examined in detail in Chapter 1 
and rejected (in favor of the view that the soul as a whole is the only agent of action) so 
we will not revisit it here.   
 A second problem is that even absent agent-like soul-parts, the view expressed 
by Johnstone, Gerson, and others still recasts the Republic’s notion of character from 
being a matter of dispositional traits into a matter of being dominated by (even non-
agent-like) soul-parts.  Thus, some might take it that the oligarch, for example, is the 
agent of all of his actions, but is dominated by the necessary desires that are ‘part’ of 
the ‘appetite part’ of his soul.  In this case we have again returned to soul-parts as the 
defining feature of character.  But at different points in the dialogue, souls are described 
as three-part, two-part, multi-part, and even non-partite.  Indeed, even the language of 
‘dominant motivations’ is insufficient to describe the complexity of character as it has 
emerged from the text.  Thus the decent man who reacts to the loss of a son at 10.603e 
is neither displayed as being dominated by a particular ‘part’ of his soul, nor by a 
particular dominant motivation.  Rather he is described in terms of having the 
disposition to behave in a certain manner in certain circumstances.  The intent of this 
chapter’s analysis has been to try to see what the text displays as a foundational moral 
                                            
 
 






psychology.  On my reading, the text of Books 1-7 has highlighted dispositional 
character traits, rather than soul-parts or dominant motivations, as contributing to an 
explanation of why we behave as we do.  
 The third concern is that in Books 1-7 we found character displayed as being 
extremely complex and varied, comprising an indeterminate number of dispositional 
character traits.  Glaucon’s character differs greatly from Cephalus’ character, as does 
mine from yours.  But Gerson’s notion that every mature person can be characterized 
as either just, timocratic, oligarchic, democratic, or tyrannical presents character as a 
much simpler matter—that of fitting into one of five categories. 
 On my view, Books 8-9 do not disturb the notions that a) we are the agent of all 
of our actions, b) character traits, not soul-parts or dominant motivations, sit at the heart 
of one’s character, and c) character is complex rather than simple. Having already 
argued (a) in Chapter 1, I will here focus on the other two concerns.  I will argue that the 
four personages are presented as idealized types, but not as a set of mutually exclusive 
and collectively exhaustive categories or types of character, based on a dominant soul-
part or motivational source, into one of which each of us must fall.  On my view, the 
reason why these four are idealized in the way that they are is to advance the main 
argument, namely, that the relatively more virtuous life (or, equally, the relatively less 







4.3.1 We do not all fit into one of five types of character 
 A significant portion of the argument against both a) character as domination by 
a soul-part or class of motivations and b) character as a simple matter of fitting into one 
of five categories, depends on the statements that caused the misconception, namely, 
“there are four forms of badness” (5.449a B) and “if there are five arrangements of 
cities, there would also be five for the soul of private men” (8.544e B).  These 
statements must be interpreted in light of a key assertion that appears three times in the 
Republic (at 4.445c, 5.449a, and 8.544a).  
 Beginning with the first of these, after describing the good city and the perfectly 
virtuous man, Socrates invites Glaucon to “see just how many forms vice, in my opinion, 
has; those, at least, that are worth looking at” (4.445c italics mine).  Thus, we have two 
quantities to determine: a) the number of forms of vice and b) the number worth looking 
at.   After Glaucon’s reply, Socrates fills in the numbers:  
now that we’ve come up to this point in the argument, from a lookout as it were, it 
looks to me as though there is one form for virtue and an unlimited number for 
vice, but some four among them are also worth mentioning. (4.445c italics mine) 
 
 Thus, there are (a) an unlimited number of forms of vice and (b) four are worth 
mentioning.  Concerning (a), one might wonder whether by ‘an unlimited number of 
forms of vice’ Socrates is referring to ‘vices’ (e.g. cowardice, pettiness, lawlessness, 
flattery).  But in the first speech of Book 5 Socrates clarifies that he is referring to “a city, 
then, or constitution …and to the corresponding kind of man” (5.449a).  The four forms 
of vice worth speaking of are “concerning the arrangement of the character of the soul 
of the individual“ (ἰδιωτῶν ψυχῆς τρόπου κατασκευήν 5.449a italics mine).  Halliwell 






sparingly in the Republic and mostly in the context of these four characters.  Socrates 
will reiterate the point in Book 8, saying that he wishes to “examine the characters in 
polities and then in individual men” (ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις πρότερον σκοπεῖν τὰ ἤθη ἢ ἐν 
τοῖς ἰδιώταις 8.545b italics mine).216  But Socrates cannot examine all possible character 
types, since it would be an “impractically long job to go through all regimes and all 
dispositions and leave nothing out” (8.548c-d B).  Therefore, he will examine four 
particular vicious character types, out of the limitless number of possible vicious 
character types. 
 The oft-misunderstood statements quoted earlier must be interpreted in light of 
the above.  When Socrates says that “there are four forms of badness” (5.449a B), he 
means: four worth discussing for the purposes of the argument.  And when he says “if 
there are five arrangements of cities, there would also be five for the soul of private 
men” (8.544e B) we should understand that for however many cities he decides to 
describe, the same number of character types can be described.   
 Along these lines, we could ask into which category Glaucon would fit.  As noted 
earlier, when Adeimantus suggested that Glaucon was a timocrat, Socrates rejected the 
characterization because the man resembling the timocratic city has many character 
traits that Glaucon lacks (e.g. he is stubborn (αὐθαδέστερον 8.548e), two-faced 
(improperly harsh to slaves but submissive to rulers), and ultimately, a lover of money 
(549a)). As for Glaucon, Socrates agrees that he is like the man who resembles the 
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timocracy in regard to his love of victory (8.548d-e), but not in many other respects.  
Certainly Glaucon is “an erotic man” (5.474d B) and a “lover of boys”.  But Socrates also 
says to him that “there must indeed be a touch of the god-like in your disposition…I infer 
this from your general character” (2.368a-b). McIntyre says that Glaucon is not only a 
victory-lover, but also “courageous, graceful, a hard worker”.217 Blondell says that 
Glaucon is “unquestionably ‘gentle’ in character”, as well as “good-natured, compliant 
and cooperative”.218  Glaucon, on my view, is not perfectly just, but neither does he fit 
well into any of the four forms described in Books 8-9.  Further, neither do most of us; I 
cannot really see any of my friends or family members fitting either into the perfectly just 
category, or into any of the other four.219 
  Although all of the dramatic characters in Books 8-9 are described to some 
extent in terms of character traits, the timocrat, oligarch, democrat, and tyrant are also 
described in terms of a particular ‘part’ or ‘part-of-a-part’ or motivation which dominates 
their behavior. Now this is accomplished by identifying different sub-parts or aspects of 
the appetitive part (e.g. the appetitive desire for necessary, unnecessary, and base 
pleasures).  But if Glaucon (and, say, my friend Karl) fit into one of the other, unlimited 
number of categories, we would need to further expand the number of ‘parts of parts’ or 
‘aspects of parts’ to follow that paradigm (and so on, ad infinitum).  The language of 
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219 With some effort, one might find examples of people who do seem to fit well into one of these four 
forms of vice.  Perhaps John McEnroe might seem to exhibit the anger and desire for victory of a timocrat, 
or Emperor Nero might have seemed to typify the typical tyrant, but those would be exceptions from the 
norm.  Many public leaders seem to have the love of power and honor of a timocrat, the love of money of 
an oligarch, and some of the uncontrolled sensuality of a tyrant.  Even more so, most private citizens 






parts, on its own, is insufficient to capture either the number of character types that 
Plato thrice asserts to exist, or the complexity of Glaucon’s particular character (or 
anybody else’s). 
 Overall, the implications of there being an indefinite number of forms of vice 
seems consistent with what I take to be common sense: each of the people in the world 
has a unique character.  Some characters may resemble each other in terms of 
particular character traits.  For example, in the good city we will have many different 
characters, indeed many with some measure of courage.  In the democratic city, since it 
is the freest, we will have the fewest number of similarities; each character will be 
exhibit a great number of different characteristics.  Thus Socrates has not extended the 
notion of character with the claim that there are five (or five main) types, each driven by 
a dominant motivation.  Rather he is going to describe four paradigmatic character 
types, and in so doing he will advance the argument.   
 Before we leave the ‘unlimited number of forms of vice’, one more point should 
be reiterated.  If there is indeed one form of perfect virtue, while all other forms are 
‘forms of vice’, then we are left with a question as to how to regard Glaucon, and many 
of the people around us, who seem to be neither perfectly virtuous nor to be vicious.  A 
small point in the text here is suggestive.  All three of the formulations of ‘the unlimited 
number of forms of vice’ express a small hint of uncertainty.   
- I seem to see as from a point of outlook that there is one form of excellence, 
and that the forms of evil are infinite, yet that there are some four among them 
that it is worth while to take note of (4.445c, italics mine)  
 
- Good, then, …is what I call such a …man, while the rest I call bad and 
mistaken, if this one is really right (5.449a italics mine) 
 






Now certainly these expressions of uncertainty are rather mild. They might simply 
amount to something like ‘in my opinion.’  Perhaps, though, Socrates is suggesting 
doubt as to whether the ‘one form of perfect virtue’ is ever really realized in an actual 
person, or whether it is rather simply ‘a pattern laid up in heaven’.  Overall, though, 
focusing on the ‘unlimited’ number of forms should assure us that Plato is neither 
revising the notion of character as a) domination by a single soul-part or motivation, nor 
b) a simple matter of fitting into one of five categories.  
 
4.3.2 The Characters in Books 8-9 Are Described in Terms of Character Traits 
 There are various figures described in Books 8 and 9 in addition to the 
paradigmatic four character types, for example the complaining mother of the timocrat.    
She, the other figures, and the character types are all described in terms of their 
character traits.  For example, the ruler of the timocracy is described as a money-lover 
with an appetite for women (8.548a), stingy, and lawless (548b).  As already noted, the 
person who best resembles the timocratic constitution is of course described as a lover 
of victory, but also as stubborn or self-willed (αὐθαδέστερον 8.548e), two-faced, and 
ultimately, a lover of money (549a). Among other character traits, the tyrant is “envious, 
faithless, unjust, friendless, impious, and a host and nurse for all vice” (9.580a B).  The 
other figures in Books 8-9 are also described in terms of character traits. 
 
4.3.3 Character Traits Are Dispositions to Act in a Particular Manner 
 As in the earlier books, character is also here represented as a disposition to act 






to be drawn in exaggerated uniformity of action.  One gets this sense, for example, 
when Socrates describes the oligarch as being dominated by the desire for wealth: 
he makes the calculating and spirited parts sit by it on the ground on either side 
and be slaves, letting the one neither calculate about nor consider anything but 
where more money will come from less; and letting the other admire and honor 
nothing but wealth and the wealthy, while loving the enjoyment of no other honor 
than that resulting from the possession of money and anything that happens to 
contribute to getting it (8.553c-d B) 
 
Similarly, when he describes the timocrat as one who would be harsh to slaves but 
subservient to rulers (8.548e) and the oligarch as “stingy and a toiler, satisfying only his 
necessary desires” (8.554a), one gets the sense that the four paradigmatic characters 
act with a degree of consistency that we do not see in Socrates’ interlocutors, nor, I 
would suggest, in ourselves.  It’s not entirely clear;  Socrates never says that these 
characters ‘always’ act according to their dispositions, nor does he say that they are 
‘more likely’ to do something in accord with their disposition.220  Overall, though, there is 
nothing here in Books 8-9 that would cause us to revise the prior notion of what a 
character trait is. 
 
4.3.4 Character is Illustrated as Being Relatively More or Less Virtuous 
 
 Again character is described or depicted as relatively more or less virtuous.  In 
Books 8-9 most of the emphasis is on vice (with the exception of one important passage 
which will be discussed shortly).  Most readers and commentators take the four 
character types to be presented in order of increasing vice.  (A few commentators 
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question whether the democrat might not in fact be more virtuous than the oligarch, but 
as will become clear, this reading does not disturb the claim of the section.)221  9.580a-c 
is most commonly cited as evidence for the fact that the types are present in order of 
increasing vice.  Socrates asks Glaucon to judge the just and the four unjust character 
types with respect to virtue and vice and Glaucon says: it is “easy”; they ‘came on stage’ 
(εἰσῆλθον) in order of increasing vice.  Ultimately, Socrates seems to agree, saying “All 
right then, I said.  That would be one proof for us.  Look at this second one…” (9.580c 
B).  Although this seems to be assent, and is so construed by most commentators, 
Plato does open some ambiguity.  One might ask both why Plato puts the assertion into 
the mouth of Glaucon rather than Socrates, and also why he has Socrates a) begin his 
assent by saying “Shall we hire a herald” (9.580b B), b) offer to announce that Glaucon 
decided the order, and c) only mention the king and the tyrant, omitting the three in 
between.    
 Further textual support that the four are ordered according to decreasing virtue is 
also seen at 8.568c.  Poets are most esteemed in the tyrannical regime, next most in 
the democratic, and then the “higher they go on the slope of the regimes” (8.568c B), 
the less they are honored.222 
 However, despite much consensus among commentators that the four are 
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Hyland (From Democracy To Oligarchy To Tyranny, forthcoming), and Roochnik (2003).   Hyland 
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types. Strauss (1964, 129-132) and Rosen (2005, 312-321) also focus on the ordering of the democrat 
and the oligarch, though in the end they agree that the four are presented in order of increasing vice.  
222 This point is made by Scott (2000, 20) who points out that the ranking pertains to the regimes, but If 
Socrates thought that the character types had a different order, “it would be very strange for him not to 







ordered to display increasing viciousness, they have various views about just what it is 
about the four that indicates increasing viciousness.  Some commentators suggest that 
the four are increasingly lacking in unity223, while others cite degree of law-like behavior, 
corruption, moderation, order and instrumental rationality, self-control, rule of reason vs. 
rule of appetite, or strife and tension.224   Each of these commentators argues their view 
in detail and I will not recapitulate those arguments here.  The key point, on my view, is 
that Plato sketches the four character types ‘worth discussing’ with such detail as to 
permit us to consider the question; is the oligarchic type presented in Books 8-9 more 
virtuous or less virtuous than the democratic type?  Irrespective of how one answers 
that question, one is left with the conviction that one is relatively more virtuous than the 
other.  The gods will correctly judge each person’s relative virtue or vice in Book 10 
when we get to the Myth of Er.  People will often judge wrongly, but still need to make 
judgments of the justness of both actions and of characters as they make their way 
through life (just as Socrates judges the characters of Glaucon and Adeimantus at 
3.368a-b).   
 None of the commentators mentioned in the footnotes to the above paragraph 
offer a detailed suggestion as to why these four in particular are chosen, 
understandably, since one can only speculate.  My own speculation is that these four 
are chosen specifically for the purpose of making clear that the countless number of 
character types can be ordered from least vicious to most vicious.  Glaucon recalls that 
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Socrates has told us that these four polities are the ones that “it is worthwhile to have an 
account of, and whose mistakes are worth seeing; and similarly with the men who are 
like these regimes” (8.544a B).225  Perhaps these four in particular are ‘easy to see’ 
because we have names for the polities (8.544c) and can therefore envision in common 
what each polity would be like and also what a person resembling each polity might be 
like.  Or perhaps these four are ‘easy to see’ because they highlight the political options 
and fault lines in Athens at the time Plato.  Overall, though, irrespective of why these 
four in particular were chosen, they serve to help advance the argument as to whether 
the just life is preferable to the unjust life by giving us four paradigmatic examples of 
unjust character types which can be seen in terms of their relative degree of injustice.  
As Socrates says, “even from a sketch we'll be able to discern the most just and the 
most unjust person.” (8.548c G).  The timocrat (who is motivated by honor) is clearly the 
least vicious of the four and the distinction first between necessary and unnecessary 
pleasures, followed by the distinction between lawful and lawless pleasures makes it 
possible to judge the relative degree of viciousness of each of the other three.  Socrates 
has staked out the ‘perfectly just man’ (in Book 4) who is replaced by the ‘even finer 
man’ (the Philosopher-King, in Books 5-7) who sits at the right limit of the vice/virtue 
continuum.  Here, in Books 8-9 Socrates stakes out four vicious character types, with 
the ruling tyrant at the left limit of the continuum.  The character types are described in 
terms of their character traits, just like Leontius, Glaucon, and the other figures who 
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populate the Republic.  The starkness with which the four vicious character types are 
drawn underscores the point that character can be described or depicted as being 
relatively more or less virtuous.  At the same time, the four support Socrates’ main 
argument that each increasingly vicious character is increasingly unhappy. 
 
4.3.5 Perfectly Virtuous Character Appears to be Extremely Difficult to Attain 
 Although the emphasis in Books 8-9 is on vicious character, at the end of Book 9 
Socrates brings back the perfectly virtuous man, offering three proofs that the life of the 
perfectly virtuous man is the best and happiest, while the life of the most vicious man is 
the worst and the least happy.  One important passage at the close of Book 9 (9.592a-
b) brings us back to the question of our likelihood of attaining that perfect virtue along 
with the attendant happiest life.  Like 5.471c-472e (which we discussed earlier) 9.592a-
b seems to again address the relative likelihood of developing a character that is 
virtuous, though this time it is philosophic virtue that is at issue.  Socrates says that the 
Kallipolis is set down in words (λόγοις κειμένῃ 9.592a), since he does not think that it 
exists anywhere on earth (ἐπεὶ γῆς γε οὐδαμοῦ οἶμαι αὐτὴν εἶναι 9,592a-b).  Again, 
Socrates seems to offer some comforting words.  He says that in heaven, “perhaps, a 
pattern [again παράδειγμα as at 5.472c] is laid up for the man who wants to see and 
found a city within himself on the basis of what he sees” (592b B, bracketed comment 
mine).  We have no control over our genes, our parents, and much of our education, but 
founding a city in oneself suggests the process of developing character through 
habituation.  The juxtaposition of a) doubting that the constitution of the Kallipolis exists 






strives for the perfection of the Philosopher-King, but although imperfect, is still 
somewhat virtuous.  Just as 5.472c introduced the notion of less than perfect virtue, 
here too Socrates seems to acknowledge that with eyes on the paradigm, we might 
habituate ourselves to some degree of less than perfect virtue.  However, neither less 
than perfect virtue, nor the degree of happiness that attends it, is discussed apart from 
those two references.  
 
4.3.6 Character in Books 8-9: Conclusion 
 Books 8-9 do not disrupt the understanding of character that we had at the 
conclusion of Book 4 and again at the conclusion of Book 7.  Character can be 
described in terms of traits and also with respect to its overall relative virtue.  Although 
character with perfect virtue has been described, we are very unlikely to achieve that 
character; and less than perfect virtue is not discussed.  Books 8-9 conclude with a 
good reason to strive not to be vicious, but leave us with virtually no information about 
a) how to characterize somebody like Glaucon, who seems to be somewhat virtuous but 
less than perfectly so, b) how likely we are to be able to develop a character like that, 
and c) whether that type of character will provide us with a flourishing life. 
 
4.4 Character in Republic Books 1-9: Conclusion 
 As discussed in Chapter 1, the Republic often describes souls in terms of their 
parts.  At times, the reason, spirit, and appetite ‘parts’ dominate the discussion.  Also, at 
times, the parts seem to be described as agent-like, providing a possible explanation of 






as discussed on page 122).  As argued in Chapter 1, once we have the whole of the 
Republic in mind, we are pushed to adopt a deflationary view of the status of soul parts.  
The person as a whole is the only agent of his or her actions.  This requires of us that 
we recognize in the Republic a different approach to the description of the person, one 
that stresses his being as a whole and does justice to the array of behaviors that 
different people exhibit.  In this chapter I have argued that the language of character 
provides some of that explanation.   
 Despite the fact that no formal inquiry into character is launched in the Republic, 
the first nine Books paint a consistent picture of human character, both in Socrates’ 
claims about the way people are, and also in the characters presented by Plato.  The 
notion of character moves us toward a more true-to-life appreciation of the complexity of 
the individual.  Building on a deflated view of soul-parts, we can reexamine the 
prototypes in Books 4-8-9 to see beyond the simplicity of parts or dominant motivations 
as a method of describing how people act and why they tend to act as they do.  We can 
now consider the prototypes in terms of their character traits, allowing for the complexity 
we find in your character and mine.  Character traits emerge as dispositions to act in a 
particular manner, although we may not act according to our dispositions all of the time.  
Further, the same character traits might appear more strongly in one person than 
another; we might both be generous but you may be more generous than I.  Although it 
is not spelled out in the text, it seems to me that Socrates’ overall account calls us to 
understand psychic conflict in light of the agency of the person with character as a key 
influence.  Jane is a generous person, while Jim is stingy.  Both are moved to donate 






they are both aware that their bank balance is low and that they have financial 
obligations (i.e. another ‘part’ of their souls thinks donating may be imprudent).  
Influencing each of them in their decision making is their respective character.  Jane will 
be more likely to stretch and give because of her character, whereas Jim will be more 
likely to suppress the urge to donate.  Finally, character as a whole can be described as 
more or less virtuous.  The Republic begins by discussing justice and virtue in terms of 
deeds (e.g. returning what is owed).  Socrates, over the course of the first nine Books, 
shifts the focus to the state of character of the agent.  Although just and virtuous deeds 
certainly exist, what counts in terms of living the life that is most flourishing depends on 
one’s character. 
 But Socrates’ focus on perfect virtue and extremes of vice, in Books 1-9, leaves 
us with a problem.  Socrates makes perfect virtue and the attendant health of the soul 
seem maximally desirable; the perfectly virtuous person lives the life that is truly 
flourishing.   Book 1 begins in the Piraeus, but by Book 2 Socrates has started 
constructing cities in speech, where most of the action will remain through Book 9.  The 
‘city of pigs’ is gradually purified over Books 2-4, such that the perfectly virtuous person 
described at the end of Book 4 is an analog to the pure city, whose virtue depends 
heavily on the laws, citizens, and poetic education found in such a pure city.  Books 5-7 
add detail to the city in speech, ending with the truly virtuous person, namely the 
Philosopher-King.  On the positive side, many outside readers will come to the end of 
Book 9 convinced by Socrates that perfect virtue, if obtained, will yield a flourishing life.   
 Yet although perfect virtue has been discussed in detail, less than perfect virtue 






itself and what, precisely, are the rewards that it offers.  Socrates does offer, in Book 9, 
three arguments to support the claim that each successively more vicious person lives a 
more unhappy life.   But there is no discussion about the degree to which somebody like 
Glaucon, whose character is ‘somewhat virtuous’, will be happier than somebody whose 
character is ‘somewhat vicious’—and it would be hard to imagine how such an 
argument would be structured.   Socrates tells us that the tyrant is 729 times more 
miserable than the Philosopher-King.  This number may be tongue-in-cheek, or it may 
be serious.  Grube/Reeve might be right that Plato’s math is wrong and the right number 
should be 125.226  Either way, the reader is left with a sense that perfect virtue, if we 
could achieve such a character, would yield the most flourishing life.  Thus, Books 1-9 
have set a very high bar for virtue.   One yearns to live as if one were living in the just 
city, even if one does this on one’s own (since the just city is one ‘laid up in heaven’ and 
not a real social possibility for people like us).   
 The vision is inspiring, but the very inspirational nature makes it distressing for 
people like us.  The reader of the Republic who lives (say) in ancient Athens or modern 
day New York may get to the end of Book 9 disheartened by Socrates’ tacit 
acknowledgement of the near-impossibility that Glaucon (and, so, people like us) will 
ever enjoy the cultural and social environment that he has described as a crucial 
support for acquiring perfect virtue.  By the end of Book 9, on my view, Socrates may 
have convinced Glaucon that a life of justice is a good to be desired “both for its own 
sake and for what comes out of it” (2.357c), though I am not sure that Glaucon would be 
                                            
 
 






right to be convinced by the argument so far.  Either way, though, I suspect that the 
young men Adeimantus wanted Socrates to address (2.365a-b) and many readers 
might well have doubts.  Overall, Books 1-9 describe people with characters that range 
from extremely vicious to somewhat vicious, but people like Glaucon are under-
described.  Intuitively, virtue (even less than perfect virtue) should make us happier than 
vice, but we come to the end of Book 9 with many open questions regarding just how 
we should go about developing ‘good’ character and achieving a flourishing life. 
 Echoing the views of many commentators, Grube/Reeve introduce Book 10 with 
the words “The main argument of the Republic is now complete.”227  On my view this is 
by no means the case.  In the next chapter, I will argue that Book 10 continues to fill out 
our understanding of character.  Book 10 turns to the real world, setting aside both the 
overly realist view of soul-parts and also the idealized constructs of virtue and vice that 
we get in Books 1-9.  I will argue that both the first half of Book 10 (the return to the 
discussion of poetry) and the second half of Book 10 (especially the Myth of Er) suggest 
that even less than perfect virtue is worth striving for and offers the potential for a 
flourishing life.  Socrates says that if a person (who I will argue is a person of less than 
perfect virtue) “philosophizes in a healthy way” (10.619d B), it’s likely that that person 
will be happy, both in this world and the world to come.  Thus, on my reading, Book 10 
offers hope even to people like us, who are unlikely to achieve perfect virtue.  As 
Socrates says in the closing line of the Republic, “both here and in that journey of a 
thousand years, whereof I have told you, we shall fare well” (10.621d).  
  
                                            
 
 












 Book 10 divides neatly into two sections, the first returning to the discussion of 
poetry and the second discussing the immortal soul.  As previously mentioned, as far 
back as 1150 C.E.,  Averroes concluded his commentary on the Republic after Book 9, 
asserting that “What the tenth treatise comprises is not necessary”.229  This assessment 
has been oft repeated by notable scholars up though the end of the twentieth century.  
As should be clear from Chapter 1, though, I have a different view. 
 The first nine Books of the Republic, as I argued in the preceding chapter, give 
us a good picture of what it means to have a particular character, as well as how one 
develops that character.  Character can be described in terms of character traits, and 
can also be described in terms of its overall degree of virtue or vice.  But in terms of 
Socrates’ attempt to exhort his interlocutors to strive to develop virtue of character, the 
first nine Books of the Republic still leave at least this reader feeling uneasy.  Socrates’ 
discussion focuses on “the perfectly just man…and the completely unjust man” 
(5.472c).  But perfect virtue does not seem to be a live option for the vast majority of us, 
                                            
 
 
228 As noted in Chapter 1, unless otherwise specified, all references to the Republic will be in the form, for 
example, (1.133b) and are from Shorey (1980).  I have selected Shorey as the standard because of the 
relative literalness of the translation and for the convenience provided by Loeb Library hardcopy and the 
Perseus soft-copy.  At times, though, Shorey’s translation is awkward, which interrupts the flow of the 
argument.  In these cases, I will typically substitute the English from Bloom or Grube/Reeve (1992).  I also 
will use Halliwell’s 1988 translation of Book 10 which I find very helpful.  These will be noted as (1.331b 
B) or (1.331b G) or (1.331b H), respectively.   






so Plato seems to provoke the reader to wonder about virtue that is less than perfect 
and yet still meets some of the criteria for virtue.   
 On my account, Book 10 plays a critical role in the overall psychological account 
by shifting the emphasis away from Book 2-9’s pervasive figure of the perfectly just man 
(first imagined by Glaucon and Adeimantus in Book 2, then re-envisioned by Socrates in 
Book 4, then refined and re-envisioned as the Philosopher-King in Books 6-7).230  The 
focus here in Book 10 is rather on the fact that there are indeed many people of decent 
character who are recognized and judged as being sufficiently virtuous to merit both the 
term and the associated rewards.  As mentioned in Chapter 1 (section 2.3.1), although 
Book 10 begins with a reaffirmation that it was right to plan to banish poetry from the 
Kallipolis (10.595a) and the renewed attack on poetry closes with comments about the 
defense of that decision (10.607b-608b), the intervening portion is about the social 
behavior and psychology of ordinary people.  Book 10 shows us people of decent 
character, both in life (e.g. at the theater) and in death (e.g. at the moment of 
judgement). Although most of the focus in Books 2-9 was on cities constructed in 
speech, In Book 10 the focus is on cities much like the Athens that existed when 
Socrates and Plato lived, where theater thrived, marriages were not in common, and 
many decent people could hold offices in the city if they chose to do so.   
                                            
 
 
230 Of course there are references to people who are less than virtuous (e.g. those characters and 
character traits Socrates objects to in Book 3 as poetry is being refined 3 and the examples of Books 8-
9).  But the former are stepping-stones to the perfectly just man of Book 4 and the latter are paradigmatic 
examples of the ‘countless forms of vice’; people in various stages of falling away from the perfectly just 
figure of the Philosopher-King.  It is only in Book 10, on my account, is we are shown decent people as 






Thus, my main claim is that by the end of Book 9, although we feel a desire to 
follow Socrates and to work to develop a virtuous character, many readers are confident 
that they will never develop into a person of perfect virtue.  Book 10 does not give us a 
lot more detail about character traits, but it does depict the soul and overall character in 
a more true-to-life manner.  On my view Book 10 completes Plato’s argument in favor of 
virtue by quietly setting a lower bar for virtue, namely decency.  Many people are 
imperfect but still decent.  These decent people would be likely to follow the laws and 
customs of the city (they would not be temple robbers) and would also be likely to 
display other good character traits.  The decent or reasonable person of 10.603e (ἀνήρ 
ἐπιεικὴς) is a good example.  He is not perfectly virtuous; simply a law and custom 
abiding person with many good character traits.   
Both halves of Book 10, on my reading, reassure many readers that even the 
basic decency we see in our friends, family, and coworkers is worth striving for.  This 
decent character, we see, can lead to a good enough life to be judged worthy of reward 
not just by one’s peers but even by the gods.  Socrates thus deflates the challenging 
notions of perfect virtue introduced in Books 4 and refined in Books 6-7.  By revising his 
hitherto excessive standards downwards, he may provoke these readers to be 
reassured that they do indeed have the potential to develop decent character and live a 
flourishing life.231   
 A second claim of this chapter is that Book 10 highlights the roles of deliberation 
and habituation within the overall process by which decent people develop their 
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character and act with a fair degree of virtue.232  The few ideally virtuous Philosopher-
Kings will gain knowledge of the Forms and will use the Form of the Good as a critical 
component in distinguishing virtuous from non-virtuous actions.  By contrast, the many 
(including many decent people) will not gain knowledge of the Forms, and therefore will 
not use the Form of the Good when faced with a choice.  Book 10 highlights the role of 
deliberation in the process by which those many people choose; they can (and must, if 
they are to act virtuously) deliberate when faced with a decision.  They may not always 
come up with the ‘right answer’, but honest deliberative effort and following the results 
of that deliberation are minimal requirements for developing decent character and acting 
reasonably justly. These two claims (i.e. [a] that Book 10 lowers the bar for a virtuous 
and flourishing life and [b] that Book 10 highlights the roles of deliberation and 
habituation in developing decent character) are mutually reinforcing.  It is through 
deliberation and habituation (and sometimes some measure of luck) that decent people 
develop their decent character and act justly.  Equally, although in practice most people 
will never use the Form of the Good or the Form of Justice in decision making, 
deliberation is available to virtually all people.233  Because human beings can deliberate, 
they have the potential to develop decent characters and live reasonably flourishing 
                                            
 
 
232 Again, I use the term habituation as described in the previous chapter section 3.5.  My focus is on 
formation of character and character traits via deliberation, choice, action, as well as the 
punishment/reward and/or reflections on that action.  I am not using deliberation in the sense that denies 
deliberation, e.g.’ I have become habituated to smoking and therefore no longer think before I reach for a 
cigarette’.  
233 Strictly speaking, deliberation about which action is right or wrong might not be functionally available to 
all people. Socrates offers the example of the oligarch, who does not allow himself to deliberate about 
anything (e.g. right and wrong) except how to accumulate more wealth (8.553d).  Similarly, a drug addict 
or a person with a completely vicious and debased character might be essentially incapable of any moral 
deliberation. These cases, though, would be rare.  Most people can and do deliberate throughout their 






lives.  Book 10 highlights both the role of deliberation and the existence of many decent 
people in our cities, thereby reassuring us that we have not only a reason to want to be 
virtuous, but also an opportunity to develop a reasonably virtuous character.  
Before moving on, let me stress that although I intend to mine Book 10 to defend 
some claims about Plato’s notion of character and virtue in the Republic, I am not in any 
way claiming that Plato’s only or even primary intent in Book 10 is to enlighten us about 
character.  The first half of Book 10 might well be primarily directed at the negative 
impacts of imitation, as many commentators have taken it to be.  The second half of 
Book 10 might well be primarily intended to advance some notions about the immortal 
soul, reincarnation, etc.  The fact that my intention is to focus on the character related 
aspects does not at all imply that I insist that this was Plato’s goal; simply that the text is 
rich and can be mined for this purpose. 
 
1.1 ἐπιεικὴς  
 Now the word ἐπιεικὴς will be important in this chapter, so a bit of linguistic 
investigation into how Plato uses the term in the Republic is in order.  According to LSJ, 
ἐπιεικὴς has primary meanings of ‘fitting’, ‘meet’, ‘suitable’ and can mean ‘reasonable or 
fair’ (when applied to statements) or ‘able, capable, reasonable, fair, good’ (when 






that these three senses are when ἐπιεικὴς is applied to people in a moral sense.  
ἐπιεικὴς  appears relevantly in 17 speeches in the Republic.234   
Commentators differ as to how to interpret ἐπιεικής in the Republic.  Consider the 
dispute between Adam and Shorey as to how to understand ἐπιεικὴς at 3.404b.  
Despite the fact that the Socrates is not referring to people but rather referring to 
“flexible” or “equitable” or “good” gymnastics, Adam makes a broad claim about the 
word ἐπιεικής: “ἐπιεικής is practically synonymous with ἀγαθή”.  Shorey disagrees:  
[ἐπιεικής,] literally “equitable,” if we translate ἐπιεικής by its later meaning, that is, 
not over-precise or rigid in conformity to rule. Adam is mistaken in saying that 
ἐπιεικής is practically synonymous with ἀγαθή. It sometimes is, but not here.235 
 
I agree with Shorey. Both in relevant and non-relevant uses of ἐπιεικής, we find that the 
term is not simply a near synonym for ἀγαθή.  This is at least trivially true.  When 
Socrates refers to the ‘Form of the Good’ (ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα 6.505a) ἐπιεικής would 
simply not work.  Similarly, when Adeimantus agrees to Socrates’ statement saying 
“That’s fairly plain” (ἐπιεικῶς, ἔφη, δῆλον 8.555d) we could not easily substitute ἀγαθή 
for ἐπιεικής.  Now the former is a term of art and the latter is a case of ἐπιεικής applied 
to a statement not a person.  But even when applied to persons, ἐπιεικής is used in 
subtly different senses at different points, but is different from ἀγαθός, which Socrates 
unsurprisingly uses to describe the perfectly just man at 449a: “To such a city, then, or 
constitution I apply the terms good [ἀγαθὴν] and right—and to the corresponding kind of 
man”. 
                                            
 
 
234 There are eight occurrences of ἐπιεικὴς that are not relevant to this discussion (i.e. 3.397d, 3.398e, 
3.404b, 4.441c, 8.555d, 9.577d, 10.602b, and 10.612a). 






 Sometimes, the meaning of ἐπιεικής is unclear.  For example, at 8.568a and 
9.577c, when Socrates and Glaucon are referring to the better citizens of an imagined 
tyranny, it is unclear as to whether they are decent people, or just less corrupt than the 
other citizens. But there are cases where Socrates does refer to people outside the 
Kallipolis as ἐπιεικής, meaning people that are reasonable, or fitting, or, as Bloom 
translates it, decent.236  For example, “a decent man will believe that for the decent 
man— who happens to be his comrade— being dead is not a terrible thing” (3.387d B).   
Further, in the two instances most relevant to this chapter (the decent man in the 
theater at 10.603e and the ‘decent men’ at 10.605c) it seems clear that Socrates is 
talking about real people; people who are decent, but not perfectly virtuous.  
 
1.2 Organization 
 As was the case with Books 2-9, although the nature of character pervades Book 
10, Socrates still does not go after a definition or launch an inquiry into exactly what sort 
of thing it is.  Absent a localized inquiry into the nature of character in Book 10, then, 
how should we organize our inquiry into the text in order to tease out Book 10’s 
additions to the picture of character and character development that emerged in Books 
2-9 (as argued in the previous chapter)?  One of the distinguishing features of Book 10 
is that it displays a large number of the decent people that went largely undiscussed 
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when it is used in this sense in Books 1 and 10, which are set in real cities and peopled with characters 







earlier, where the focus was on people of (perfectly) good character.  My plan is to first 
work through the sections of the first half of Book 10 (the return to the attack on 
imitation) pointing out the decent people along the way, as well as what we can learn 
about character from the subsections of this first half.  Most of these sub-sections were 
discussed in Chapter 1, but there my focus was on whether people were described as 
having agent-like parts or not.  Here my focus will be on the characters of the people we 
meet. 
 I will then turn to the second half of Book 10 which concerns the immortal soul.  I 
will first pause over the implications of the three subsections that lead up to the Myth of 
Er and then consider the myth itself.  On a straightforward, literal reading, I will argue 
that the myth assures us that many people will lead decent lives, and by so doing 
receive a judgement of 1000 years of heavenly reward.  I will then consider the oft-cited 
‘allegorical reading’, which takes the myth to be an allegory for how we live our lives.  I 
will argue that also on the allegorical reading, the myth promises us a reasonable 
chance of developing a character which, although not perfect, is decent enough to 
produce a life which is sufficiently flourishing so to be choice-worthy.  Further, I will 
argue that the allegorical reading gives us a picture of part of how one develops a 
decent character, namely deliberation and habituation. 
 
1.3 Setting 
 As mentioned in Chapter 1, Book 10 takes place in a setting that is markedly 






composed as a ring-composition.237  The outermost ring, comprising Books 1 and 10, 
has a distinct setting.  In Socrates’ narration of the Republic, the action begins just 
outside of Athens and the conversation of Book 1 takes place in the house of a 
historical family.  The discussion focuses on real people in real cities.  By contrast, 
much of Books 2-9 focuses on cities that Socrates explicitly constructs in speech (first 
the ‘healthy’ city of pigs; then the diseased city; which is gradually purified to become 
the Kallipolis; then the constructed cities of the timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and 
tyranny).  Book 10 returns to consider real people in real cities.  Philosopher-Kings, 
auxiliaries, producers, and other members of the Kallipolis are never mentioned.  
Timocrats, oligarchs, and other constructed types from Books 8-9 are also never 
mentioned.  Rather we have people like those that could have been found in 4th century 
Athens, living (e.g. going to the theater, suffering loss) and ultimately dying.  This 
change from idealized inhabitants of idealized cities helps makes us ready to accept 
that the perfectly just figure which was pervasive in Books 2-9 is ready to be left aside in 
favor of more realistic, ‘decent’ people.  That said, let us dive into the text itself. 
 
2.0 Book 10 Part 1: ‘The Impact of Poetry on Character’ (10.595a-608b)238  
 In Chapter One, I skipped over the first section of Book 10 (10.595a-602b), which 
I will call ‘The Charge Against Imitation in General’.  I focused only on the other three 
sections of Book 10’s discussion of effect of poetry on the soul, which I named, ‘The 
Charge Against Painting’ (10.602c-603c), ‘The Charge Against Poetry’ (10.603c-605c), 
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and ‘The Greatest Charge’ (10.605c-606d).  Those three were the sections that were 
relevant the realist/deflationist debate that was the subject of Chapter 1.  Here I will 
focus on all four sections, as each sheds light on the matter of decent character. 
 
2.1 ‘The Charge against Imitation in General’ (10.595a-602b) 
 This section considers imitation in general, touching on painting (and painters), 
poetry (and poets) and other imitations (and imitators).  As noted in Chapter 2, although 
early influences (e.g. first nature, rearing, early education) are most formative of 
character, other influences (e.g. habituation, surroundings, continuing education) 
continue to influence character development throughout our lives.  Adult education and 
its impact on the soul is explicitly the worry here.  Socrates says that Homer and the 
other poets are said to know “all things human pertaining to virtue and vice, and all 
things divine” (10.598e).  Socrates wants to take Homer to task for “the education of 
men” and question whether in so doing he is “capable of knowing what pursuits make 
men better or worse in private or public life” (10.599d). Socrates, of course, argues that 
Homer was in fact not “able to educate men and make them better” (10.600c); that he 
was not successful at education (παιδείας 10.600e). 
 ‘The Charge Against Imitation in General’ mostly concerns itself with 
metaphysics (i.e. with “how things are or how they look” 10.598a).  Imitators produce 
phantoms of virtue (εἰδώλων ἀρετῆς 10.600e) and “the maker of the phantom 
understands nothing of what is but rather of what looks like it is” (10.601b B). Although it 






view, its focus on cognitive functions is very much part of the psychological account and 
very much part of the account of character. 
 ‘The Charge Against Imitation in General’ argues that imitation harms our 
character in terms of our reasoning process (and so, by extension, our deliberation).  
Socrates says that imitations “seem to maim the thought of those who hear them” 
(10.595b B).  It maims our thought by training us in the direction of mistaking 
appearance for reality and in mistaking untruth for truth.  (As Socrates says, “the 
appearance of them, but not the reality and the truth… his creations are not real and 
true” 10.596e).  The man with the mirror can create everything on earth, as well as the 
gods and all things in the heavens and in Hades (10.596c).  But he is not to be trusted.  
He produces only shallow imitations that “look like they are; however, they surely are not 
in truth” (10.596e B, italics added by Bloom).  Again, at 10.596e “[the painter’s] 
creations are not real and true”.  Reality versus unreality and reality versus appearance 
are repeatedly stressed throughout the ‘The Charge Against Imitation in General’ (e.g. 
10.597c, 10.598a, 10.598b, 10.598e).  The distinction between knowledge, true opinion, 
and false opinion is also key (e.g. “with respect to beauty and badness the imitator will 
neither know nor opine rightly” (10.602a B).  But it is not just the imitator who is 
highlighted in this passage; it is not just that Homer is unable to “help human beings 
toward virtue” (10.600d B).  The character of the person who trusts in imitation is also 
on display. 
 ‘The Charge Against Imitation in General’ does not deal at all with appetites or 
spirited emotions.  Rather the passage deals only with cognitive functions.  Imitation 






and calculation.  Further, when we do summon our reasoning powers, but there is 
conflict between our reasoning and appearances, imitation makes us more prone to 
follow appearance rather than our reasoning.   This tells us a lot about imitation, but it 
also tells us something new about character.  Certainly virtuous character has 
consistently been described as reason leading with the rest of the soul harmoniously 
following.  Knowledge too has been at play (e.g. of the Forms), leading to an ‘even finer 
form of virtue’, as Glaucon observes at the outset of Book 8.  However, through the first 
nine Books the focus has been on conflicts between reason, appetites, and spirited 
emotions.  Conflict between fine reasoning and lower cognitive functions, we now see, 
can also lead to poor character. 
 As discussed in the last chapter, in the Kallipolis, the rulers will refer to the Form 
of the Good, which will help them correctly identify which act is just, courageous, etc.  In 
4th century Athens, though, (as in other cities) most people will not have the knowledge 
required to avail themselves of the Form of the Good or the Form of Justice.  If their 
character is somewhat virtuous, it is such not only as a result of nature, rearing, and 
education, but also as a result of the extent to which they habituate themselves to 
deliberate well and follow the path of reason.  To the extent that we are “unable to put 
knowledge and lack of knowledge to the test” (10.598d B), it will be difficult to develop a 
decent character.   Socrates’ focus is on how poetry degrades the ordinary person’s 
propensity to use reasoned deliberation.  It rather strengthens his propensity to bring 
other cognitive forces to bear, such as wish, fantasy, hasty acceptance of attractive 
appearances, etc.  This highlights the fact that using reasoned deliberation can lead to 






nature, education, etc., we can (at least some of the time) deliberate about whether a 
particular act is just or unjust, courageous or cowardly, etc.  Thus, ‘The Charge Against 
Imitation in General’ provides some support for both of this chapter’s two main claims, 
namely, a) the importance of deliberation in developing decent character, and b) the 
suggestion that ordinary people in real cities have the potential to develop a character 
which is sufficiently good to merit the term ‘decent.  The next section continues these 
themes. 
 
2.2 ‘The Charge against Painting’ (10.602c-603b) 
 Like the prior passage, ‘The Charge Against Painting’ argues that imitation harms 
our psyche in terms of reasoning.  This claim was argued in detail in Chapter 1 Section 
2.3.2, so it will not be repeated here.  In summary, though, the claim was that painting 
instills in us a character that is less likely, overall, to summon our powers of reasoning 
and calculation.  Further, when we do summon our reasoning powers, but there is 
conflict between our reasoning and appearances, painting makes us more prone to 
follow appearance rather than better judgment.  Again, this tells us something about 
painting, but it also tells us something about character. (In Chapter 1 we were focused 
on soul-parts, but here we are focused on character, so there are some new pieces of 
argument to add.)  As Socrates said in Book 3, when we are surrounded by good 
painting, architecture etc., they affect us by instilling good character (ἀγαθοῦ ἤθους 
3.401a) whereas bad painting has the opposite effect (3.400e-401a).  Note that 3.400e-
401a talks about bad painting’s promoting bad character, but, similar to this passage in 






appetite-led or spirit-led but rather “κακολογίας καὶ κακοηθείας” (3.401a).  Sachs is not 
atypical in rendering this as bad speaking and bad character, which fits with the notion 
of bad painting promoting bad character by damaging our ability to lead with our 
calculative capacity rather than other, lesser cognitive capacities.   
 As in the previous section, poor character is not simply a state of character 
where we are led by our appetites or our spirited emotions.  ‘The Charge Against 
Painting’ reminds us that poor character is equally a product of being led by inferior 
cognitive states.  Second, ‘The Charge Against Painting’ suggests some optimism 
regarding our likelihood of developing a character with some degree of virtue.  Unlike 
the ascent from the cave, where it was knowledge that contributed to virtue, here it is 
simply the discipline to use our calculative capacities instead of jumping at 
appearances.  And this is something that seems to be within the reach of all of us.  Part 
of how we develop virtue, the passage suggests, is to repeatedly avoid the easy path, 
employing reasoning when choices are presented or doubts are present.  Plato himself 
did not receive the purified education described in Books 2-4, nor did he live in an 
ideally good city.  But one can imagine him as a man who brought his reasoning to bear 
in the vast majority of circumstances.  This is a notion of virtue that seems accessible to 
many more people than the ideal virtue of Books 2-9. Thus ‘The Charge Against 
Painting’ also supports both of this chapter’s two claims, namely (a) the importance of 
deliberation in developing decent character, and (b) the suggestion that ordinary people 
in real cities have the potential to develop a character which is sufficiently good to merit 








2.3 ‘The Charge Against Poetry’ (10.603b-605c) 
 Socrates begins by suggesting we examine what part of ‘thought’, as Bloom has 
it (τῆς διανοίας 10.603b), poetry appeals to. This seems to be a continuation of ‘The 
Charge Against Painting’, focusing on higher vs. lower cognitive functions. Socrates 
asks (10.603d) whether “just as in the domain of sight” (i.e. painting), so too with 
respect to deeds (i.e. poetry), does a person suffer inner conflict?  Now the conflicts 
with respect to sight were cognitive conflicts, as argued in the previous section.  But 
Socrates is not willing to trust that poetry will be analogous to painting, that is to say, will 
be focused on or solely on cognitive conflicts (10.603b).  Therefore, Socrates continues 
to inquire:  
just as with respect to the sight there was faction and he had contrary opinions in 
himself at the same time about the same things, is there also faction in him when 
it comes to deeds and does he do battle with himself?  But I am reminded that 
there’s no need for us to come to an agreement about this now. For in the 
previous arguments we came to sufficient agreement about all this, asserting that 
our soul teems with ten thousand such oppositions arising at the same time. 
(10.603d B) 
 
How we should interpret this backward reference to “the previous arguments”, i.e. 
4.436bff?  In Chapter 1 we focused on 4.436bff simply to improve our understanding of 
how to interpret the ‘parts’ of the soul and the associated locus of agency.  Here, we 
can look at this passage with fresh eyes, in light of Chapter 2’s discussion of character.  
The straightforward (and I will argue correct) interpretation is that Socrates is 






without reference to the examples to which the principle is applied in Book 4239.  On this 
reading, Socrates intends to here apply to Principle of Non-Opposition to the different 
‘parts’ of us are that are in conflict in this case—between the ‘serious’ part of our 
thought and the ‘ordinary’ part.  In this case, poetry would here be described (like 
painting) in terms of cognitive conflicts.   
Some readers, though, might object that Socrates’ intent is to refer back to both 
the Principle of Non-opposition and also to the specific types of conflicts described in 
Book 4, e.g. conflicts involving reasoning and also appetitive desires or spirited 
emotions.  Using Bloom’s translation quoted above, Socrates’ comment that “we came 
to came to sufficient agreement about all this” does seem to leave the question open.  If 
read this way, ‘The Charge Against Poetry’ would be broader than ‘The Charge Against 
Painting’.  Although Socrates’ condemnation of poetry will ultimately be broader than his 
condemnation of painting, this will come in the next section (i.e. ‘The Greatest Charge’).  
In this section, on my reading, we should understand this backward reference as 
referring to the former, that is, to the principle itself.   
First, appetitive desires are never mentioned in ‘The Charge Against Poetry’.  
Similarly, although pain and grief are mentioned in this passage, desire for victory, 
pride, anger, and the other types of spirited emotions discussed in ‘The Inquiry into 
Soul-Parts’ (4.435c-441c) are not present here.  Further, although the conflict in 
question is initially cast (at 10.604a) as one between reasoning and misjudging the size 
of the loss and therefore giving in to suffering, it is later (at 10.604d) restated and 
                                            
 
 






refined as one between the ‘part’ that follows calculation and the ’part’ that leads to 
reminiscences of the suffering (using Bloom’s translation). Both reasoning and 
misjudging (in the first case) are cognitive facilities, as are deliberating and 
remembering (in the restated case). Finally, Socrates sums up his argument by casting 
the conflict as one between rational and irrational behavior, concluding that the irrational 
(ἀλόγιστόν 604d) person is easier to imitate. Again, both rationality and irrationality are 
cognitive states.  Appetitive desires and spirited emotions will be brought up in the next 
section, namely ‘The Greatest Charge’.  Here, though, Socrates only goes so far as to 
agree the poet is indeed like the painter, which is why Socrates concludes that: 
So we would be right now to apprehend the poet and to place him as a match for 
the painter.  For he resembles the latter in making things which stand in a poor 
relation to the truth, and he has also been found similar to him by virtue of 
associating with some other part of the soul than the best. (10.605a-b Halliwell, 
italics mine). 
 
 What part of the soul is it that the poet appeals to in Socrates’ reference above 
(i.e. what part is “other than the best”)?   First, as previously noted, Halliwell supplies 
the word part in the above quote, despite that fact that Socrates does not once use 
‘part’ words, such as εἶδος, γένος, or μέρος.240  Nevertheless, those who take Book 10 
here to be referring to a bipartite soul (and who are still holding on to the primacy of the 
three canonical parts of the soul) will take the part that is “other than the best” to be 
appetite and spirit combined.  But, as I argued in Chapter 1 Section 2.3.3, on my view 
this interpretation is mistaken. The soul has many ‘parts’, just as the Republic has many 
                                            
 
 
240 Indeed, the words μέρος and γένος do not appear at all in the first half of Book 10, and εἶδος only 







‘parts’. The deflationist position argued in Chapter 1 tells us that the soul can 
conceptually be cut in many ways (i.e. into many different ‘parts’).  If one takes it that 
here Socrates is distinguishing the soul as having two parts, namely, calculation on the 
one hand and everything else on the other (i.e. the ‘parts’ that want to laugh, weep, 
dream, drink, etc.) then it is true that all of our appetites and spirited emotions are in the 
“inferior” part.  
But the ‘part’ of the “inferior part” that is under discussion here is not related to 
the appetite or spirit parts of the earlier tripartition.  The ‘part’ being distinguished from 
the calculating part, here, is the part that wants to “dwell in memory on our suffering and 
impels us to lamentation, and cannot get enough of that sort of thing, is the irrational 
and idle part of us, the associate of cowardice” (10.604d).  This is not a part of us that 
deals with appetites or anger, desire for victory, etc.  On the one hand, it cognizes but 
does not reason.  It dwells in memory of loss, which is cognitive.  On the other hand, the 
loss that it dwells in is suffering, associating with the sad, etc.  It is the part of us that 
literally wants to weep with the hero.  But this is not spirit and appetite, as displayed in 
the tripartite soul of earlier books, The inferior part here is an inferior part of cognition, 
as previously argued.  This is supported by Socrates’ characterization of the part as “the 
soul’s foolish part, which doesn’t distinguish big from little, but believes the same things 
are at one time big and at another little” (10.605b-c B).  In other words, the poet is like 
the painter in appealing to the non-calculative part of cognition. 
Returning to 10.603d, then, Socrates next makes a second backward reference 
with a statement that at first reading seems unremarkable, but taken in light of the 






But what we then left out, it is now necessary to go through, in my opinion.  What 
was that?” he said.  A decent man (ἐπιεικεῖς),” I said, who gets as his share some 
such chance as losing a son or something else for which he cares particularly, as 
we were surely also saying then, will bear it more easily than other men.  
(10.603d-e B italics mine) 
 
When Socrates says “as we were saying then” in the quote above, he is referring to the 
speech at 3.387d.  Before we can discuss was left out at 3.387d that will now be said in 
Book 10, we need to look again at ‘the part that was not left out’ at 3.387d in discussing 
how a decent person acts when suffering a great loss.  It was not left out that a 
reasonable man will bear loss more easily than an unreasonable man: 
We surely say that a decent man will believe that for the decent man— who 
happens to be his comrade (ὁ ἐπιεικὴς ἀνὴρ τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ)— being dead is not a 
terrible thing…Then, he wouldn’t lament him as though he had suffered 
something terrible...Moreover, we also say that such a man is most of all 
sufficient unto himself for living well and, in contrast to others, has least need of 
another…Then for him it is least terrible to be deprived of a son, or a brother, or 
money, or of anything else of the sort…Then he laments the least and bears it 
most gently when some such misfortune overtakes him. (3.387d-e B) 
 
We should begin by noting that this is in the context of educating and developing fully 
just guardians—not the many. Indeed, Socrates acknowledges that passages like the 
ones under discussion (that make us fear death, lament loss, etc.) are  
poetic and pleasing to most hearers, but because the more poetic they are the 
less are they suited to the ears of boys and men who are destined to be free and 
to be more afraid of slavery than of death. (3.387b) 
 
They might, he says, be “all well and good for other purposes” (3.387c) (i.e. to the less 
worthy women and inferior men 3.387e-388a)—but not for the guardians.  Two things 
are stressed in the above passage from Book 3. First, death is not bad for a decent 
person.  Second, decent people are the most self-sufficient; they are the least in need of 






people should not fear death.  In a passage too long to be set out here (10.603e-604d) 
Socrates provides the new information that was left out in Book 3 that must now be said 
in Book 10. 
 After affirming that a decent man (ἐπιεικεῖς) will bear loss more easily than other 
men, Socrates elicits that the decent man will still feel pain at the loss, but will be 
sensible in the face of the pain.  But this is in public.  In private he will behave badly; 
indeed, he will say and do many things of which he would be ashamed to be heard 
saying or seen doing or do in public.  This is one major difference between the Book 3 
speech and the Book 10 speech.  The Book 3 speech concerns the ‘decent’ young man 
in the Kallipolis who (although still a work in progress; still an ἐπιεικὴς but not yet fully 
ἀγαθός) has been selected for the education and testing designed to turn him into the 
perfectly virtuous person.  There is no indication that this youth will speak or behave in 
private in ways he would be ashamed to be heard saying or seen doing in public.  The 
Book 10 speech concerns the ‘decent’ person in a regular city, who is far less than 
perfectly virtuous (this particular decent person will speak and behave in private in ways 
he would be ashamed to be heard saying or seen doing) but is still a decent person.241  
Socrates continues by explaining how an ordinary decent person behaves, namely by 
deliberating and following the results of one’s deliberation: 
being in pain is an impediment to the coming of that thing the support of which 
we need as quickly as possible in these cases…. Deliberation about what has 
happened…One must not behave like children who have stumbled and who hold 
on to the hurt place and spend their time in crying out; rather one must always 
                                            
 
 
241 Note Gill (1996, 212) says, “Plato here seems to have in view a picture of conventional (not ideal) 
goodness of character, and a conventional conception of what goodness of character consists in”.  Ferrari 
(2007, 178-80) also paints a useful picture of the “decent but still imperfect fellow” (178).  He is good, but 






habituate the soul to turn as quickly as possible to curing and setting aright what 
has fallen and is sick, doing away with lament by medicine. (10.604c-604d B, 
italics mine) 
  
Again, this is behavior which is available to all of us.  When we suffer a loss, or indeed 
are faced with any decision, decent character is formed by habituating ourselves to act 
according to our deliberation. 
 Now this long passage about how the decent person will behave in public and in 
private (10.603d-604d) calls us to compare the decent person with the person who 
resembles the oligarchy.  Like the decent man of Book 10, the oligarch will behave 
shamefully in private, but in public he “seems to be just” (8.554c B).  Indeed, he seems 
to be just because his base desires are held in check by some ‘decent’ (ἐπιεικεῖ) part of 
himself.  But the similarities only serve to highlight the differences.  The oligarch is 
clearly not a decent person.  He is a “squalid fellow” (αὐχμηρός 8.554a) who welcomes 
‘opportunities of getting away with injustice with impunity’ (8.554c).  Although the decent 
man of Book 10 also says and does some things in private that he would be ashamed to 
say or do in public, he is clearly a decent person.  His sense of shame does him credit 
and serves to guide his public behavior.  He is a divided, convention and reputation 
bound individual, but Socrates seems to be giving him a measure of approval.  Thus we 
are reminded that unlike Books 2-9 where the emphasis was on the perfectly virtuous 
person, here in Book 10 the emphasis is on the many decent people who are not 
perfectly virtuous, but still exist in cities like the Athens of Plato’s day. 
 Before concluding our consideration of this passage, note that in describing ‘what 
was left out’ in Book 3, Socrates uses the strong term ἀναγκαῖος (10.603e) saying that 






moderate in giving in to his grief and will resist expressing it in public, does not seem so 
surprising as to warrant the assertion that it must be said now.  Certainly we will 
subsequently (at 10.605a) get to one reason why this must be said now, namely that the 
mimetic poet will appeal to the weak parts of our cognition.  But between 10.603d and 
10.605a there is much discussion of the person and how he behaves that informs our 
notion of character.  It seems to me that part of why this ‘must be said now’ is because 
the passage serves to emphasize that we are here discussing a person who while 
lacking perfect virtue, still has some reasonable measure of virtue.  Unlike many people, 
who, as we will argue, will be judged subsequently (in the Myth of Er that concludes the 
Republic) as worthy of punishment, he will be judged worthy of heavenly reward.  In 
sum, what was left out at 3.387 which now must be said is that proper education, 
habituation, and acculturation are not only necessary for developing perfectly just 
guardians, but also for instilling a measure of virtue in ordinary decent people.  Like 
painting, poetry educates and acculturates adults to develop bad habits which damage 
character.  Both degrade one’s propensity to use reasoned deliberation and strengthens 
the propensity to bring lesser cognitive forces to bear (to repeat, ones such as wish, 
fantasy, hasty acceptance of attractive appearances, etc.)  This is why, as noted earlier, 
the passage concludes that we should set up the poet as the antistrophe of the painter. 
Like the painter, the poet induces a bad character in the soul of individuals (10.605b 
κακὴν πολιτείαν ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστου τῇ ψυχῇ ἐμποιεῖν) by acculturating us to eschew 
deliberation and good sense for irrationality.  ‘The Charge Against Poetry, like the 
previous two sections, highlights both the role of deliberation in the building of decent 







2.4 ‘The Greatest Charge’ (10.605c-606d)  
 As noted in Chapter 1, there is much that is the same in 'The Charge Against 
Poetry’ and 'The Greatest Charge’.  As we will see, the same two themes about 
character (the role of deliberation and the reasonable possibility of attaining decent 
character) will emerge.  The setting is unchanged, remaining in a city populated with 
both bad and decent people.  In the very first speech (10.605c), Socrates makes clear 
that the concern with poetry here regards its power to corrupt the decent people (τοὺς 
ἐπιεικεῖς) that live in the city.  Indeed, it even has the power to corrupt those who are the 
“best” (note the plural—βέλτιστοι) of those decent people.  In fact, it will become clear 
that we are not to take this phrase (‘the best of us’) too seriously, since there are a few 
people who will not be corrupted in the theater (10.605c).  These few, who will not be 
corrupted, are presumably even better than those who are the ‘best of us’, however odd 
that may sound.  Thus in contrast to Book 2-9’s focus on perfect virtue, Book 10 
increasingly takes for granted that there are many decent people in our cities, and 
further that some are more decent than others.  In this passage, for example, we have 
a) a significant number of decent people that can be corrupted by poetry, b) a group of 
people that are the most decent among those decent people, and c) an even better 
group who will not be corrupted by the theater.  
 The fact that poetry can corrupt decent people, though, does not seem very new.  
As previously noted, imitation “maim[s] the thought” (10.595b) and instills bad character 
(10.605b) even in decent people.  It is not clear to what extent it maims our thought, and 






makes this the greatest charge will need to turn out to be something more than just the 
damage cited above.    
 The first example, which pertains to poetry in the theater, also seems roughly 
similar to what has already been said.  How does the decent man behave in the face of 
personal sorrow?  He bears up under it: “when personal sorrow comes to one of us, you 
are aware that, on the contrary, we pride ourselves if we are able to keep quiet and bear 
up” (10.605e B).  Nevertheless, in the theater, we often give ourselves over to the 
suffering of the hero and praise the poet who most induces us to do so.  Most people 
are incapable of understanding that enjoying the suffering of the stage hero habituates 
us toward a character that revels in wallowing in suffering in our own lives (“few are 
capable of reflecting that what we enjoy in others will inevitably react upon ourselves” 
10.606b).  A person like this is foolish in enjoying the suffering of the hero, because 
doing so is damaging to his character (“For after feeding fat the emotion of pity there, it 
is not easy to restrain it in our own sufferings” 10.606b).  As of yet, though, there is no 
indication in the text that he acts shamefully either in public or in private.  For this 
reason, he seems more virtuous than the “decent and reasonable man” described at 
(10.603d-604d), who will act shamefully in private.   
 Socrates continues, though, with an example about the impact of comedy in the 
theater: 
Well, doesn't the same argument hold for comedy too?  Namely, that whenever, 
at a comic performance or in private life, you get keen pleasure from, and refuse 
to detest as wicked, humour which you would be personally ashamed to indulge 
in, you are doing the same thing as in cases of pity? (606c H, italics mine) 






First, let us take note of the phrase “at a comic performance or in private life”.  Here 
Socrates stresses what I have taken to be a key point in interpreting this renewed attack 
on imitation.  The attack here may be directed at comedy in the theater, but the theater 
is only one of the avenues in which character can be damaged.  When we learn about 
how, say, attending comedic theater habituates us away from virtue, we learn, at the 
same time, how other temptations (sometimes away from the theater in public or in 
private) habituate us away from virtue. 
 To return to the passage on comedy, Socrates stresses that the same argument 
as the one used against tragedy also applies to comedy.  But although the argument is 
the same, the result is not the same.  Socrates highlights the end result that comes from 
habituating oneself toward vice.  Although the man in this example starts out with an 
appropriate attitude toward buffoonery (as above, he would be “personally ashamed to 
indulge in” it (10.606d H), ultimately he develops into a buffoon.  Socrates continues: 
what your reason, for fear of the reputation of buffoonery, restrained in yourself 
when it fain would play the clown, you release in turn, and so, fostering its 
youthful impudence, let yourself go so far that often ere you are aware you 
become yourself a comedian in private. (10.606c-d H italics mine) 
 
 
Enjoying the buffoonery in the theater habituates us toward buffoonery.  Before we 
know it, we develop the character trait of acting the buffoon.  This man no longer 
regards buffoonery as base (as quoted earlier).   
 It is the same, Socrates says, with spirited emotions and appetitive desires.  
Poetic imitation “fosters and waters them when they ought to be dried up” (10.606d B).  
But the passages about imitation, on my view, encourage us to extend Socrates’ main 






issue of how people behave in the face of public and private temptations.  If people 
habituate themselves to giving in to these, rather than deliberating and then following 
the voice of reason, they damage their character.  Contrariwise, if people habitually 
deliberate and then decide to follow the course of reason, instead of the temptations of 
illusion, buffoonery, licentiousness, gluttony, etc., they develop into decent human 
beings—not perfect—simply, as Socrates says, ‘as virtuous they are able to be’ 
(10.606e-607a, as discussed below). 
 Before leaving ‘The Greatest Charge’, one question that we raised earlier must 
be considered: given that the theater is damaging to character, just how damaging is 
the theater to people?  It has already been made clear that the young are more 
susceptible to influences than adults.  Whether youth or adult, though, it certainly seems 
that one trip to the theater does not immediately and fully corrupt a decent person, 
much less ‘the best of us’.  Similarly, somebody with a (reasonably) good character, 
who succumbs to temptation and acts basely on a particular occasion is not 
immediately and fully ruined.   This is perhaps supported by Socrates’ conclusion of 
Book 10’s renewed attack on imitation when he says:  
Consequently, Glaucon, when you encounter admirers of Homer who assert that 
this poet has been the educator of Greece…you ought to show friendly affection 
to these people, since they are as virtuous as they are able (10.606e-607a H, 
italics mine) 
 
There are a lot of decent people in the non-ideal city.  They are not ideally virtuous, but 








2.5 Book 10 Part 1: Conclusion 
 Socrates’ main thrust in the first half of Book 10 is just what it appears to be, 
namely, a return to the issue of imitation and the damage it can do.  But one can still 
mine the passage for Plato’s views about character and character development broadly.  
As Socrates says in his last speech of this section: 
Because it’s a great struggle, dear Glaucon, I said, though it doesn’t seem as 
great as it is, to become a reliable (χρηστὸν) or worthless person, so it’s not 
worth it to be enticed by honor or money or any ruling power or even by poetry 
into being careless about justice and the rest of virtue. (10.608b Sachs, italics 
mine) 
 
Note that Sachs’ careful translation avoids translating χρηστὸν as “good” (as, for 
example, Bloom, Halliwell, and Shorey do.  Socrates is still talking about the decent 
person, not the person of perfect virtue.  The temptations to eschew deliberation or to 
act against our deliberations are many.  Honor or money imply the entire spectrum of 
emotions and desires.   Two important points about character should be noted.  First, 
although Socrates said more than once in the early Books that early childhood and 
youth are the times when character develops the most, Book 10 underscores the 
importance of habituation, as well as the related fact that character continues to develop 
throughout the course of our entire life.  This contest that concerns becoming “a reliable 
or worthless person”, as quoted above, is the most important thing in life. Building a 
good life is a matter of building a decent character, and building a decent character is a 
matter for an entire life.   
 Second, although Socrates does not discuss the relationship between less than 
perfect virtue and a flourishing life, the first half of Book 10 does make clear that people 






are not affected by poetry.  Also, ‘even the best of us’ are present in the theater.  Along 
these lines, this half of Book 10 ends with Socrates saying that even now, “we haven’t 
discussed the greatest rewards and prizes which await virtue” (10.608c H, italics his).  
Here, I will argue, Socrates is still referring to decent people and discussing the greatest 
rewards for their less than perfect virtue.  Now Socrates cannot here be referring to the 
perfect virtue of the Philosopher-King or the guardian raised in the Kallipolis.  Those 
figures are not present or discussed in Book 10.  Further, in the speech quoted just 
before, Socrates says that “it’s not worth it to be enticed by honor or money or any 
ruling power or even by poetry into being careless about justice and the rest of virtue”.  
He must be referring to the virtue of the decent person outside the Kallipolis, for it is 
only outside the Kallipolis that theater will be present, and that a ruling office will be a 
possibility for a large number of people. This will be additionally supported in the next 
section.  The rewards Socrates speaks of are the rewards in the afterlife.  And, as we 
will see, the Myth of Er makes clear that roughly half of people get judged to have been 
sufficiently virtuous to merit and receive these rewards.  This group of roughly half the 
population are clearly not people of perfect virtue, a) because people of perfect virtue 
are explicitly said to be extremely rare,242 and b) because the description of those 
judged favorably and sent to the heavens indicates that they were virtuous but 
imperfectly so while they were alive.   
                                            
 
 
242 Although I stay wholly within the Republic in this dissertation, I am moved to point to the Phaedo 89e-
90a: “the very good and the very wicked are both quite rare, and that most men are between these 






Thus the first half of Book 10 steps down off the ledge on which we were perched 
at the close of Book 9.  There, perfect virtue was defended as leading to the truly 
flourishing life, but less than perfect virtue was simply not discussed.  Now we find 
ourselves back in Athens or some similar real city and find that people of less than 
perfect virtue are all around us. Socrates, on the above reading, asserts that we mustn’t 
be tempted not to strive for justice and virtue, even if we cannot attain perfect virtue.  At 
the beginning of Book 2, Glaucon imagines a perfectly just and perfectly unjust man so 
as to be able to judge “which of the two is the happier” (2.361d).  Although Glaucon and 
Adeimantus pose their questions in the starkest of terms, the relevant underlying 
question, on my reading, is: ‘will the even less than perfect virtue of the decent person 
yield a more flourishing life with greater rewards then the apparent pleasures of the 
Ring of Gyges?’  The first half of Book 10, on my reading, answers ‘yes’. 
 Another key takeaway from the first half of Book 10 is the importance of 
deliberation.  This is not new; it has been discussed throughout the Republic.   Here, 
though, we see ordinary people engaged in deliberation.  Socrates reinforces that 
deliberation is a key component of developing a decent character.  This in turn supports 
our optimism that we can develop decent character, since even if the purified education 
of the Kallipolis is unavailable to us, we do have the capacity to deliberate.  We need to 
have the discipline to avoid the easy path of temptations, whether they be cognitive, 
emotional, or appetitive. 
 Much seems to depend on Book 10’s shift of locale, away from cities in speech 
and toward real cities populated by ordinary citizens.  If, as I have argued, in these real 






was also set in a ‘real locale’.  One would expect there to be many decent people there 
too.  And, indeed, when we look back at Book 1 from this perspective, we find that 
decent people are often mentioned.  Even Thrasymachus, when he talks about the 
unjust man’s exploitation of his fellow citizens (i.e. “those who are simple in every sense 
of the word and just” 1.343c) acknowledges the conventional goodness of many of 
those decent people.  For example, at 1.343d, “the just man always comes out at a 
disadvantage in his relation with the unjust.”  The just man, he says does less well in 
business, pays more taxes (1.343d), and refuses to show favoritism to his friends when 
in office (1.343e).  Socrates also takes it as obvious that there are decent people in the 
city, for example insisting that the “finest spirits” will rule so as not to be ruled by 
somebody worse than them (1.347c).  Other examples jump out (e.g. 1.352a).  Thus, in 
Book 1, like in Book 10, the focus is not on the perfectly just person but on the many 
decent people (who are headed for the heavens in the closing myth) and the many bad 
people (e.g. temple robbers, kidnappers, housebreakers, defrauders, thieves, pirates, 
robbers) who are headed for Hades.   
  
3.0 Book 10 Part 2: Character in Book 10’s Second Half (10.608c-10.621d) 
 As the renewed attack against imitation concludes at 10.608b, Socrates turns to 
examine the nature of the disembodied and immortal soul; a topic that is entirely new 
and previously undiscussed in the Republic.243  Socrates begins this discussion with 
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three short sections, namely a) the defense of the immortality of the soul, b) the image 
of Glaucus, and c) ‘the return of what was borrowed’.  These sections are followed by 
the Myth of Er, which runs from 10.614a to the end of the Republic at 10.621d. 
 My claims about the second half of Book 10 are the same as my claims about the 
first half.  First, although the main intent of the second half of Book 10 is a consideration 
of the immortal soul, along with how it fares after death and in rebirth, on my view we 
can mine this discussion so as to better understand the Republic’s view of character. 
Second, the same three features about character that were prominent in the first half of 
Book 10 are prominent, I will argue, in the second half as well.  As before, habituation, 
deliberation, and the reasonable chance we have of developing decent (but not 
necessarily ideal) character are highlighted in this second half of Book 10. 
 
3.1 The Subsections Prior to the Myth of Er (10.608c-614a) 
 As noted, three subsections lead up to the Myth of Er, namely, a) the defense of 
the immortality of the soul, b) the image of Glaucus, and c) ‘the return of what was 
borrowed’ (10-612b-614a).  I do not have much to say about the defense of the 
immortality of the soul.  It certainly seems to me that the defense is necessary, since the 
Glaucus image and the Myth of Er depend on the existence of the immortal soul.  But it 
seems an odd defense.  Shields calls it a “manifestly lame argument”, while Annas calls 
it “question-begging” and “ridiculous”.244  On the other hand, Larivée calls it one of 
Plato’s “sophisticated philosophical arguments in favour of the immortality of the 
                                            
 
 






soul”.245  This is not an issue that I need to settle (although it does seem to me that 
Shields and Annas have the right of it).246  
At 10.608d, Socrates asks Glaucon if he has not considered that the soul is 
immortal.  Glaucon looks him: “full in the face in amazement” and replies “No, by Zeus, 
not I”.  Halliwell supposes that many of Plato’s readers would have been skeptical of the 
notion of the immortal soul.247  Perhaps this passage is a suggestion to the reader to 
remember that this entire closing section of the Republic recounts matters related to the 
disembodied immortal soul, which is a completely new topic for the Republic.  
Nevertheless, by means of many backward references (to the foregoing account related 
to embodied souls) and also because of the subsequent rebirth and re-embodiment of 
those souls, Plato causes the reader to keep in mind the entirety of the Republic when 
considering the disembodied, immortal soul. 
 I also do not want to make any points about the Glaucus image here.  The 
Glaucus passage was important in Chapter 1 when we were inquiring into the issue of 
soul-parts, but is not critical to this chapter.  As many commentators have pointed out, 
the hints we get from the Glaucus image about what the disembodied soul might be like 
are very different from the souls we see in the Myth of Er.  But we will return to this 
conflict later in this chapter when we take up the Myth of Er.    
 We do, though, need to spend some time on the third section leading up the 
Myth of Er, which I have named ‘the return of what was borrowed’ (10.612a-614a).  
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Here Socrates asserts that it has been proven that “justice in itself is the best thing for 
the soul itself, and that the soul ought to do justice whether it possess the ring of Gyges, 
or not” (10.612b).  He now asks for the ‘return of what was borrowed’ in terms of the 
good reputation and rewards enjoyed by just people.  Precisely what is the subject and 
who are the subjects of discussion, here?  Is ‘the justice in itself’ perfect justice or 
ordinary justice?  Similarly, are the “just people” who enjoy rewards, the perfectly just 
people of the Kallipolis or the ordinary decent people we have been discussing so far in 
this chapter?  The answer in both cases clearly seems to be the latter.  Socrates says 
that “the just, when they become older, hold the offices in their own city if they choose, 
marry from what families they will, and give their children in marriage to what families 
they please” (10.613d).  Clearly this is not a description of the truly just Philosopher-
Kings in the Kallipolis, since this is the opposite of how rulers behave in the Kallipolis.  
In the Kallipolis, holding office is not optional and marriages are in common.  Then who 
are these decent people who do and do not choose to hold offices in their cities?  Are 
they doctors? ship-owners?  merchants?  We don’t know, but we get the sense that 
Socrates is talking about a reasonably large number of people of decent character, not 
one or two people of perfect character.  The reader who has read the entire Republic, 
knows that these people of decent character will soon (measured by the timeframe of 
eternal souls) be judged and rewarded with 1000 years of delight, while the unjust 
people will be sent below to suffer.  For now, though, ‘the return of what was borrowed’ 
passage moves the argument forward, but along the way, also reminds the reader that 
in an ordinary city (like Athens) there are lots of ordinary people, some of decent 






  This passage implies that there are plenty of decent people (which allows 
discussion of what they as a group deserve and receive) and asserts that they deserve 
and receive good reputation and rewards, both from gods and from men.  Both of these 
two points are important, but neither of them are argued.  Nevertheless, in this passage 
Socrates is not only ‘taking back what Glaucon and Adeimantus borrowed from him’ 
(10.612c), I will argue that he is here giving back what he took from them, namely their 
confidence that they know what justice is and that they have the ability to develop just 
characters.   
At the beginning of Book 2 Socrates praises Glaucon and Adeimantus saying, “I 
had always been full of wonder at the nature of Glaucon and Adeimantus…something 
quite divine must certainly have happened to you…I infer this from the rest of your 
character” (2.367e-368a B).  Now Socrates is laying on the praise thickly here, since 
these fine youths have the disposition to aspire to justice, but are certainly neither 
godlike nor yet of fully developed character.  Although they probably began the 
evening’s conversation with confidence in their knowledge of justice and potential to 
develop just character, Socrates’ arguments against Thrasymachus must have shaken 
their confidence that they know precisely what justice is, hence their demand (in Book 
2) that Socrates give a deep account that will be persuasive.  Further, as I argued in the 
previous chapter, the high bar that Socrates sets for justice in Books 2-9 (the perfectly 
just man) must have further eroded their confidence.  Over the course of Books 2-9, 
Socrates completes the argument designed to persuade Glaucon and Adeimantus that 
they should be just.  But along the way, his conclusion that there is one form of virtue 






(especially the Philosopher-King), does or at least should shake their confidence.  They 
are certainly not just in the manner of the ‘perfectly just man’.  In the same way, Plato, in 
having Socrates set this high bar shakes the confidence of the reader.  But throughout 
Book 10 Socrates has lowered the bar, allowing that many decent people in Athens will 
be judged favorably.  Thus, in this passage (along with others in Book 10) Socrates 
gives back the confidence that he has taken from them, and Plato gives back the 
confidence he has taken from us.  Since a) there are many decent people in Athens, 
and b) Glaucon and Adeimantus are fine young men, then it must be the case that they 
can develop reasonably just characters if they work at it.  The same holds true for many 
readers of the Republic. 
 This passage is the last one before the closing myth.  If the Republic ended here, 
it would still be a fine ending.  Socrates finishes the answer to Glaucon and Adeimantus’ 
original challenge with the assertions that a) they can be just, b) they should be just 
(because justice will lead to a flourishing life), and c) being just will also win them good 
reputation and rewards from both gods and men. 
 Why then is Socrates asserting rather than offering an argument?  Perhaps 
because although he has argued for the high bar for justice in Books 2-9, here in Book 
10 he is also confirming the common opinions that a) there are decent people, and b) 
decency is rewarded by gods and men.  In this Socrates is not arguing with the common 
wisdom, but rather agreeing with it.  Certainly he has taken us down a long road, and 
convinced us that reputation and prizes are not what we should value most highly—
psychic harmony and the associated flourishing life is what we should value most 






flourishing life.  Socrates has filled in that story.  But even though reputation and prizes 
are not the most important things, the many are right that decent people receive them 
both from people and from the gods. 
 
3.2 The Myth of Er (10.614b-621d) 
 The Myth of Er is rich, complex, and full of contradictions.  It is tempting to get 
lost in exegesis, but for the purposes of this chapter we will consider the myth only as it 
relates to character.  On my view, the Myth of Er, like the first half of Book 10, shifts the 
focus from the ‘perfectly just man’, thereby reassuring us that we do indeed have the 
potential to develop decent character. In addition, also consistent with the first half of 
Book 10, I will argue that the myth highlights the roles of deliberation and habituation 
within the overall process by which decent people develop their character and act 
virtuously.  As previously noted, these two claims are mutually reinforcing.  It is partly 
through deliberation that decent people develop their decent character and act justly.  
Equally, although the vast majority of people will not have the knowledge required to 
make use of the Form of the Good, deliberation is available to all people.  Because 
human beings can deliberate, they have the potential (via habituation) to develop 
decent characters and live lives which are sufficiently flourishing so as to be choice-
worthy. 
 On a literal reading, the myth describes the post-mortem judgement and reward 
of the immortal soul, followed by the choosing of a new life and incarnation.  Alongside 






commentators over the past two millennia.248  Interestingly, all of the commentators I 
have read discuss the same possible allegorical reading, namely:  
is Plato, through Socrates, asking us to truly believe in the transmigration of the 
soul and in the account of Er concerning the process of choice in the afterlife? Or 
rather, should we interpret the content of the myth simply as a symbolic way of 
calling to mind the life choices that we make here and now? The reincarnation of 
the soul, then, would simply represent through allegory the succession of our 
diverse ‘selves’ as they result from the choices that we make in the course of our 
immediate existence249 
 
But despite the fact that pointing to this reading as a possibility has become the norm, 
none of the commentators has fleshed out either the allegorical reading in great detail or 
its implications for how we understand the Republic’s picture of character. That the myth 
has a literal reading is inescapable.  That there is a possible allegorical interpretation 
that presents itself is evidenced by millennia of commentators. I will argue that the two 
are necessary, entwined, and support the thesis of this chapter and the claims set out at 
the beginning of this section.  I will consider the two readings in turn, starting with the 
literal reading. 
 
3.2.1 The Literal Reading of the Myth of Er (10.614b-621d) 
 One important initial question concerns the setting of the myth.  In section 1.3 of 
this chapter, I argued that Book 1 of the Republic is presented as a dialogue among 
actual historical people in Athens.  I subsequently claimed that although much of Books 
2-9 takes place in cities constructed in speech, Book 10 returns to a setting where the 
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discussion is about ‘real’ people in an apparently ‘real’ city.  But even if this is true for 
Book 10 up to this point, is the same true for the Myth of Er?  In an odd way, I would 
suggest that the answer is yes, certainly on the allegorical reading, but even on the 
literal reading as well.  Although Er may be a ‘made up’ character, just as Leontius and 
Odysseus may have been, in Socrates’ story he is not presented that way.  Just as 
Glaucon, Solon, and Damon are presented in the text as real people (living or dead), so 
too are the souls described by Er.  The Philosopher-King, the timocrat, the auxiliary, the 
simple person living in the city of pigs are all presented as being constructed in words 
by Socrates, inhabiting cities he explicitly constructs in words.  By contrast, at the 
surface level of the text in Er’s story, we have descriptions of apparently real souls 
(albeit in between embodied lives and often presented very much as embodied people).  
Thus, on my view, like the rest of Book 10, the myth can be construed as contributing to 
our understanding of the nature of souls and characters of people. 
 The other important note about the setting of the Myth of Er regards the odd 
temporality that we must constantly keep in mind when interpreting it.  Souls (on the 
literal reading of the lead-up to the myth and the myth itself) are eternal.  Souls “that live 
for a day”, as Lachesis puts it at 10.617d, exist on a never-ending cycle of a ‘short’ 
embodied life (as if living for just a day) followed by 1000 years of punishment or 
reward, followed by another short embodied life, and so on, eternally.  Thus, when we 
consider Er’s account of the sights he saw at the specific moment described, we must 
always remember that he is describing souls that have lived countless embodied lives 
before that moment, and will live countless embodied lives after that moment.  






responsibility for choosing our next lives, but if we do not focus on it we lose some of 
the important points yet to come, for example the implications of ‘the exchange of good 
lives for bad’. 
 Building on that, let me offer a slightly more detailed (but still extremely spare) 
sketch of the main steps of the process (on the literal reading).  Essentially there are 
eight main steps:  1) Embodied souls live a life and then die.  Their souls then 2) get 
judged by the gods, 3) get rewarded or punished for 1000 years for the life they just 
lived, 4) gaze upon the universe itself, 5) receive a ‘lot’ which dictates the order in which 
they will choose their next lives, 6) deliberate (more or less) about which life-paradigm 
to choose, 7) choose their next lives, and then 8) drink from the waters of Lethe, 
causing them to forget what has happened to them up to the moment of drinking.  The 
process then repeats over and over, eternally.  (Note that because of the eternal cyclical 
nature of a soul’s existence, it is arbitrary as to which step we take to be the ‘first’.  Er’s 
account actually begins with step 2.  I began with step 1, because in step 2 they are 
being judged based on the life they had just lived.)  As a baseline, I include a graphical 
representation of this process below.  This representation will also be useful 
subsequently, to see how the allegorical reading maps onto the literal reading:250 
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 Er’s story begins with step 2, the description of the post-mortem judgment of 
souls, followed by the associated rewards and punishments (10.614a-616a).  Each soul 
is judged, after which those judged to be just (δικαίους 10.614c) were commanded to go 
upward and to the right to the heavens, with the signs of their judgement attached to 
their chests.  There they enjoy 1000 years of delight in reward for their justice.  But 
those judged to be unjust (ἀδίκους) were commanded to go down and to the left with 
the signs of their unjust deeds attached to their backs, to suffer 1000 years of 
punishment.  At the same time, from two other openings, some souls were coming up or 
down from their 1000 years of punishment or reward.  In terms of those coming down, 
Er says:  
and from the remaining chasm other souls were coming down from the sky in a 
state of purity.  The souls that were constantly (ἀεί) arriving seemed to have 
come from a long journey, and they went off happily to the meadow to encamp 
there as if at a festival.  Souls which knew each other exchanged 
greetings…They told their tales to each other, the one group wailing and 
weeping…but the souls from the sky in turn explaining their happy experiences 
(10.614d-615a Halliwell, italics mine). 
 
On my reading this passage provides one piece of support for the claim that we have a 
good chance of developing decent character.  The sense of the passage is that both 
coming up from below, and (more relevantly) coming down from above, we have a 
throng of people.  They were ‘constantly’ arriving; some knew each other and some 
didn’t; and there were enough of them to encamp ‘as if at a festival’.  What this means is 
that 1000 years before the point in time that Er is observing, a great throng of people 
were judged to be just enough to be sent to the heavens.  Not one or two people of 
perfect virtue, but rather lots of decent people (like the ‘decent people in the theater’ 






myth described above, it seems likely that just as lots of people were judged as 
sufficiently good to be sent to the heavens 1000 years before Er’s observation, the 
same was true from the cohort that died 999 years and 364 days before, 999 years and 
363 days before, etc.  (This hypothesis will be supported by the ‘even exchange of good 
lives for bad’, which will be discussed subsequently.)  Thus, it seems that this passage 
suggests that on any given day, the cohort that dies that day contains lots of decent 
people as well as lots of people of bad character.251  In the same manner, among those 
alive at any point (say in Athens), we are likely to find many people of both reasonably 
good and bad character.  This fact should give Glaucon and Adeimantus (as well as 
many readers) confidence that despite lacking the knowledge which would allow them 
to use the Form of the Good in decision making, they may still develop a character 
which will be decent and will be judged as such by the gods.  
 The eschatological passage discussed above (comprising steps 2 and 3) is 
followed by (step 4) a complex cosmological vision (10.616b-617c) which I will not 
consider, since it does not contribute to the issue at hand.  Following that, though, 
comes the third and final section (10.617d-621b) of the myth (steps 5-8) which 
describes the process of choosing a new life and being incarnated into that life.  This 
section does contribute to our understanding of character. First, I will sketch the steps in 
the life-choosing process in slightly more detail.   
 The process of choosing a life, on a literal reading of the myth, begins with all of 
the souls together, arrayed in ranks.  Each soul gets a ‘lot’.  A great many ‘life-
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paradigms’ (βίων παραδείγματα 10.617d) are arrayed before the souls. Then, in the 
order determined by their lots, each soul deliberates (to a greater or lesser extent) about 
which life-paradigm to choose, and then chooses one of them.  The choices are sealed 
by the Fates, and then each soul drinks from the river Heedless.  The drink causes each 
soul to forget what has come before, up to the point of drinking.  Thus, on the literal 
reading, the myth presents us with an odd temporal perspective.  The souls, under the 
influence of both their last lives and the associated reward or punishment, select their 
next life by considering the events in the life-paradigm (events that have not yet 
happened but will ultimately happen in that next life).  As we will see, both the prior life 
(especially the training they received) and the reward/punishment are key factors in how 
well the souls choose.   
 There are many features of this long description of souls picking their next lives 
that bear discussion, but I want to focus on a few passages in particular.  One such 
passage is when the Priest assures the people that the ‘lots’ do matter, but are not fully 
determinative of one’s chance of a virtuous character in one’s next life: 
Even for him who comes forward last, if he make his choice wisely and live 
strenuously, there is reserved an acceptable life (βίος ἀγαπητός), no evil (κακός) 
one. Let not the foremost in the choice be heedless nor the last be discouraged. 
(10.619b) 
 
This seems quite optimistic.  Even for the soul that chooses last ‘an acceptable (βίος 
ἀγαπητός), not evil life is available’. Precisely how to take βίος ἀγαπητός is unclear, as 
evidenced by the fact that each translator I consulted has a different translation.252  
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What seems clear, though, is that the available lives are not limited to ‘perfectly virtuous 
or else vicious’. There are many desirable lives, some more virtuous and some less, but 
each contrasted with the life that is evil.  All of the choosers, this passage seems to say, 
will have a reasonable chance of having a next life which is somewhat virtuous.   
A second passage to focus on begins at 10.619b, immediately following the 
Priest’s assurance that ‘a satisfactory life is available to all’.  
the man who had drawn the first lot came forward and immediately chose the 
greatest tyranny, and, due to folly and gluttony, chose without having considered 
everything adequately; and it escaped his notice that eating his own children and 
other evils were fated to be a part of that life. When he considered it at his 
leisure, he beat his breast and lamented the choice, not abiding by the 
spokesman’s forewarning. For he didn’t blame himself for the evils but chance, 
demons, and anything rather than himself. He was one of those who had come 
from heaven, having lived in an orderly regime (τεταγμένῃ πολιτείᾳ) in his former 
life, participating in virtue by habit, without philosophy. And, it may be said, not 
the least number of those who were caught in such circumstances came from 
heaven, because they were unpracticed in labors. But most of those who came 
from the earth, because they themselves had labored and had seen the labors of 
others, weren’t in a rush to make their choices. On just this account, and due to 
the chance of the lot, there was an exchange of evils and goods for most of the 
souls.  However, if a man, when he comes to the life here, always philosophizes 
in a healthy way and the lot for his choice does not fall out among the last, it’s 
likely, on the basis of what is reported from there, that he will not only be happy 
here but also that he will journey from this world to the other and back again not 
by the underground, rough road but by the smooth one, through the heavens.  
He said that this was a sight surely worth seeing: (10.619b-d B, italics mine)253 
 
The first to choose was a soul who 1000 years before had been sent to the heavens for 
reward, since he had been judged to be a decent person.   He hadn’t been a man of 
perfect justice, simply a person who had “lived in an orderly regime, participating in 
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virtue by habit, without philosophy”, as quoted above.  This is a very different picture 
from the one at 5.449a, where Socrates says that he calls the Kallipolis a “good and 
right” (ὀρθὴν καλῶ) city, along with the corresponding type of person, but the others he 
describes as “bad and mistaken”.  This man whose soul was the first to choose did not 
live in a city of the supposed excellence of a Kallipolis.  A ‘city which is orderly’ 
(τεταγμένῃ πολιτείᾳ) is quite different from a city which is ‘good and right’ (ὀρθὴν καλῶ).  
Nevertheless, his city was not described as ‘bad or mistaken’; simply ‘orderly’.  
Similarly, the man was not a man of perfect virtue, but he was not ‘bad or mistaken’.  He 
simply participated in virtue by habit.  It appears that he was a decent person who 
followed the laws and norms of a decent city.  As Halliwell puts it, he had “a degree of 
virtue…this soul in some measure had been just; it could not otherwise have been sent 
up to the sky by the judges”.254   
Now this soul is not going to have a good next life.  The 1000 years of reward 
have made him careless and the lack of training in philosophical rigor that characterized 
his last life—the careless way he practiced decency—will also contribute to his hasty 
choice.  Nevertheless, despite the fact that his choice is about to be bad, the myth here 
gives us confidence that in the real world, there are ordinary decent people who live 
reasonably good lives and are judged favorably after their deaths. 
 A second important point in the passage above is that “there was an exchange of 
evils and goods for most of the souls” (10.619d).  The exception was a person who, 
when embodied, “always lived a sound life of philosophy” (10.619d-e H) and whose lot 
                                            
 
 






was not among the last.  First, given the context of selecting next lives, “an exchange of 
evils and goods” must mean an exchange of evil prior lives for good next lives and vice 
versa.  Second, we must consider who is making this assertion.  Now Socrates narrates 
the Myth of Er, sometimes interjecting his own comments.  It is usually clear whether 
Socrates is retelling what Er said or interjecting his own comments, but is difficult to 
determine just who is asserting that ‘there was an exchange of good lives for bad for 
most souls’.  In this case, as Halliwell correctly points out, it is Socrates who asserts, 
based on Er’s account of what he saw, that the souls who were choosing usually went 
from a prior good life to a future bad life, and vice versa.255  The fact that Socrates is 
here interpreting Er’s account for Glaucon’s benefit seems to indicate that we should 
take this statement seriously.  And if we do, the mathematical implications seem 
inescapable.  If in this life about half the people are reasonably good and the other half 
                                            
 
 
255 Halliwell (2007, 465) points to “the change of syntax from indirect to direct speech conveying a 
confident change of voice from reporter to exegete of the myth.”  Indirect speech, though, is not the only 
evidence.  Just before this passage Socrates says: 
 
The messenger from the other world reported that on that occasion the priest said as follows: 
‘Even for the person who comes up last, there is, if he chooses with intelligence and lives 
earnestly, a desirable life free from evil.  Let not the first to choose be heedless, nor the last be 
despairing’.  After these words Er said… (10.619b H)  
 
Now the “messenger from the other world”, at the start of the above quote, must be Er, but it should be 
noted that “Er said”, at the close of the quote, is Halliwell’s interpretation of “he said”.  Nevertheless, it 
seems to me that Halliwell has rendered it correctly.  Socrates narrates Er’s report, which embeds a quote 
from the Priest, and then returns to Er’s report of the ‘first to choose’.  But although it seems clear that Er 
is reporting what he saw when the ‘first to choose’ chose, when we look back to the italicized bits in the 
quote in the body of this text (10.619b-d), it seems clear from the context that Socrates is narrating Er’s 
report until the words “weren’t in a rush to make their choices” (οὐκ ἐξ ἐπιδρομῆς τὰς αἱρέσεις ποιεῖσθαι. 
619d5).  The following phrase, “And, it may be said”, begins Socrates’ interjection, which he makes “on 
the basis of what is reported from there”.  Socrates’ interjection ends with the phrase “through the 
heavens.” (τε καὶ οὐρανίαν 619e5).  Socrates then resumes narrating Er’s report with the words that 








bad, then in the next life the same will be true.  Even if we take it that (say) sixty percent 
of the people around us are bad people, then in the next life sixty percent of the people 
will be reasonably good people.  Ultimately the assertion of the exchange between good 
lives and bad supports the idea that in the real world, many people have the potential to 
develop reasonably good character; and in fact do develop reasonably good character. 
 Here, one apparent conflict needs to be discussed. Socrates says that mostly 
there was an exchange of good lives for bad, as discussed above.  This means that one 
who led a life of even modest virtue (like the first to choose) will generally choose a next 
life leading to vice.  In the very next paragraph (as Halliwell divides the paragraphs), Er 
says: “They chose in most cases according to the habits formed in their previous 
existence.” (10.620a H).  This might seem to imply the opposite, namely, that if in the 
prior life somebody had habituated themselves to virtue, they would mostly choose a 
virtuous next life.  Now perhaps this is simply one of the contradictions that are rife in 
the Myth of Er.  But perhaps the language employed here can suggest a speculative 
reconciliation of the two statements.  Note that the word that Halliwell and Shorey 
translate as ‘habits’ is not ἔθος, which was the description of the first to choose who 
‘participated in virtue by habit’.  Neither is the word ῆ̓θος, τρόπος, φύσις, κατασκευή, or 
any of the other character-related words discussed in Chapter 2.  The word is rather 
συνήθειαν, a word which appears only two other times in the Republic, namely at 
7.516a and 7.517a.  Both of those two are in the context of the metaphor of the cave, 
and in neither case is the soul the subject of discussion.  In both cases the word is used 
to refer to the amount of light to which the person is habitually accustomed. It is true that 






here is closer to the primary meaning cited by LSJ, namely “habitual intercourse, 
acquaintance, intimacy”.256  Sachs seems to endorse this notion with his translation: 
“Mostly, they chose according to what they were accustomed to in their previous life.”  
On this reading it was the habitual acquaintance with women that drove Orpheus to 
choose the life of a swan and with music that drove Thamyras to choose the life of a 
songbird.257  The same was the case with the last to choose.  Odysseus’ habitual 
acquaintance with a life of honor drove him to seek the life of a private man.  Thus, 
perhaps both claims are true.  Perhaps Socrates is right in deducing that for the most 
part there was an exchange between good lives and bad, because 1000 years of 
reward or punishment significantly affect the soul that is choosing, the former making 
the soul sloppy and the latter making the soul careful.  Within that, though, Er reports 
that in general the souls chose according to the people or things with which they had 
been habitually acquainted in their prior lives.   
Most of the impact on how the souls chose came from the punishment or reward 
that made them careful or sloppy respectively.  Still, to a lesser extent, the souls’ past 
lives also contributed to their deliberation and choice.  Socrates seems to endorse this 
when he makes his exception to the exchange of good lives for bad at 10.619e: 
if, whenever he reached life in this world, a person always lived a sound life of 
philosophy, and if his choice of life did fall by lot among the last, surely, to judge 
                                            
 
 
256 As LSJ points out, this is the sense used by Aristotle in the Politics at 1319b26. 
257 Of course, we don’t know whether Orpheus was coming down from the heavens or up from Hades 
when he made this choice, nor do we know whether the swan-life he chose would turn out to be a 
virtuous swan life or a vicious swan life, if such a thing is even possible.  Similarly, in the next sentence Er 
reports that he saw a swan choosing the life of a human.  We don’t know the same two facts about this 
swan that we don’t know about Orpheus.  The entire matter of animal lives (and the associated 
virtue/vice, punishment/reward, etc.) is left unexplained in the Myth.  Thus we have no reason to think that 
Orpheus and Thamyras did not choose according to Socrates’ claim that in most cases there was an 






by what is reported from the other world, he would not only be happy in this life, 
but would also have a journey from here to there and from there back to here, 
which would not be subterranean and rough, but smooth and heavenly (10.619e 
Halliwell). 
 
This passage is difficult to interpret, and translations differ widely, but it does seem that 
Socrates is saying that always philosophizing soundly in embodied life is a prerequisite 
to consistently choosing good lives.  Now most people (both the bad people who had 
been sent to Hades and the decent people who had been sent to the heavens) will not 
have been among the rare few who are named in this exception.  Most will not have 
lived a prior life of healthy philosophizing.  And most, in their past lives, will not have 
found a teacher who can teach them how to choose well (as described at 10.618c).   
Overall, then, on the literal reading, both the prior life and the postmortem 
punishment or reward contribute to the soul’s deliberation and choice of a next life.  The 
punishment or reward is the major factor, making the soul careful or sloppy in 
deliberating and choosing.  For a rare few, their prior philosophical lives will have made 
them able to overcome being sloppy.  For most people, though, the prior life will still 
have some effect.  Both the sloppy deliberator and the careful deliberator will mostly 
choose lives associated with that which had been familiar to them in their prior lives. 
 Now there is another point needing clarification when considering the various 
passages cited above.  At 10.619b, the Priest says only that the lots determine the 
order of choosing.  Indeed, he stresses that there are good lives available even to the 
last to choose.  Socrates, though, seems to emphasize the importance of the lots. At 
10.619e, quoted in the paragraph above, he says that the exception to the exchange 
comes when somebody always philosophizes healthily in life, and his lot does not fall 






in line has a satisfactory life available.  Perhaps the two are not in conflict because the 
Priest is addressing the souls as a group and Socrates is discussing the specific and 
rare case of the philosopher.  As we saw in the passage about the first to choose 
(10.619b-d), a satisfactory life had been sufficient for him to have been judged as good 
and sent to the heavens. Perhaps Socrates is simply saying that to reach the consistent 
happiness of a philosopher, a ‘satisfactory’ life is not enough.  In this case, the lot does 
matter.  In the exceptional case of a philosopher, given a reasonable lot each time, he 
can always choose an outstanding life, thus living a succession of virtuous and 
flourishing lives.  For most people, though, even if one life is satisfactorily virtuous, it is 
quite likely that the next life will not be.  
There is one more point that emerges from the passage about ‘the first to 
choose’.  The first to choose chose badly because of “folly and gluttony” and he “chose 
without having considered everything adequately”.  Just as in the first half of Book 10, 
Plato highlights the importance of deliberating and following the results of one’s 
deliberation.  Others among the named choices (10.620a-b) illustrate the same point.  
The soul that had once been Orpheus and the soul that had once been Agamemnon 
both chose out of hatred rather than deliberation.  The soul that had been Atalanta 
chose out of a passion for honor. Contrast this with the soul that had been Odysseus in 
its past life (10.620c-d).  This soul remembered its past toils, and searched diligently for 
a private life.  Clearly the example of a good chooser, this soul also seems to exemplify 
the impact of deliberation on choosing a good life that will lead to the development of 
reasonably good character.   






the myth (which I set out in slightly condensed form): 
Always to choose the better life in the available circumstances: that is, by 
calculating (ἀναλογιζόμενον) the relevance to a virtuous life of the combination 
and separation of all the things mentioned just now, to know what effect of good 
or evil is produced by the mixture of beauty with poverty or wealth…so that a 
man is able, on the basis of all these factors, and with his eye on the nature of 
the soul, to calculate (συλλογισάμενον) and make his choice (10.618c-e H) 
 
In other words, when faced with this choice, we must use our calculative powers to 
deliberate on the combination of factors in each life-paradigm.  We can then choose the 
best possible next life.  Now this passage will be very relevant in the next section when 
we turn to the allegorical reading, but even here, the importance of deliberation in 
creating reasonably good character (here, choosing a reasonably good life) is stressed. 
 One critical issue in interpreting the Myth of Er concerns the nature of the life-
paradigms.  What was contained in or revealed by the life-paradigms?  Clearly things 
external to the soul were, for example, wealth, poverty, beauty, strength, sickness, etc. 
But were things internal to the soul (e.g. character traits, overall virtue) also included?  
This is a complex and vexed issue and is critical for interpreting the myth, which is why 
commentators have spent much time over it. Either view is consistent with my claim that 
the literal reading of the Myth of Er supports confidence in our ability to develop a 
decent character.258   
 In conclusion, on my view, the literal reading of the myth gives us confidence that 
we have a reasonable chance to develop decent (even if not completely good) 
                                            
 
 
258 I have argued this point in a different paper, suggesting that even on the literal reading, a life-paradigm 
containing the externals of a life is chosen, but one’s character (either more virtuous or more vicious) is 








character.  Although many passages in the myth support this claim, three stand out in 
particular.  First, many people get judged to be good and go up to the heavens.  
Second, those people (like the first to choose) were not ideally good people, rather they 
were simply decent people.  Third, the exchange of bad and good lives assures us that 
there will be lots of decent people on the next cycle as well.  In choosing their next life, 
many people choose a good next life which will lead to (or at least can lead to) the 
development of reasonably good character.   
In addition, the myth highlights deliberation, which is available to nearly all of us, 
as a key factor in developing decent character.  Many commentators take the endless 
cycle of lives, the description of the choosing, the exchange of good lives for bad, etc. to 
be a pessimistic view.  For example Lear says “Thus while there may be grounds for 
pessimism, there can never be grounds for despair”. 259  McPherran goes farther and 
thinks that despair might indeed be in order.260  Lear and McPherran might well be right, 
given their focus on tracking an eternal soul through its never-ending series of lives.  
 When taken in this light, I regard the myth as pessimistic but exhortatory. For 
most souls the exchange of good lives for bad paints a depressing picture.  Even if the 
soul is decent during its life, it will be likely to choose badly the next time around and 
lead a life which is relatively lacking in virtue.  But it is exhortatory in that Socrates tells 
us how to avoid that fate.  First you must find a teacher who can impart the necessary 
wisdom.  Then, you must practice philosophy in a healthy way during your life, training 
yourself with respect to both content and process.  With respect to content, you train 
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yourself to be ready to analyze the life tokens and determine which will be a good life.  
More importantly, with respect to process, you train yourself (during your life) to bring 
reason and deliberation into each choice you make.  If you do, then even 1000 years of 
delight will not make you into a careless chooser.  Now most people will not succeed in 
finding a teacher who will teach us this, and even those who do will not be able to 
succeed in following through and practicing philosophy in a healthy way during their 
lives.  Socrates tells us that the philosophers are the few not the many.  So in this sense 
the myth is pessimistic for most, but exhortatory to the few who can succeed. 
But my focus is on the embodied lives of people in general, and on the prospects 
for those lives to be ones of decent character.  With this focus, on my view, the literal 
reading of the myth is highly optimistic and exhortatory.  One has good reason to be 
pessimistic about one’s chances of developing the perfect virtue described by the end of 
Book 7.  But the myth, on the literal reading, displays clearly that a great many people 
develop a sufficiently decent character to be judged favorably by the gods.  The myth 
reinforces the message of the earlier section of Book 10, namely that if we strive to 
bring deliberation to bear in all of our choices, many of us have a reasonable chance to 
choose well, develop a decent character, and live a reasonably flourishing life.  Thus, 
from the perspective of (say) Glaucon, the life his soul had in its last embodiment is of 
little concern to him.  The fact that many decent people will exist around him as he 
matures should make him optimistic that if he deliberates about virtue when making 
choices, and chooses according to his best reasoning, then he can develop into a 






allegorical reading of the myth is also optimistic about our chances for leading a 
reasonably flourishing life. 
 
3.2.2 The ‘Allegorical’ Reading of the Myth of Er (10.614b-621d) 
 The idea of reading the myth allegorically is certainly not original to me.  Indeed, 
it dates at least as far back as the Middle Platonist Alcinous, 2000 years ago. 261  
According to Bobzien, the view offered by Alcinous  
is very much a reinterpretation of Plato.  Plato’s formerly “pre-natal” choice of a 
life is presented as including the choice of individual actions in one's life, and it 
has become depending on the soul whether or not to act.262   
 
But where Bobzien sees Alcinous as reinterpreting Plato, many commentators point to 
the allegorical reading as a reasonable way to interpret Plato’s intent in recounting the 
Myth of Er.263   As noted previously, all of the commentators that I have read have the 
same basic view of the nature of the allegory, although none of them have fleshed it out 
in detail.  Further, none of them suggests that the allegorical reading should replace the 
literal reading; they simply suggest that the allegorical reading should be considered 
alongside a literal reading.  Thus, alongside the literal reading which depicts an 
immortal soul choosing successive lives in its ’lifetime’ (which consists of an infinite 
number of lives), the myth allegorically depicts one person choosing successive actions 
during the course of a single lifetime (which consists of a very large number of actions 
limited only by the finitude of one’s lifetime).  Among modern commentators, Annas, 
                                            
 
 
261 See Dillon’s translation of Alcinous (1995, 34-35). 
262 Bobzien (1998, 161).  See, relatedly, Gill (2006, 185). 






Thayer, Halliwell, Johnson, Gonzales, Destrèe, McPherran, Larivée, and others have 
noted this reading.264  Halliwell, on my view, sums up the allegorical reading accurately 
and succinctly.  The myth, on the allegorical reading, displays the 
inescapably self-forming consequences of ethical agency, a magnified image of 
how at every moment (“always and everywhere”) the individual soul/person is 
intrinsically responsible for what matters most about its existence.  Every action, 
we might thus say, brings with it its own “afterlife.” Every choice makes us what 
we are; when we choose, we activate (and become) something, and therefore 
cannot simply pull back from ourselves265  
 
 In other words, the allegorical reading of the myth is a picture of that part of 
character formation that comes by means of habituation.  It is not surprising that so 
many commentators have drifted to this reading.  First, the fact of character formation 
via habituation has been woven throughout the text of the Republic.  Further, as I have 
tried to argue, it is especially prevalent in Book 10.  Therefore, it should be very much 
on our minds as we come to the close of the dialogue.  Second, many of the myth’s 
contradictions and confusions melt away on the allegorical reading.  There are too many 
instances to list, but I will give a few examples.   
What soul would ever choose the life of a slave in an iron mine?   We know that 
there were a lot of slaves toiling in iron mines, so on the literal reading of the myth, 1000 
years previously all of those souls chose the life of a slave toiling in an iron mine.  Now 
perhaps some of those souls simply chose carelessly, but it seems unlikely that many, 
                                            
 
 
264 See Annas (1981), Thayer (1988, 377ff esp. 380), Halliwell (1988, 186) and (2007, 469-470), Johnson 
(1999,2), Gonzales (2012, 273), Destrèe (2012, 121), McPherran (2010, 143), and Larivée (2012, 246-
248, who argues against the allegorical reading). 
 






much less all of them, missed the salient factor.  On the allegorical reading there is no 
problem here.  Even slaves have action choices, and those choices express and 
develop their characters.  Consider, for example, the Biblical story of Joseph who was a 
slave in the house of Potiphar and had to choose whether or not to accept Potiphar’s 
wife’s offer “Come to bed with me!”266 
Or consider Er’s strange comment in describing the judgement and 
reward/punishment of the souls: some things were “not worthy of record”, such as the 
fate of “those who had just been born and lived but a short time” (10.615c).  Certainly in 
Christian eschatology the status of these souls was of paramount importance.  In any 
eschatology, though, one would think that this subject would be very much worth 
recounting, as it would shed considerable light on how the gods viewed judgment, 
reward, etc.  On the allegorical reading, though, the comment makes perfect sense.  An 
infant that lives only a very short time has few if any choices to make, and is not a good 
example of how character develops over the course of a lifetime. 
As a final example, consider that the souls in Er’s story certainly do not resemble 
Glaucus stripped of his encrustations.  First, they are depicted as practically being 
embodied. They have hands and feet that can be bound (10.616a), they can wear signs 
(10.614c), they can talk and listen, walk and drink, etc.  Further, they have all sorts of 
appetites and passions. Plato moves back and forth between calling them souls and 
calling them persons (e.g. 10.617d-e, 620d-e, 621a).267  The allegorical reading has the 
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advantage of avoiding the need to imagine a disembodied soul which is appetitive, 
passionate, and seemingly somewhat embodied. 
Before delving into the allegorical reading, it is worth pausing over Socrates’ odd 
comment that the most critical thing is to “discover the man who will give him the ability 
and the knowledge to distinguish the life that is good from that which is bad” (10.618c, 
italics mine).  On the literal reading, the teaching received from this teacher must have 
occurred during the prior embodiment of the soul, but the choosing of the next life 
occurs after 1000 years of punishment or reward.  On the allegorical reading, no such 
temporal gap exists.  Our teachers are teaching us during our lives, in close temporal 
proximity to our choice-making activities.  Indeed, Socrates’ long speech here, on my 
view, both confirms the literal reading and motivates the allegorical reading.  Socrates 
interrupts his own retelling of Er’s report to discuss how a person should act during life 
and after life.  Although the narration has gone back and forth between the language of 
souls and persons, in this passage Socrates names the subject to be a person 
(ἀνθρώπῳ). Socrates must be talking about what people should be doing during the life 
that preceded or will succeed the after-death moment that Er is describing.  During that 
life, one should abandon all studies except those which can help that person find a good 
teacher.  The good teacher, as previously noted, will teach the student how to 
distinguish the good life from the bad life.  In addition, though, Socrates says that with 
that knowledge, one, during life, must endeavor  
always and everywhere to choose the best that the conditions allow, and, taking 
into account all the things of which we have spoken and estimating the effect on 
the goodness of his life … so that with consideration of all these things he will be 
able to make a reasoned choice between the better and the worse life, with his 






make it more unjust and the better that which will make it more just. (10.618c-e 
italics mine)  
  
Socrates tells Glaucon and Adeimantus (and Plato tells the reader) to deliberate 
(think over all the things we have mentioned and how they jointly and severally 
determine what the virtuous life is like) and also tells us what to aim at: we should 
choose that which will tend to make [the soul] become more just.  This, he tells us, is 
the best way to choose, whether “in life or death (10.619a B). We should choose well, 
“in this life, so far as is possible, and in all of the next life. For in this way a human being 
becomes happiest.” (10.619a-b B) 
Plato has Socrates blend the literal and allegorical reading.  He is endorsing the 
literal reading in telling us how to best choose our next life.  He suggests that between 
lives, we choose a life-paradigm using the education we got during the past life.  In the 
best case, we now have a clear goal (choose a just life) and a process for choosing 
(consider all the aspects).  At the same time, he is endorsing the allegorical reading.  He 
is telling us how we must recognize choice-worthy goals, external circumstances, and 
choose actions in such a way as to best develop a decent character.  During a life, we 
cannot “choose a character” in a single moment.  We cannot wake up one morning and 
choose to have a disposition to act courageously.  We can build up courage by 
choosing to be courageous one choice at a time.  Over time a courageous character is 
formed.  This is what it means to ‘choose the good life during a life’; to choose the good 
actions which will build good character traits.  Thus the literal and the allegorical come 
together.  Building a decent character both builds a decent life during life, but also 






In order to focus on the allegorical reading, let me bring back the diagram of the 
literal reading (which I will often shorten to LR), with the allegorical reading (which I will 
often shorten to AR) laid alongside:268 
 
As noted, at the highest level of abstraction, the two diagrams match up very 
well.  A countless series of life choices in eternity is paralleled by a countless series of 
action choices in a single life.  But it is worth digging a little deeper, to see how the 
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the argument unfolds.  Thus some of the titles might be initially obscure (e.g. how does ‘External Factors’ 






steps match up at a more detailed level.  The souls (LR) begin by receiving a ‘lot' which 
determines the order in which they will select a life-paradigm.  The lot clearly represents 
an element of luck and, as Halliwell puts it, “all the external circumstances over which a 
person has no control”.269  On the allegorical reading, the lot represents just the same 
thing.  Imagine I am at a dinner party, and am offered a fourth glass of wine.  I might 
end up refusing it because I think it would be intemperate to drink a fourth glass.  But 
perhaps (although I would have accepted a fourth glass of white wine) they have just 
run out of white wine, so I am only being offered red wine, which often gives me a 
headache.  The external circumstance of them running out of white wine may influence 
my deliberation about the action to be chosen. 
Here we need to pause to consider just what are the life-paradigms (βίων 
παραδείγματα 10.617d).  As noted in the last chapter, we don’t get much help from the 
context of who is uttering the word βίος.270  But the text is pretty clear.  Many ‘externals’ 
are mentioned (poverty, exile, beggary, reputation, [10.618a] wealth, sickness, health 
[10.618b], etc.)  Indeed, Er reports that “There was no determination of the quality of 
soul, because the choice of a different life inevitably determined a different character. 
But all other things were” (10.618b, italics mine).  This statement needs to be 
interpreted in conjunction with the prior statement that “virtue has no master over her 
and each shall have more or less of her as he honors her or does her despite” 
                                            
 
 
269 Halliwell (2007, 466). 
270 As argued in Chapter 2, Socrates consistently uses the word to indicate the ‘internals’ of a life 
(character traits internal to the soul) whereas interlocutors consistently use the word to indicate the 
‘externals’ of a life (e.g. wealth, beauty, success in marriage, etc.)  Here the speakers are Er and the 






(10.617e).  Also connected is the Priest’s comment that a satisfactory life is available to 
all “provided that he chooses it rationally and lives it seriously” (10.619b italics mine).  
Now these statements are critical, but are open to multiple interpretations.  Clearly, on 
the literal reading, the life-paradigms contain the external events and attributes of a life, 
but not the character of the person.  But it is unclear as to whether each person will 
have more or less virtue depending on the life-paradigm that he or she chooses (i.e. the 
set of external events in the life-paradigm is sufficiently exhaustive that the degree of 
virtue is predetermined, so to include the character as well would be redundant), or, 
rather, that the external events in the life-paradigm have some influence on the 
outcome, but ultimately, each person will have more or less virtue depending on how he 
or she lives the life that is chosen.  Some commentators (e.g. Annas) argue the former 
view, while others (e.g. Inwood) argue the latter view.271  As noted earlier, although I 
have a view as to which interpretation is superior on the literal reading, it doesn’t need 
to be argued in this chapter to support the claims I have made.   
On the allegorical reading, though, the answer is clear.  With very few (if any) 
exceptions, character traits are not formed by a single choice.  One excessive fourth 
glass of wine does not develop the trait of intemperate drinking; rather that trait gets 
formed by making such choices repeatedly over a period of time.  Although the souls in 
the LR have a good view into the externals contained in the life-paradigm, the character 
that will result needs to be deduced (as explained at length by Socrates at 10.618b-
619a).  Similarly, when we are faced with a choice as to whether or not to accept a 
                                            
 
 






fourth glass of wine, we have a good view into the externals of that choice (how great is 
my typical capacity for alcohol, how much is it customary to drink at a party of the type I 
am attending, etc.) but we have very little insight into how formative that one choice will 
be on our overall character, or on the character trait of temperance.272 
Resuming, then, we have a set of external circumstances (lots) and alternative 
life-paradigms (options to choose from in the AR).  We then deliberate (whether to flee 
or stand fast at a particular point in a battle, or in this example, about whether or not to 
accept the fourth glass of wine). We may deliberate very little (like the first to choose in 
the LR) or at length (like Odysseus in the LR), but ultimately, we make our choice.  
Immediately following our choice (LR) we drink from the river Heedless (LR), forgetting 
what has come before.  The same happens in this life (AR).  We may deliberate over 
whether to accept or reject a glass of wine, but after making the choice, we tend to 
forget the preceding deliberation.  We simply do or do not have wine in our glass.   
We then live the life we have chosen (LR) or drink (or don’t drink) the wine (AR).  
On the LR the judgement comes immediately after death, is made by the gods, and is 
directly followed by reward or punishment, the reward being accompanied by much 
delight and the punishment being accompanied by much suffering.  (On the AR the 
judgment and reward/punishment is not quite the same, as will be discussed in the next 
paragraphs.)  And then the cycle repeats.  As the cycle repeats through the countless 
number of choices we make every day (much less in a lifetime), we begin to habituate 
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ourselves to certain types of choices in certain types of situations.  This is how 
character traits develop.   
But here we need to dig into the details, beginning by returning to the apparent 
conflict between a) ‘the exchange of evils for goods’ and b) the claim that ‘they chose in 
most cases according to the habits formed in their previous existence’ or ‘they chose 
according to what they were accustomed to in their previous life’.  The first matter to 
consider are two ways in which the allegorical and literal readings differ.   
First, on the literal reading, a) each life is accurately judged by the gods, b) the 
soul is rewarded or punished for 1000 years, and c) the soul feels that reward or 
punishment keenly.  This is not the case on the allegorical reading.  Sometimes an 
unjust action will be rewarded instead of punished (e.g. you go out with your friends and 
drink intemperately, but everybody thinks you are a wonderful companion, and you 
wake up with no hangover).  At other times an unjust action may go unpunished, or the 
punishment may go unnoticed. 273 
Second, on the literal reading, as previously argued, there are few exceptions to 
the exchange of good lives for bad.  A few might find the right teacher and then live a 
full life of healthy philosophy but most will not.  This is not the case on the allegorical 
reading.  The allegorical analogue to living a healthy life of philosophy is deliberating 
before making a choice, and this, I have argued, is something most of us are at least 
capable of doing.  Therefore, unlike the many whose 1000 year reward on the literal 
                                            
 
 
273 Ultimately there are always consequences, since unvirtuous acts damage our souls, but we may never 
be aware of that damage, or may be aware much later.  Similarly, acting virtuously benefits our soul, but 






reading mostly choose carelessly, many decent people, on the allegorical reading, can 
avoid the careless choice by deliberating. 
How, then, does the allegorical reading of the myth help us understand the 
manner in which a person develops a virtuous or vicious character trait?  We begin with 
Er’s report that in most cases ‘they chose according to what they were accustomed to’.  
This is what we would expect.  Somebody with a first nature or a developing disposition 
to (say) generosity will generally choose to be generous rather than ungenerous, and 
vice versa, reinforcing the disposition and eventually developing, by habituation, that 
character trait.  But then we come to Socrates’ glosses that add three important pieces 
to the puzzle, namely, a) deliberation is critical because if we deliberate well we tend to 
choose virtuously, b) that punishment tends to cause us to deliberate274, and c) that 
reward tends to make us careless in choosing and choosing carelessly without 
deliberation tends to cause us to choose poorly, but, importantly, that we do have the 
possibility to deliberate.  Applying these as we consider what happens when a person 
with a specific developing disposition acts in a specific manner and is rewarded, 
punished, or neither gives us a sense of how character traits build up over time. 
To play out how this set of assertions and circumstances would result in a person 
developing a virtuous or vicious character trait would require tracing through many 
examples.275  Overall, though, the results seem to be to match what we would intuit.  
                                            
 
 
274 Socrates has consistently described deliberation as critical and as leading to good choices (e.g. at 
10.604c-d, 10.618c-d.  Also, being punished for unvirtuous action is the best thing that can happen to 
somebody, as Socrates says in multiple places, e.g. at 2.380b. 
275 On my view, 20 main cases would need to be traced, 10 concerning an individual with a developing 
disposition toward a virtuous character trait and 10 concerning the opposite type.  For each, 5 cases 
would need to be considered for a just action and 5 for an unjust (those cases being, 1) punished, 2) 






Somebody (an ordinary person; not somebody completely corrupt) with a first nature or 
developing disposition for intemperance tends to choose intemperately and habituate 
toward developing that trait.  The exception is when they deliberate.  If they deliberate, 
they tend to move toward temperance.  On the other hand, somebody with a first nature 
or developing disposition for temperance tends to choose temperately and habituate 
toward developing that trait.  The exception is when they act intemperately, are 
rewarded for so acting, and do not bring deliberation to bear the next time around.   
Thus, as Halliwell and other commentators point out, the allegorical reading 
highlights the “inescapably self-forming consequences of ethical agency”.276  It 
highlights the process of habituation by which we form our own character.  The cyclical 
nature of the myth is particularly apt; my character influences my choices and my 
choices develop my character.277  But like the literal reading, the allegorical reading is 
optimistic about the possibility of developing decent character.  External factors and luck 
certainly play a role, but we have a countless number of choices to make and we are 
capable of deliberating and choosing well.  Over time, choosing well repeatedly in a 
particular area will develop a particular good character trait.  Somebody with many good 
character traits will likely be regarded as a decent person by those around her, like the 
‘decent people in the theater’.  Thus, on the LR we are judged by the gods, but on the 
AR we are judged by ourselves and those around us. 
                                            
 
 
nor punished with no subsequent deliberation, and 5) neither rewarded nor punished with subsequent 
deliberation. 
276 Halliwell op. cit., 469. 
277 This cyclical aspect of character partly driving choice and choice partly driving character may well have 







3.2.3 The Myth of Er: Conclusion 
 Halliwell’s annotated translation of Book 10 does a nice job of summing up the 
conundrum of the Myth of Er: 
It is difficult to see how the notion of pre-natal choice could be interpreted literally 
without undermining the whole ethical structure of the Rep.  Yet, equally, if the 
apparatus of reincarnation were taken as only allegorical of choice within life, 
what would become of the soul’s immortality-the great premise of the entire 
myth? (Halliwell, 1998, 186). 
 
If we read the myth literally, taking the notion of pre-natal choice seriously, then we 
have a lot of work to do to explain why Socrates is working so hard to persuade 
Glaucon and Adeimantus to pursue virtue.  But if we read the myth only as an allegory, 
then why does Socrates not simply argue the points he is making, rather than 
embedding them in an allegory wrapped in a myth?  The solution that many 
commentators have come to is to read the myth both literally and allegorically, taking 
away from each what it has to offer and also considering a blended reading.  On my 
view, the literal reading assures us that the perfect virtue described in Books 2-7 is not 
required for a life which is more flourishing than any life of vice.  The literal reading 
assures us that there are people of decent character who are recognized as decent, 
judged favorably, and are happy in this life and the afterlife.  It doesn’t, though, tell us 
much about how those people got to be decent.  The allegorical reading, though, does.  
The allegorical reading pushes us to think in detail about how deliberation and choice 
serve to develop the positive or negative character traits that we exhibit.  Taking the 
lots, life-paradigms, judgment, reward or punishment, and the other elements of the 






moment, we have the character we have developed up to that point, as well as a set of 
external forces over which we have no control.  When we make an action choice, we do 
so partly because of that character and those external forces, but at the same time, 
making that choice incrementally changes and further develops our character.   
  
3.3 Character in Book 10: Conclusion 
 Many commentators agree with Scott that: 
the task undertaken in the Republic as a whole, i.e. the defence of justice, 
which breaks down into the projects of first giving an account of justice 
and then demonstrating its value. This is what Socrates thinks is needed 
to reply to Glaucon’s challenge278  
 
I agree that these two projects are necessary, but on my view they are not sufficient.  
On my view, Socrates must also give the readers some hope that they can achieve a 
form of virtue that will provide value to them.  By the end of Book 9, the first two projects 
seem complete, which is perhaps why so many commentators call the Republic 
complete at that point, regarding Book 10 as an appendix or an afterthought.  But by the 
end of Book 9, on my reading, Socrates has described several versions of perfect virtue 
(first, in Book 4, psychic harmony led by reason and next, in Books 6-7, action informed 
by using the Form of the Good) and has defended the proposition that the perfectly 
virtuous life provides a more flourishing life than a vicious life, but has not yet fulfilled 
the third requirement.  The careful reader looks at the requirements needed to develop 
either of the two versions of perfect virtue and concludes that it is unlikely that she or 
                                            
 
 






her children will succeed in developing such a character.  Twice Socrates has hinted at 
some less than perfect virtue, but has said little about it.279 
 Book 10 provides the necessary reassurance that there are in fact decent people 
of less than perfect virtue and that those decent people can have sufficiently flourishing 
lives so as to be choice-worthy.  Both the first half of Book 10 and the second half of 
Book 10 emphasize the importance of deliberation and habituation in character 
formation. In the previous chapter we identified five critical factors that go into character 
development, namely, 1) breeding and first nature, 2) rearing, 3) early and adult 
education, 4) city of residence, and 5) habituation.  In practice, we have no control over 
our breeding and first nature and virtually no control over our rearing and early 
education.  Some people are lucky enough to have control over their city of residence 
(after childhood), but all of us have a significant degree of control over two things, 
namely adult education and ongoing habituation.  In Books 2-9, as Socrates described 
an ideal of virtue and four idealized forms of vice, the first four factors played a very 
significant role.  Outside of the Kallipolis, without its eugenics program, fine and well 
supervised nursemaids and parents, purified education, and excellent laws, it would be 
very difficult to develop the perfect virtue described.  Similarly, within (say) the four 
idealized vicious cities in speech, it might be very difficult to develop anything but one of 
the countless forms of vice.  In Book 10, though, the focus is on those two items that are 
very much under our control; we hear virtually nothing about the first four factors.280  
                                            
 
 
279 At 5.472b-473b, and at 9.592a-b, as discussed in the previous chapter. 
280 The exception, of course, being the comment that the ‘first to choose’ had lived in a well ordered polity.  






The first half of Book 10 focuses on the corruption of character and good judgement 
caused by adult education (e.g. as it takes place in the theater) and the Myth of Er 
focuses on deliberation and then choice, which is the process by which habituation 
proceeds.  Thus the allegorical reading of the Myth of Er supports the literal reading in 
giving us confidence that we can develop decent character and thereby live a flourishing 
life.  We cannot control our genetics, and have little control over our rearing, early 
education, or initial city of residence, but we can control how we make choices.  We can 
choose to deliberate carefully and we can choose to follow the results of our 
deliberation.  We also can choose how we behave in the theater and how we approach 
adult education overall.  Book 10 gives us the confidence that by doing so, as Socrates 
says in closing the Republic, “both in this world and on the thousand-year journey we 









 Clearly a central question of Plato’s Republic, if not the question, is whether the 
just life or the unjust life is the superior one.  Socrates’ quest to answer that question 
takes us on a journey through diverse interlinked topics including (but not limited to) the 
normative structures of the soul and the city, being and the knowing of being, the good 
and the beautiful, etc.281  In so doing, he needs to surmount the problem that his 
conception of a) justice itself, b) the just act, and c) the just person, all differ greatly from 
the then common views of those items.  With respect to the nature of the just person, 
the many consider the just person in terms of things external to the soul (i.e. a just 
person is a person who consistently refrains from unjust acts).  Socrates primarily 
regards a just person in terms of ‘internal’ matters (e.g. reason-led harmony of the soul, 
knowledge of the Forms).  Harmony of the soul implies some notion about the internals 
of a soul, a topic that was probably undiscussed prior to Plato.  Further, discussions of 
matters internal to the soul necessarily call forth external metaphors, images, and 
language.  When Socrates speaks of one thing in the soul “pulling against” another 
thing (ἀνθέλκει 4.439b), we are thrust into the world of the physical as we attempt to 
understand the psychic.   
 These three problems—a new view on what constitutes a just person, a first 
inquiry into the internals of the soul, and the inherent linguistic difficulties of discussing 
                                            
 
 
281 In modern terms, we would say that he travels through many of the fields of modern 
philosophy (e.g. metaphysics, epistemology, aesthetics, political philosophy, and, of 






psychic matters using ordinary language—pose a significant challenge for Plato.  For 
this reason, on my reading, he starts slowly, introducing provisional accounts of key 
matters that promote initial understanding, but subsequently get refined, revised, or 
even subverted.  Thus, he famously, and sensibly on my view, starts with the politically 
oriented notion of the parts of the citizenry. 
 Instead of running away from the linguistic difficulties inherent in describing 
psychic matters, Socrates embraces analogy and metaphor, first constructing a city and 
then testing to see whether a soul has parts that resemble the parts of the city.  In the 
Book 4 passage that I named ‘The Inquiry into Soul-Parts’ we get a picture of the soul 
that has three main parts, focusing on how the internal interplay of those parts results in 
an action.  It is left unclear, at that point, whether the parts are themselves the agents of 
the actions under discussion, or rather whether the parts lack agentic capacity, all 
agency residing, rather in the individual.  Socrates avoids any direct assertions that the 
soul’s parts are agent-like, but the metaphors and analogies certainly suggest that this 
might be the case.   
In addition, Socrates insists that the account will be imprecise.  And the reader 
who reads the Republic with the entire dialogue in mind knows that Socrates is serious 
about this.  This picture of the soul we have at the conclusion to ‘The Inquiry into Soul-
Parts’ (4.441c) is a good first step but not the last word.  In addition to our lack of clarity 
about whether the soul-parts are agent-like, we also don’t know much about how 
knowledge fits into the picture.  In describing soul-parts, Socrates says that calculation 
(4.439c) is what resists the desire to drink and that calculating about the better and the 






haven’t heard about deliberation (βουλεύω).282  And we certainly don’t know anything 
about knowledge of the Forms.  Nevertheless, we have a good first approximation of a 
philosophy of action.  When faced with a decision, often different parts of the soul are in 
conflict.  There is a struggle, and one side ‘wins’.  But we don’t really have any idea as 
to why sometimes we follow our (say) desire and at other times we follow our 
calculation about the better and the worse.  Nevertheless, the partite story and the city 
soul analogy have given us a good first step in thinking about the soul with respect to  
single actions.     
 Building on this initial picture of the soul, Socrates then turns his attention from 
how the soul behaves in matters of single actions to how the soul is in terms of a 
person’s whole life.  This move is necessary if he is to get to the fundamental question 
of which life is the better one, the life of a just person or the life of an unjust person.  
The picture that he has painted of a tripartite soul helps Socrates explain the notion of 
psychic harmony led by reason, which is his initial picture of a perfectly just individual.  
In painting this picture of the perfectly just individual, Socrates often portrays the soul-
parts as if they were agentic.  This continues when he describes four paradigmatic 
unjust individuals.  Although partite-agency is still left unclear, it is quite easy to imagine 
the just person whose appetite-part and spirit-part agree to follow the lead of her 
reason-part.  Similarly, it is quite easy to imagine a specific unjust individual as one 
whose money-loving part has taken control, causing the reason-part and the spirit-part 
to do its bidding.  
                                            
 
 







 In between the picture of the perfectly just man and of the four unjust types 
comes the seemingly digressive interlude of Books 5-7.  Of course, though, this 
interlude is not at all digressive.  It is necessary in order to allow Socrates to suggest his 
new conception of justice itself (the Form of Justice as illuminated by the Form of the 
Good) and the just act (the act that participates in the Form of Justice).  These new 
conceptions allow Socrates to significantly enhance his picture of the perfectly just 
individual.  Without abandoning the idea of a soul in harmony, Socrates (in Books 5-7) 
never mentions soul-parts, focusing, rather, on the role of knowledge in acting justly.283   
 The picture of the perfectly just and the four unjust individuals represent a 
refinement and a necessary second step, moving the focus from single actions to the 
person as a whole.  We now have some idea about what often makes one part win in 
certain kinds of cases, namely that it is the part that largely controls the character of the 
individual (for example, the timocrat’s honor-loving part most often wins).  But this 
seems too simple; even if we thought that John was controlled by his honor-loving part, 
he doesn’t always act consistently.  Indeed, the four paradigmatic vicious character 
types all seem idiosyncratically specific, consistent, and simple—to such an extent that 
we are left with doubts about how realistic they are meant to be.  For this reason, the 
reader is left questioning Socrates’ picture of the person as a whole.  Further, although 
Books 5-7 have given us some idea about how knowledge plays a role in the case of 
the Philosopher-King, we still don’t have a very good picture of how knowledge or 
deliberation play a role in people who are not Philosopher-Kings.  
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 Thus we come to the end of Book 9 with an enhanced notion of a) the nature of 
the soul, b) the nature of the just life, and c) the superiority of the just life, but also with 
important unanswered questions about each. With respect to (a), we are still wondering 
whether the soul is indeed tripartite and whether the person is the agent of all his 
actions or rather parts of his soul are.  With respect to (b) we are still wondering about 
whether a just life depends on soul-parts and their ordering, knowledge of the Forms, 
both, or something else that only a ‘longer way’ discussion can reveal.  And with respect 
to (c), since only the perfectly just person has been discussed, we are left wondering 
about the extent to which somebody who is not perfectly just, but seems to be a pretty 
decent person all the same, lives a flourishing life. 
 Book 10, on my view, offers significant assistance in dealing with these open 
questions.  With respect to (a), I have argued that although Book 10 certainly does not 
provide a clear and unambiguous picture of the nature of the soul, it does fully 
undermine both the notion that there are three main ‘parts’ of the soul, as well as the 
notion that anything except the person as a whole has agency; the person emerges as 
the only actor.  Along with the deflation of the notion of agent-like parts, though, comes 
a question.  If a person is not the way he or she is because a particular part is dominant, 
what does make a person ‘the way he or she is’?  On my view, Book 10 pushes us to 
reexamine the entire Republic with a downplaying of any focus on parts, focusing, 
rather, directly on the person as a whole.  And when read that focus, I have argued, the 
notions of character and character traits emerge as the dominant factors in what makes 
people ‘the way they are’.  Both character and character traits are described in relative 






more virtuous or healthy than another person.  Similarly, Glaucon is described as 
characteristically courageous, but Achilles might be even more courageous.  
 Along with this reexamination, on my view, comes a better, though still not full, 
understanding about question (b).  A just life need not be a matter of an ordering of the 
parts; we can talk about character without getting bogged down in the ontology of parts.  
I have argued that a just life is partly a matter of developing virtuous character traits 
such as courage, generosity, intellectual energy, etc.  As to how knowledge of the 
Forms fits in, although the picture is still very open (perhaps waiting for the ‘longer way’ 
discussion), Book 10’s contribution to clearing up question (c) also helps here.  Both 
halves of Book 10 (the renewed attack on poetry and the Myth of Er) give us confidence 
that although Books 2-9 focus almost exclusively on perfect justice, people of decent 
character who are less than perfectly just (and who certainly lack knowledge of the 
Forms) still may be judged to be just by right-thinking people and by the gods.  In 
addition, they can live relatively flourishing lives, thanks to the degree of virtue that they 
do possess, thereby setting to rest the worry inherent in question (c). 
 Thus Book 10 pushes us ahead a third step.  The emphasis on character, 
deliberation, and habituation begins to fill out a story which seems reasonable.  
Character is self-forming.  Each time we make a choice, we incrementally build our own 
character traits, and thus our own character.  At any given moment, if faced with a 
choice, our current character, coupled with external circumstances and other factors 
(such as our energy for deliberation at that moment, the strength of various desires, 
etc.), result in a choice.  Our character is complex; most of us have some good 






of the allegorical reading of the Myth of Er, we get assessed by ourselves, the people 
around us, and perhaps the gods, certainly about our character in respect of specific 
character traits (we think that John is or is not generous), and perhaps in terms of being 
‘reasonably good people’ or not, overall.   
 Certainly many questions remain to be investigated, for the story is by no means 
complete.  Plato never puts Socrates to work to inquire directly into the nature of 
character (as he does with respect to so many other topics).  Perhaps Plato himself was 
working his way through the issue of the nature of the soul and how it fits with his 
philosophical commitments with respect to being, knowledge of being, the beautiful, etc.  
Certainly he was a keen observer of human behavior and the psychology of the people 
around him.  As is so often the case with other issues, Plato opened some of the key 
questions about character.  Most modern philosophers who work on virtue and ethics 
tend to look toward Aristotle as a starting point.  On my view, though, mining the 
Republic (as well as Phaedrus, Phaedo, etc.) for Socrates’ comments on character can 
offer additional value to those philosophers. 
 As noted in the introduction, this dissertation was motivated, in part, by several 
puzzles.  Leaving the first puzzle (regarding the status of Book 10) aside for a moment, 
the second puzzle was the active debate between ‘realists’ and ‘deflationists’ about soul 
parts.  By the end of Book 9, both realists and deflationists have ample evidence to 
point to in defense of their reading; and the major 20th century commentators ignore 
Book 10.  But along the line of Rachel Barney’s interpretive strategy, it is natural to look 






It turns out, on my view, that Book 10 does indeed contribute to our overall 
understanding of the status of soul-parts in the Republic, and in so doing reveals itself 
as more than simply an appendix.  Both Book 10’s aesthetics and the myth, on my view, 
help push us toward a deflationist view of soul-parts and impel us to look for answers 
about the nature of the just and unjust life that are not dependent on agent-like soul-
parts. 
This brings us to the third puzzle, namely, how one should refer to the soul as a 
whole, the true moral agent, in its moral status?  For me, the odd notions of character 
and character types portrayed in Books 4 and 8-9 did not provide a satisfying answer.  
Again, Book 10, on my reading, plays a key role in bringing us back to consider the 
characters of most people; who fit neither into the category of perfectly just nor neatly 
into any of the four character types “worth mentioning” in Books 8 and 9.  We are 
therefore moved to reexamine the entire text for a more believable notion of character 
types. The picture of character development, character traits and overall character of 
varying degrees of virtue, on my view, provides that more believable picture.  
But as the reader works through the third puzzle, on my view, a fourth puzzle 
comes to the surface.  By the end of Book 9, only perfect virtue has been discussed; a 
state of character which most readers will never develop.  This leaves one wondering 
about the moral status of the many decent people who are not perfectly virtuous, but are 
certainly not vicious.  Again Book 10 provides assistance in solving this puzzle.  By 
quietly lowering the bar for virtue, Socrates assures the reader that many people have a 
reasonable opportunity to develop a decent character, live a flourishing life, and be 






This then brings us to a place where we can address the first puzzle, namely that 
apart from those with an interest in aesthetics, the nature of the immortal soul, or 
Platonic myths, Book 10 had been largely ignored in the literature for over 1000 years, 
up to and including 20th century philosophers, who regarded Book 10 as an 
‘excrescence’ or an ‘appendix’.  Certainly, on the surface, it seems as if Reeve might 
have been accurate in opening his introduction to Book 10 with the words: “The main 
argument of the Republic is now complete”.284  On the other hand, I am impressed by 
the arguments of commentators who argued that the Republic is, like a number of 
Plato’s dialogues as well as other texts, composed as a ring composition.285  This would 
make Book 10 anything but an appendix.  Although none of their accounts of Book 10 
are consistent with my own, I am struck by Barney’s comments about structure.  She 
writes that  
the recognition of ring-structures, and their methodological functions, can help us 
to solve interpretive puzzles large and small. This is a weak claim: obviously we 
need to figure out as much as we can about the design of Plato’s works in order 
to get their content right…resolution is a complex and variable business. In 
philosophical works, we should expect a resolution to answer open questions, 
correct provisional hypotheses, relocate half-truths and revise earlier arguments 
on the basis of intervening principles.286 (italics mine) 
 
It is unsurprising, then, that on my view Book 10 has something to offer on topics in 
addition to aesthetics and the nature of the immortal soul. 
  
                                            
 
 
284 Grube/Reeve (1992, 264). 
285 As previously cited, Brann (2004) and Barney (2010) argue that the Republic was composed as a ring 
composition.  McPherran (2003) argues that the Phaedo and the Apology–Crito–Phaedo are composed 
as ring-compositions. 






As we worked through the various puzzles, Book 10 emerged as a key part of the 
evolving story of the human soul and the nature of just character.  Therefore, far from 
being an excrescence, I claim that Book 10 is essential in answering the challenge 
posed by Glaucon and Adeimantus in Book 2, namely, why should somebody like me 
choose the just life, if I could act unjustly and not be caught.  Socrates’ answer, in Book 
10, is that we will live the best possible life if we 
always keep to the upper road and practice justice with prudence in every way 
so that we shall be friends to ourselves and the gods, both while we remain here 
and when we reap the rewards for it like the victors who go about gathering in 
the prizes. And so here and in the thousand year journey that we have described 
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